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A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware

Authors

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock and Gernot Heiser

Data61
CSIRO

UNSW

University of Adelaide

Abstract

Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware state though timing. We survey recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they are relevant for cloud computing. We classify types of attacks according to a taxonomy of the shared resources leveraged for such attacks. Moreover, we take a detailed look at attacks used against shared caches. We survey existing countermeasures. We finally discuss trends in the attacks, challenges to combating them, and future directions, especially with respect to hardware support.

BibTeX Entry

  @article{Ge_YCH_16,
    doi              = {10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6},
    journal          = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
    author           = {Ge, Qian and Yarom, Yuval and Cock, David and Heiser, Gernot},
    month            = dec,
    volume           = {-},
    year             = {2016},
    keywords         = {microarchitectural timing attacks, cache-based timing attacks, countermeasures, trend in the attacks},
    title            = {A Survey of Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary Hardware},
    pages            = {1-27}
  }

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