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Can we prove time protection?

Authors

Gernot Heiser, Toby Murray and Gerwin Klein

Data61, CSIRO, Australia
UNSW, Australia

Published:

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.08338.pdf

Abstract

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect applications from information leakage through timing channels. Based on a recently-proposed implementation of time protection in the seL4 microkernel, we investigate how such an implementation could be formally proved to prevent timing channels. We postulate that this should be possible by reasoning about a highly abstracted representation of the shared hardware resources that cause timing channels.

BibTeX Entry

  @article{Heiser_MK_19_1,
    numpages         = {6},
    author           = {Gernot Heiser and Toby Murray and Gerwin Klein},
    month            = jan,
    year             = {2019},
    howpublished     = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.08338.pdf},
    title            = {Can We Prove Time Protection?},
    journal          = {{arXiv} preprint arXiv:1901.08338}
  }

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