Towards Verified Microkernels for Real-Time Mixed-Criticality Systems

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Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

Today's embedded systems are becoming increasingly complex. We are seeing many devices consolidate both mission-critical real-time subsystems with convenience functionality such as networking stacks and graphical user interfaces. For example, medical implants such as pacemakers now provide wireless monitoring and control; bugs within the wireless subsystem must not be able to affect the safety-critical real-time operations of the pacemaker. Traditionally, this is achieved by using multiple processors with limited communication channels. However, these extra processors add significant overheads of size, weight and power.

The mixed-criticality design promises to mitigate these overheads by consolidating multiple subsystems onto a single CPU, but this entails both mission-critical and convenience functionality sharing the same processor. In order to enforce isolation between subsystems of differing criticalities, we require a trustworthy supervisor to mediate control over the processor and provide behavioural guarantees.

In this thesis, we explore several ingredients required to construct a high-assurance mixed-criticality real-time system. We propose that the formal verification and design of the seL4 microkernel makes it highly suited as a trustworthy foundation for these systems. We show how to compute interrupt response time guarantees which complement seL4's guarantees of functional correctness. We also explore the design space for such microkernels, which must balance the competing goals of formal verification and real-time responsiveness. We investigate the limits of interrupt latency for non-preemptible microkernels, and question whether fully-preemptible kernels are necessary for low-interrupt latency applications.

We show that C can achieve equivalent performance to hand-optimised assembly for performance-critical kernel code, thereby allowing such code to be formally verified using C verification frameworks and maintain trustworthiness.

We also present a practical framework for applying the capabilities of model checkers and SMT solvers to reason about compiled binaries. This framework can automatically detect infeasible paths and compute loop bounds, increasing the accuracy and the trustworthiness of response time guarantees.

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Abstract

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In this thesis, we explore several ingredients required to construct a high-assurance mixed-criticality real-time system. We propose that the formal verification and design of the seL4 microkernel makes it highly suited as a trustworthy foundation for these systems. We show how to compute interrupt response time guarantees which complement seL4’s guarantees of functional correctness. We also explore the design space for such microkernels, which must balance the competing goals of formal verification and real-time responsiveness. We investigate the limits of interrupt latency for non-preemptible microkernels, and question whether fully-preemptible kernels are necessary for low-interrupt latency applications.

We show that C can achieve equivalent performance to hand-optimised assembly for performance-critical kernel code, thereby allowing such code to be formally verified using C verification frameworks and maintain trustworthiness.

We also present a practical framework for applying the capabilities of model checkers and SMT solvers to reason about compiled binaries. This framework can automatically detect infeasible paths and compute loop bounds, increasing the accuracy and the trustworthiness of response time guarantees.
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List of Publications

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Embedded systems are ubiquitous today—we interact with them without even knowing. We entrust our lives to many of these embedded systems such as medical implants, industrial automation controllers, engine controllers and avionics systems. These are hard real-time high-criticality systems, where failure is unacceptable and may lead to loss of life.

The safe operation of these systems depends on the functional correctness of the software and the timeliness of its responses. Such systems must be able to react to asynchronous events from external stimuli within a specific deadline, regardless of any other activities currently executing. For example, airbag controllers in a car must reliably deploy an airbag within milliseconds of an impact being detected; similarly, pacemakers must be able to deliver precisely timed electrical pulses to the heart.

As these systems are becoming increasingly important in our daily lives, the manufacturers of these systems also seek to gain a competitive advantage by adding convenience features to their devices. For example, many embedded devices today incorporate wireless and Bluetooth networking stacks, and run a built-in web server for configuration. This extra functionality adds a significant amount of complexity and code, and is not critical to the system’s primary function. It is important that these low-criticality subsystems are unable to interfere with the correct operation of high-criticality subsystems.

This is achieved most easily by separating high- and low-criticality subsystems onto different CPUs, with limited communication channels. However, this leads to in-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Figure 1.1: Traditional system designs (left) isolate real-time components onto separate processors. A trustworthy microkernel or hypervisor (right) can be used to provide strong isolation between trusted and untrusted components executing on a single processor.

Increased size, weight and power consumption (SWaP), as well as greater cost and design complexity. A prominent example of these concerns can be seen in modern cars, which have up to 100 CPUs, each dedicated to specific subsystems or tasks (Broy et al., 2011).

Mixed-criticality systems offer a path to reduce design and production costs, whilst improving software reuse. The key idea, illustrated in Figure 1.1, is to consolidate both high- and low-criticality subsystems onto a single processor. Doing so can promote software reuse, simplify communication between subsystems, ease debugging and thus speed up development.

The challenge in creating mixed-criticality systems is ensuring that the behaviour of a low-criticality component is unable to affect the correct operation of high-criticality components. Low-criticality components may be faulty due to software bugs or could have been maliciously compromised. Mixed-criticality systems must be constructed with strong guarantees of isolation between components—in particular, preserving the behaviour of high-criticality components in all circumstances.

In this thesis, we explore various aspects of building hard real-time mixed-criticality systems that provide strong guarantees of isolation. We build upon prior work on the seL4 microkernel (Klein et al., 2009b) which is able to give guarantees of functional isolation backed by the strength of machine-checked mathematical proof. Functional isolation ensures that components cannot interfere with the memory or other state
This thesis explores the interaction between formal verification, operating system design, and real-time requirements, and how to combine them to build trustworthy mixed-criticality systems.

of one another. However, it does not address the interactions between components caused by their effects on execution time.

We focus this thesis on the ability to provide usable guarantees on the timing behaviour of a mixed-criticality system, without compromising functional isolation. We do not address total temporal isolation between components—in particular, a malfunctioning high-criticality component may be able to affect a low-criticality component. Nor do we address the possibility of covert communication channels, although the results from our work are essential to addressing these concerns.

Instead, this thesis is concerned with ensuring that high-criticality real-time subsystems are able to meet their deadlines, regardless of the actions of low-criticality subsystems. In particular, we look at measuring and managing the worst-case interrupt latency of the operating system (OS) kernel. We examine how aspects of formal verification interact with the worst-case interrupt latency of a system, and how these demands influence kernel design (Figure 1.2). Finally, we investigate whether average-case performance is degraded by the needs of formal verification.

We limit our investigation and analysis to uniprocessor systems, choosing to delve deeper into the design of such systems, rather than attempting to address the wide array of complexities introduced by multiple processors. Multiprocessor systems add
additional concerns for analysing both worst-case execution time and proving strong correctness guarantees through formal methods. We build upon a rich foundation of prior work towards high-assurance real-time uniprocessor systems, which is not yet as mature or as advanced for their multiprocessor counterparts.

1.1 On meeting deadlines

Real-time systems are characterised by the need to complete their computations within specific deadlines. They can be broadly categorised according to the severity of the consequences of missing a deadline, as follows:

- **hard real-time**: missing any deadline is catastrophic, resulting in complete system failure;
- **soft real-time**: missing some deadlines can be tolerated—each missed deadline results in degraded system performance; and
- **best-effort** (not real-time): such systems have no strict deadlines which affect the operation of the system.

Systems traditionally dedicate individual processors to real-time tasks (sometimes referred to as a **federated** design). With no other tasks executing on the processor which could interfere, it is reasonably easy to guarantee that real-time deadlines are met. In mixed-criticality systems, this is no longer true: there will almost certainly be lower-criticality tasks executing which may affect real-time performance. In particular, these lower-criticality tasks may induce the kernel to disable interrupts for prolonged periods of time. It is the responsibility of the system designer to ensure that these non-interruptible periods do not compromise the real-time components.

In an event-driven system where external interrupts initiate any activity, the OS kernel plays a significant role in ensuring that real-time deadlines are met. The kernel must provide guarantees on the **worst-case interrupt latency**—i.e. the longest possible length of time between the arrival of an external interrupt and the execution of its respective interrupt handling routine. In general, this is determined by two factors: (1) the longest duration for which interrupts are disabled on the CPU, and (2) the execution time of the code performing interrupt delivery. Both of these can be determined using techniques for analysing **worst-case execution time** (WCET).
In this thesis, we consider the mixed-criticality model, and assume that lower-
criticality tasks may be malicious (e.g. they may be compromised and therefore 
execute arbitrary code). It should be possible to guarantee that even if a compo-
nent is compromised, components at higher criticality levels remain unaffected and 
continue to meet their deadlines. This depends on having safe upper bounds on the 
worst-case execution time of the kernel, which we address in Chapter 3.

1.2 On correct operation

A kernel which can guarantee that real-time deadlines are met is useless if it mal-
fuctions, crashes, or is compromised. In particular, in our threat model of mixed-
criticality real-time systems with compromised components, we must expect that an 
attacker will attempt to exploit any bugs in the system. This is not unreasonable 
given, for example, recent exploits demonstrated on modern cars by Checkoway et al. 
(2011), who were able to gain control over key components (including the engine 
and brakes) via the CD player, Bluetooth wireless and even over a GSM connection. 
To this end, we require not only a kernel with sound temporal guarantees, but also 
one that provides strong guarantees of functional correctness and isolation.

In order to build high-assurance mixed-criticality systems, the trusted computing 
base must be kept as small as possible. The trusted computing base refers to the 
set of all components (both hardware and software) which are critical to the correct 
operation of the system. In particular, a bug in the trusted computing base can 
compromise the security or reliability of the system. We assert that for mixed-
criticality systems, the OS responsible for enforcing isolation must be kept as small 
as possible—a notion shared by the design concepts of microkernels (Liedtke, 1995), 
microvisors (Heiser and Leslie, 2010) and exokernels (Engler et al., 1995).

seL4 (Klein et al., 2009b) is a third-generation microkernel, broadly based on the 
concepts of L4 (Liedtke, 1995). It provides familiar OS abstractions such as vir-
tual address spaces, threads, synchronous and asynchronous communication, and 
capabilities (Dennis and Van Horn, 1966) for access control and confinement.

The distinguishing feature of seL4 is that it is the first general-purpose operating sys-
tem kernel to be formally verified, with a machine-checked formal proof that the C 
code implementation adheres to the functional specification of the kernel. Recently, 
the seL4 team have extended this proof to the compiled assembly code (Sewell et al.,
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

There are some convenient byproducts of the correctness proofs—in particular, they additionally imply that seL4 will never perform a (functionally) unsafe operation or crash due to a software error, and that all operations will eventually terminate.

Built on top of the proof of functional correctness, are proofs that seL4 enforces integrity (Sewell et al., 2011)—i.e. that the ability to modify any state of a component is restricted to only those subsystems with the appropriate authority. When applied to the context of mixed-criticality systems, this ensures that the functional behaviour of a completely isolated component is unaffected by the actions of other software running on the same CPU.

The work presented in thesis leverages seL4’s ability to provide strong isolation and functional correctness guarantees. Acceptable real-time performance was a key design goal of seL4. However, this was not quantified until we performed a worst-case execution time analysis of seL4, as described in Chapter 3. The results of our analysis showed that seL4 required several improvements to make it suitable for industrial real-time applications. Our efforts to improve seL4’s real-time performance were constrained by the demands of formal verification. We explore the compromises between real-time performance and formal verification in Chapter 4. We also demonstrate in Chapter 5 that by forgoing the requirements imposed by formal verification, we can reduce latencies even further, without the need for a fully-preemptible kernel design and still maintain high levels of assurance.

1.3 Research contributions and thesis outline

By combining a sound response time analysis with isolation and correctness guarantees that are backed by the strength of mathematical proof, we can create a trustworthy platform for building high-performance mixed-criticality hard real-time systems with unprecedented levels of confidence. This is the overarching goal of the work contained herein.

The structure of this thesis is aligned with the key research contributions to achieve this goal. These contributions are the following:

• We successfully compute the WCET of the complete seL4 microkernel—the
first such published WCET analysis of any protected general-purpose operating system kernel. (Chapter 3)

- We examine the trade-offs between achieving good interrupt response times and formal verification of microkernels, as part of a case study in improving the interrupt response time of the seL4 microkernel. (Chapter 4)

- We investigate the limits of how low interrupt response times can be reduced within a non-preemptible kernel, and compare it to what may be possible with a fully-preemptible kernel. (Chapter 5)

- We apply model checking to executable binaries, to automatically compute upper bounds on the iteration count of loops, and to prove (or disprove) specific properties given by the user. (Chapter 6)

- We demonstrate a new technique to automate much of the labour-intensive, error-prone manual annotation work that is required to achieve tight upper bounds on the worst-case execution time. (Chapter 7)

- We show that performance-critical code, such as the as IPC fastpath used in seL4, can be implemented in C rather than assembly, without incurring any significant performance penalty, and remain amenable to formal verification. (Chapter 8)
Chapter 2

Background

This thesis presents several different but related aspects of designing and analysing trustworthy, mixed-criticality, real-time systems. In this chapter, we give an overview of the broader area of mixed-criticality systems and their trustworthiness for mission-critical real-time applications, as well as the worst-case execution time problem. Additionally, each chapter will also give a more specific overview of related work to contextualise the material presented therein:

- **Section 3.2** gives an overview of past WCET analyses of real-time operating systems code.

- **Section 4.7** looks at previous work in the area of formal verification and kernel design of real-time systems.

- **Section 5.2** focuses specifically on previous work towards analysing and implementing preemptibility in OS kernels.

- **Section 6.2** highlights previous work on static analysis of binaries, including control flow graph reconstruction and loop bound computation.

- **Section 7.6** reviews previous work on infeasible path detection for WCET analyses.

- **Section 8.2** summarises previous work on using higher level languages for micro-optimisations.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Real-time application domains

Real-time systems are required in many different application domains. A common feature of all real-time systems is that they demand guaranteed upper bounds on response time. However, the magnitude of this bound is application-dependent and can vary significantly. For example, as outlined in Figure 2.1, industrial automation systems requiring motion control may need response times in the order of tens of microseconds, while systems such as traffic light controllers can tolerate response times in the order of seconds. Many industrial applications are controlled using programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which are dedicated hard real-time systems designed for interfacing with physical sensors and actuators. The typical response times expected from these can be as low as one millisecond.

As Figure 2.1 shows, there is a difference of several orders of magnitude between the clock speeds of modern embedded processors (nanoseconds) and the latency requirements of high-end real-time applications (tens of microseconds). However, designing a system that can guarantee a given response time requires careful thought and analysis. In particular, as memory access times are 1-2 orders of magnitude slower than CPU speeds, it is easy to unknowingly write code with long latencies (in particular, long worst-case latencies).

This thesis focuses on creating real-time systems covering the full range of possible application domains. As such, we ultimately target the 10–100 μs end of the spectrum (in Chapter 5), and explore what is required to reach this goal, without compromising on trustworthiness.

2.2 Designing trustworthy mixed-criticality systems

Mixed-criticality real-time systems consolidate mission-critical with less critical functionality on a single processor, in order to reduce cost, weight and power consumption, and improve software re-use. Examples include the integrated modular avionics architecture (ARINC, 2012), and the integration of automotive control and convenience functionality with infotainment (Hergenhan and Heiser, 2008).

In a typical mixed-criticality system, the high-criticality components contain at most 10 000 to 100 000 lines of code. In comparison, the low-criticality components may have millions of lines of code, and it is unrealistic to certify these components to the
Figure 2.1: Putting latency into perspective: typical latency requirements of various application domains on the right (Graf, 2012), compared with the execution time of various CPU operations on a modern embedded processor on the left. Note that the time scale is logarithmic.
same level as high-criticality ones. Safely consolidating both high- and low-criticality components on the same processor demands strong isolation.

This isolation is provided by a supervisory OS such as a microkernel or hypervisor. Each component is encapsulated within an isolated address space, with protection enforced by hardware mechanisms that are configured by the OS. As the supervisor OS has full control over the system, it must be certified to at least the same level as the highest-criticality component.

Design standards for both safety- and security-critical software are now encouraging more pervasive use of formal methods throughout the design, development and testing phases. For example, IEC 61508 dictates functional safety standards for various industry applications, and highly recommends model-based testing and formal verification for systems requiring the highest level of safety integrity (Int, 1998). Similarly, the NIST Common Criteria define a range of “Evaluation Assurance Levels” from EAL1, for non-critical systems, up to EAL7, for mission-critical systems in high-risk environments (NIST). Levels 5 to 7 require formal methods in the design, verification and testing.

The push for formal methods stems from the potential dangers arising from faulty software. In contrast to traditional empirical testing-based validation, formal methods can offer significantly stronger assurances. However, both formal methods and traditional testing have associated financial costs for industry. In order to minimise cost, these efforts should be focused only where they are required.

### 2.2.1 Fully-preemptible vs non-preemptible kernel models

A fundamental design issue for kernels is whether they should be constructed as fully preemptible or non-preemptible.

The traditional real-time operating system (RTOS) design uses a fully-preemptible kernel, which means that the kernel is “interruptible by default”—interruptions are expected to occur almost anywhere in the kernel. For code that cannot be interrupted (e.g. code which accesses shared data structures), interrupts are explicitly disabled to avoid preemption. In addition to accessing shared data, other uninterruptible sequences include kernel entry and exit, interrupt dispatching and some hardware accesses. On a multi-processor system, disabling interrupts is combined with spin locks to prevent other CPUs from concurrently accessing data. Uninterruptible code
paths must be kept short in order to minimise the kernel’s interrupt latency.

The alternative design, referred to as non-preemptible, disables interrupts by default while the kernel is executing, resulting in a much simpler kernel design and implementation, as concurrency issues are avoided. The resulting RTOS code is easier to understand, debug and reason about. It also simplifies the process of formally proving the functional correctness of the code, something that is presently considered infeasible for preemptible programs given their high levels of concurrency (Klein et al., 2009b). The simplicity also tends to result in better average-case performance, which is the reason this approach has traditionally been taken in L4 microkernels.

RTOS designers, even when targeting high-performance processors typically used for protected-mode systems, aim to achieve worst-case interrupt latencies in the order of tens of microseconds or less. While this allows for a fair amount of computation, it is difficult (if not impossible) to design a practical RTOS where all system calls are so short. However, the interrupt latency of non-preemptible kernels can be reduced by adding preemption points in long-running kernel operations. At a preemption point, if a pending interrupt is detected, the current operation is postponed so that the interrupt can be handled. Preemption points introduce a limited and controlled form of concurrency. The approach requires that kernel data structures be in consistent states when a preemption occurs. Furthermore, the designer should ensure that the interrupted operations are eventually completed, and that high interrupt rates do not impede progress.

The fully-preemptible design makes sense for a classical, unprotected RTOS, where most interrupts can be handled with minimal switching of state. Such RTOSes can achieve interrupt latencies of up to a few hundred cycles. Hofer et al. (2009) have achieved latencies bordering on the limits of the hardware by taking advantage of the CPU’s interrupt dispatcher for scheduling. However, this was done at the expense of any memory protection, as all threads execute in system mode. Real-time systems are becoming increasingly complex, running large software stacks which are hard to debug and assure when using a flat address-space model. Given these pressures, the unprotected RTOS design is reaching its limit.

Mixed-criticality systems demand strong isolation between subsystems, which requires trustable memory safety (typically provided by hardware-enforced memory protection, but could be a software-based solution). It also entails that hardware interrupts should be handled in userspace. As such, the factors influencing the de-
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

The design of such a kernel are significantly different to an unprotected RTOS. We explore this further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Furthermore, embedded processors are becoming faster, and latencies in the order of 10,000 to 100,000 cycles are acceptable in many situations. For example, 1 GHz processors are increasingly common on modern high-end embedded devices and can execute 100,000 cycles in 100 $\mu$s—adequate for many applications. Hence, a fully preemptible kernel is generally not necessary to meet real-time requirements (except where ultra-low latencies are required) provided that the kernel can deliver reasonable interrupt latency guarantees.

In the fully-preemptible design, it is also much more difficult to reason formally (or even informally) about the behavior of the kernel, and adds complexity to development and testing. It requires very careful coding of the interrupt paths, and defensively analysing that at every point in the kernel an interrupt cannot crash the kernel or make its state inconsistent. It also degrades the average-case performance of the kernel due to locking overheads, which in-turn consumes more power, thereby reducing the battery life of portable devices.

Analysing concurrency issues within a fully-preemptible kernel is extremely challenging due to the explosion of possible interleavings to consider and the difficulty in reproducing timing-related bugs. Formal verification of a fully-preemptible kernel has not yet been achieved although there has been some progress (Feng et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Baumann et al., 2012).

In addition to unprotected RTOSes and high-assurance kernels for mixed-criticality systems, there exist monolithic operating systems such as Windows, Linux or Mac OS. In such systems, kernel operations can execute for a long time. Under a non-preemptible design, limiting the WCET would require a very large number of pre-emption points, resulting in negligible gain over a preemptible approach due to the added complexity. As such, monolithic kernels are typically fully-preemptible. However, such kernels are a poor choice for high-assurance mixed-criticality systems, as their trusted computing base is in the order of millions of lines of code.

2.2.2 Event-triggered vs time-triggered system designs

Any real-time system is concerned with responding to external stimuli. There are two broad categories of systems based on how they are designed to respond to these
stimuli, known as *event-triggered* systems and *time-triggered* systems (sometimes referred to as state-based systems).

In an event-triggered system, external stimuli are delivered via an interrupt to the CPU. Depending on the system software, the interrupt may be handled immediately, or after some non-interruptible operation has completed. In either circumstance, the CPU processes the interrupt *as soon as possible*. Viewed differently, the execution of the CPU is governed largely in response to external stimuli. This is the common approach used for building non-safety critical systems.

In contrast, a time-triggered system is driven by periodically monitoring (polling) the state of some object, and taking action when changes in state are observed. Time-triggered systems are governed by a fixed schedule, and provide significantly more deterministic behaviour than event-triggered systems.

*Kopetz (1991)* gives a comparison between the two types of systems, based on classifying events as either *predictable* or *chance* events. The occurrence of predictable events is *a priori*, and therefore the system designer can anticipate them and allocate the required resources ahead of time. Chance events cannot be predicted, and therefore neither can their occurrence be limited. To compensate for this, event-triggered systems must introduce mechanisms to control the flow of such events, such as buffers and low-pass filters. On the other hand, a time-triggered system implicitly provides such flow control by design. This avoids the need for testing scenarios with high rates of chance events. Such testing can only be done with simulated loads for event-triggered systems, and still does not guarantee correct behaviour under all possible loads.

*Scheler and Schröder-Preikschat (2006)* more recently analysed the design considerations when choosing between time-triggered and event-triggered architectures for real-time systems. They considered several non-functional requirements of event- and time-triggered systems, and identified only two criteria where one gives an advantage over the other. They found that fault tolerance is much easier to provide through replication on a time-triggered system, as the schedules of each replica offer convenient synchronisation points. However, event-triggered systems provide lower overall resource utilisation, particularly when some inputs to the system are aperiodic or sporadic in nature.

Others have shown that it is possible to defer the decision of whether to use an event-triggered or time-triggered model and still build the majority of the system,
by using design patterns which can be applied to both models (Scheler and Schröder-Preikschat, 2006; Lakhani and Pont, 2012).

In the context of mixed-criticality systems, although the reliability of high-criticality systems can benefit from a predictable time-triggered solution, low-criticality systems are often comprised of large legacy event-triggered code bases which are not immediately portable to a time-triggered architecture. As such, mixed-criticality systems may need to support aspects of both.

Irrespective of the system design, whether time-triggered or event-triggered, a real-time OS kernel must still provide timing guarantees in order for a complete system schedulability analysis. The work presented in this thesis applies to either design.

2.2.3 Schedulability of mixed-criticality systems

The scheduling of tasks and subsystems plays a fundamental role in a mixed-criticality systems, in order to guarantee that high-criticality tasks are given the CPU time they require to meet their deadlines. A straightforward approach to scheduling is to provide fixed allocations of CPU time on a static schedule. However, this requires the use of pessimistic worst-case execution time estimates to ensure that high-criticality tasks can always meet their deadlines. In practice, this leads to a significantly underutilised system, as the worst cases are rarely experienced.

Vestal (2009) presented a technique to reclaim this spare capacity for lower-criticality tasks for preemptive fixed-priority systems. He observed that tasks of higher criticality levels require more conservatism in their WCET estimates (to satisfy certification requirements), and conversely, lower-criticality tasks can accept much less conservative estimates. He proposed that for a system with \( L \) criticality levels, \( L \) different sets of WCET estimates should be used. He presented methods to use this information to obtain a more precise schedulability analysis with better utilisation.

Baruah et al. (2011) continued this work to derive an optimal method of assigning priorities to tasks (i.e. to maximise the system’s utilisation, and still guarantee schedulability of the system). Mollison et al. (2010) have investigated the issue of mixed-criticality scheduling on multi-core systems, presenting a technique to provide temporal isolation between tasks of different criticality levels, whilst allowing unutilised CPU time to be reallocated.
Baruah and Fohler (2011) have investigated the resource utilisation issue of time-triggered architectures, with a view to creating certifiably correct systems. Under a strictly time-triggered system, constructing schedules for multiple criticalities is NP-hard and therefore can only be done offline. This lack of run-time adaptability limits the maximum utilisation of a system. They show that a modification to the time-triggered paradigm known as *mode change* can ensure that real-time guarantees are still met, and also improve resource utilisation to be on par with event-triggered systems. Similar to the idea of Vestal, described above, two different system schedules are computed: a “certification” schedule, which uses conservative bounds to ensure that all high-criticality tasks can be scheduled; and a “system-designer” schedule, that uses more realistic worst-case estimates (for example, based on measurements), and allows for fuller utilisation of the system. In case of overrunning a deadline in system-designer mode, the system immediately switches to certification mode to ensure that no high-criticality deadlines are missed.

The work presented in this thesis is largely independent of the scheduling approach used by a system. However, the worst-case response times and execution times of the kernel are vital inputs into any schedulability analysis for a mixed-criticality system.

### 2.3 The worst-case execution time problem

The response time of a system is the time between an event arriving, and it being processed (the precise definition of “processed” depends on the application domain). In software-based systems the response time is governed by the time it takes for some program or code to execute.\(^1\) Determining the *worst-case* response time requires computing the worst-case execution time of the relevant code.

Figure 2.2 shows different aspects of “execution time”. Along the bottom of the figure, are the various aspects of a program’s execution time which can be practically observed or measured. Due to the complexity of modern hardware, it is difficult to predict precisely how long a program will take to execute. For a deterministic program, there exists some worst-case hardware state, and similarly some

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\(^1\) There are often hardware delays before the software running on a CPU is even notified of an event, but such delays are outside the scope of this thesis. They are typically in the order of cycles, and so we assume they are negligible compared to the latencies required for software to respond.
best-case hardware state, which maximises or minimises the execution time, respectively. These give rise to the worst-case and best-case execution times. Given an exponential number of possible hardware states, the likelihood that we see the worst or best case through random testing is extremely small. In fact, even knowing what the cases are, it can be extremely difficult to deliberately manipulate the hardware into the required state.

For trustworthy real-time systems, we do not necessarily need to know the true WCET. It suffices to instead have a *safe upper bound* which is guaranteed to be at least as large as the WCET. A hard real-time system must be designed to allow for the safe upper bound. Clearly, if the safe upper bound is significantly larger than the actual WCET, the CPU would remain largely under-utilised. The difference between the actual worst-case and a safe upper bound may be referred to as *tightness*, *pessimism*, *conservatism* or *overestimation*. Tighter safe upper bounds are desirable, as they allow slower (and thus generally cheaper) hardware to be used, while still guaranteeing that deadlines are met.
2.4 Estimating the worst-case execution time

The problem of estimating the worst-case execution time can be broken down into two distinct subproblems (Li et al., 1995). The first involves analysing the program and identifying control structures which may cause long execution times. This includes loop analysis, examining conditionals and analysing recursive function calls. This behaviour is independent of the hardware architecture.

The second subproblem involves applying this knowledge to a specific microarchitecture. The microarchitecture of a system includes the structure of the CPU, its pipelines and all levels of caches and main memory. For a given code path, the microarchitecture can introduce a wide variation in possible execution times depending on the state of other parts of the system. On a simple microprocessor with no caches, a simple pipeline and deterministic instruction execution times, there is no “hidden state” which could affect the execution time of a program. As a result, there is practically no variability in the total execution time of a given code path.

More complex architectures often include features to optimise the common case. These features include:

- deep pipelines,
- instruction caches,
- data caches,
- virtual address translation (MMUs),
- branch prediction,
- speculative execution, and
- out of order execution

The introduction of these features make analysis of the worst case execution time much more difficult, as all of these features rely on some hidden state within the processor. An increase in hidden state causes an exponential growth in the number of possible states the processor could potentially be in. To exhaustively enumerate all possible hidden states quickly becomes infeasible.
Such features also cause a large disparity between best and worst case execution times. For example, data caches are often 10–100 times faster than memory accesses. A safe WCET estimation must assume that memory accesses miss the data cache unless it can prove otherwise.

Caches are the dominant cause of execution time variability in modern embedded systems. Mehnert et al. (2002) show that the use of MMUs and address spaces for isolation did not significantly affect the real-time behaviour of tasks, as the extent of their impact was comparable to that of caches. Features such as branch predictors and other pipeline interactions can be considered second-order effects in comparison.

Complex interactions between different hardware features can create timing anomalies. Timing anomalies arise when an instruction on a code path has multiple possible execution times—specifically, they occur when a locally shorter execution time leads to a longer execution time overall, and vice versa (Lundqvist and Stenström, 1999; Reineke et al., 2006). This means that it is not possible for analysis tools to assume that locally maximising execution time of a given instruction will guarantee the worst-case execution time overall. Instead, more state needs to be maintained throughout the analysis in order to compute a safe upper bound. Cassez et al. (2012) make the distinction between timing anomalies which exist in the hardware itself, and those which arise only due to the hardware abstraction used.

### 2.4.1 Analysis techniques

Wilhelm et al. (2008) have published a comprehensive survey of WCET analysis tools and techniques. In the following sections only the most relevant ideas are summarised.

WCET analysis techniques can be categorised into three classes (Petters et al., 2007):

- **static analysis** attempts to analyse the source code and/or compiled binary without executing it. Using a model of the hardware’s timing properties, it computes conservative estimates at each stage of the analysis in order give an upper bound with absolute confidence.

- **measurement-based analysis** attempts to exercise various code paths to find the worst-case execution path and measure it on real hardware.
hybrid analysis combines both static analysis and measurement-based analysis in order to mitigate issues with unreliable hardware models of modern complex processors.

Safe upper bounds for WCET are generally computed using a combination of static analysis techniques and measurements on real hardware to validate the timing model and/or results (Kirner et al., 2005b; Petters et al., 2007; Seshia and Rakhlin, 2012). WCET bounds based on measurements alone cannot be relied upon—for example, measurement-based upper bounds stated for RTLinux (Yodaiken and Barabanov, 1997) were later shown to be invalid (Mehnert et al., 2001).

### 2.4.2 Static analysis based approaches

Static analysis encompasses a class of techniques used to analyse code without executing it. For the purpose of analysing WCET, there are several different approaches that all use static analysis. Each approach makes a trade-off between accuracy of the analysis and complexity (or time taken to perform the analysis).

Computing the WCET of programs in general is undecidable, as it is equivalent to solving the halting problem. However, by placing reasonable restrictions on programs, we can obtain a tractable problem. For example, by removing the use of recursive functions, self-modifying code and unbounded loops, it can be shown that such programs will always terminate (Kligerman and Stoyenko, 1986; Li and Malik, 1995).

As static analysis never executes code, it requires a model of the architecture the code will be executed on. Such models are often constructed from information made available by the device manufacturer. The accuracy of the result depends largely on the accuracy of the model. Whilst static analysis methods give theoretically safe bounds, an error in the model can invalidate the result and any safety guarantees provided by it. As an example, Avison (2010) has found discrepancies in the timing models given by one prominent CPU manufacturer.

#### Implicit path enumeration

The implicit path enumeration technique (IPET) uses a set of integer linear equations to describe the possible execution paths of a program. Li et al. (1995) first
described this technique and it has since seen widespread use through the literature and in tools developed by industry (Colin and Puaut, 2001a; Ferdinand and Heckmann, 2004; Gustafsson, 2000; Staschulat et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007).

In IPET, the program is first decomposed into a control flow graph of basic blocks. The cost \( c_i \) of executing each basic block can be determined for the processor architecture (or, at least a safe upper bound). A variable \( x_i \) is defined as the number of times a given block will be executed in the program. Variables are also created for the execution count of each edge within the program. These variables are related by structure-defined flow constraints: the execution count of each basic block is equal to the sum of the execution counts of all incoming edges, and similarly for outgoing edges. Extra flow constraints may be added by the user or other analysis tools to eliminate infeasible paths.

Once a set of equations in \( x_i \) have been established, the total cost function to be maximised is the sum-product of each basic block and its execution count:

\[
\text{Execution Time} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i x_i
\]

Together, these form a standard integer linear programming (ILP) problem. Such problems arise in many fields and there has been a significant amount of research effort dedicated to solving ILP problems (Schrijver, 1986). Although solving ILP problems is in general NP-hard, the equations derived from IPET are similar to network-flow problems and therefore exhibit systematic structures which can be solved reasonably quickly with modern ILP solvers (Li et al., 1995).

The IPET technique has been extended to accommodate features of modern embedded processor architectures, including multi-level instruction and data caches (Chattopadhyay and Roychoudhury, 2009) and branch prediction (Burguì`ere and Rochange, 2006). It has also been used in conjunction with other methods, such as abstract interpretation (described below), to refine the ILP equations and thus give tighter WCET estimates.

IPET is the approach implemented by the Chronos tool (Li et al., 2006), which we use for the WCET analyses in this thesis.
Abstract interpretation

Abstract interpretation provides a basis for creating safe approximations of programs in order to analyse their properties (Cousot and Cousot, 1977). It is a technique with a wide range of applications and is often used in compilers and other tools to find bugs and analyse software. Applied to WCET analysis, abstract interpretation can be used to provide a safe approximation of all possible cache states, pipeline states or variable values that can occur at any point in a program (Theiling et al., 2000). This technique is typically combined with IPET to compute a safe upper bound on WCET.

At points in the control flow graph where two paths merge, the sets of possible states (or values) are combined. Merging is necessary in order to manage the potentially exponential number of states which the system may be in. However, this can lead to significant overestimation, as contextual information associated with each state is lost when merged. Without this context, the analysis may proceed to explore bogus states after a merge, resulting in possible solutions which are infeasible in practice. However, the analysis is still guaranteed to be safe—i.e. all possible states and outcomes will be considered, and the result will never be smaller than the true WCET.

Model checking

Model checking can be used to reason about the logical correctness of discrete systems. A model checker is a procedure which decides whether a given abstract model of a system satisfies a specific property (Müller-Olm et al., 1999). There are two types of model checkers: explicit-state model checkers explore individual states to ensure a property always holds, whereas symbolic model checkers operate on sets of states. In the symbolic approach, sets have a compact representation, typically using binary decision diagrams (BDDs).

Applied to WCET analysis, a model checker can be used in several ways. Firstly, it can be used to determine the longest path by checking a property such as “this program will execute for no more than $N$ cycles”. The WCET of a program is computed by performing a binary search for the answer. Metzner (2004) notes that using model checking for finding the longest path will not lead to more accurate results than IPET, however it does overcome some limitations of IPET such as the
numerical instability in some ILP problems.

Secondly, model checking can also be used to model the cache behaviour at different program points. Unlike abstract interpretation, model checking does not overapproximate the set of states by abstracting details away. Model checkers only ever deal with concrete states—if a solution is detected, it is guaranteed that it can be realised on hardware (assuming the model itself is consistent with the hardware).

Dalsgaard et al. (2010) achieve both of the above in their tool METAMOC, by framing the WCET problem as a network of timed automata in the UPPAAL symbolic model checker (Behrmann et al., 2004). They produce independent models of the CPU’s pipeline, its caches, external memory, and the executable being analysed. Loop bounds need to be manually provided as annotations on the executable. These models are composed together using “synchronisation channels” into a complete model on which UPPAAL computes a precise worst-case execution time.

Cassez (2011) uses some of the ideas from METAMOC, modelling the hardware and program as timed automata, but instead frames the WCET problem as a “timed two-player game”. Player one is the program whose goal is to terminate, and player two is the hardware whose goal is to maximise the execution time of the program. Using support for timed games in UPPAAL-TiGa (Behrmann et al., 2007), the model checker finds the smallest time in which player one can “win” (terminate), regardless of how the adverse hardware behaves. Cassez’s method also automatically performs value analysis and computes loop bounds as part of the model, and demonstrates better scalability than METAMOC.

Compared with IPET, these various approaches to model checking trade better accuracy for increased computational complexity. Huber and Schoeberl (2009) compare both model checking and abstract interpretation, and suggest that model checking is best suited to accurately computing results for basic blocks, while the overall program WCET should be computed with IPET.

### 2.4.3 Measurement-based approaches

An obvious technique to calculate the worst-case execution time of a program is to execute the program under all possible scenarios and measure the program’s execution time. However, all possible scenarios must accommodate all possible code paths and all states of the system (including hidden states). As both programs and
processors typically have an exponentially large number of possible states, exhaus-
tively testing all of these is not possible. Measurement-based approaches determine
a subset of code paths and states to examine. It is very difficult to guarantee that
the selected subset covers the true worst-case bounds for the program and so the
WCET will always be underestimated. This makes it a risky approach for analysing
hard real-time systems where the missing a deadline is not permissible.

Whilst the number of paths and states becomes infeasible in the general case, nu-
merous approaches exist to contain the state explosion. Wenzel et al. (2005) propose
to partition loop-free programs into discrete units which can be analysed individu-
ally. Zolda et al. (2009) later extended this with support for loops and unstructured
code. However, this approach suffers from the issue that partitions of a program are
not completely independent. Deverge and Puaut (2005) explore how to eliminate
any interactions between different partitions, and assert that this requires support
from the compiler and comes at the expense of performance.

There are other techniques to improve measurement-based WCET analysis which
rely on some form of static analysis. These are classified as hybrid analyses and are
described in the following section.

2.4.4 Hybrid approaches

Hybrid approaches seek to gain some of the benefits of both static analysis and
measurement-based analysis. Such methods are typically targeted for soft real-time
systems. Kirner et al. (2005a) argue that hybrid analyses are much more realistic
and less likely to be undermined by modelling inaccuracies, compared with pure
static analysis.

Schaefer et al. (2006) present a hybrid approach called Potoroo, which seeks to
identify the worst-case execution time by analysing the execution time profile (ETP)
of a code path. An ETP represents a distribution of timings for a specific code
path. For such a path, the most significant factor contributing to execution time
on modern cache-based processors is the number of memory accesses that miss the
caches. Other sources of microarchitecture-specific variability, such as pipeline stalls
and branch mispredictions, can be considered second-order effects and of much less
significance than caches.

The Potoroo approach attempts to correlate predicted ETPs generated from static
analysis with the measured ETPs from executing a code path. Given the set of cache
miss counts observed during execution of a program, Potoroo uses static analysis
to either confirm that it is in fact the largest number of cache misses possible,
or automatically construct a counterexample which can be executed and measured.
Although this technique is probabilistic as it assumes all non-cache related variations
to be negligible, it does lend some assurance that the WCET is in reality feasible.

Seshia and Rakhlin (2012) demonstrate a different hybrid approach to WCET mea-
surement called GameTime, based on game-theoretic online learning and systematic
test case generation. They decompose a loop-free program into “basis paths”, such
that all paths through the program can be represented as linear combinations of
the basis paths. In GameTime, the problem is modelled as a game between the
WCET-estimation algorithm and the hardware (the adversary). In this game, the
hardware is assumed to always hide the worst case if it can, and the algorithm is
challenged with finding these hidden cases. The approach is highly portable as it
discovers the platform’s timing model automatically. However, the resulting WCET
guarantees remain probabilistic and therefore may not be suitable for hard real-time
systems.

2.5 Summary

Both mixed-criticality system design and worst-case execution time analysis are
active research areas in their own right. This chapter has given a background on the
relevant aspects of each area, as they are both key ingredients in the construction
of trustworthy mixed-criticality real-time systems.

In the following chapters of this thesis, we build upon existing static analysis tools
for computing worst-case execution time, applying them to a verified OS kernel,
as well as improving infeasible path detection. We also explore the interactions of
kernel design, formal verification and real-time constraints, in order to develop a
high assurance real-time kernel that is suitable as a platform for a variety of mixed-
criticality real-time systems.
Chapter 3

A preliminary WCET analysis of seL4

This chapter is based on work published at RTSS 2011 in which I was the primary author (Blackham, Shi, Chattopadhyay, Roychoudhury, and Heiser, 2011a). The analysis of the seL4 kernel was performed primarily by myself, with assistance from Yao Shi, and using analysis software based upon the Chronos tool from the National University of Singapore. Some of the text in Section 3.4.3 describing the functioning of Chronos was contributed by the paper’s co-author Sudipta Chattopadhyay.

3.1 Overview

Mixed-criticality designs aim to reduce the hardware requirements of a system, compared with their traditional federated counterparts. This is achieved by consolidating multiple components onto a single processor and trusting a supervisor such as a microkernel or hypervisor to provide functional and temporal isolation between critical real-time components and less critical time-sharing components. To support hard real-time applications, the supervisor must provide safe upper bounds on its interrupt latency.

Computing interrupt latency bounds on OS kernels is a task made difficult by their unstructured code, tight coupling with hardware and sheer size. Their design, structure and implementation details determine how complex such an analysis will be. For example, the interrupt latency of a well-designed fully-preemptible kernel can be computed by evaluating a small subset of kernel paths independently. Non-preemptible kernels require much longer code paths to be analysed. Unconventional
control flow, as is common in OS kernels, can also significantly complicate the analysis.

We assert that using a microkernel-based design reduces the size and complexity of the analysed code base. This makes them amenable to static analysis, whilst also reducing the size of the trusted computing base, which is a desirable property for mixed-criticality systems.

The seL4 microkernel is especially suited to high-reliability applications as it is formally verified (Klein et al., 2009b). Formal machine-checked proofs guarantee not only functional correctness, but also that all operations terminate, which is an essential (and non-trivial) underpinning of any execution time analysis. Whilst these strong guarantees are sufficient for many systems, the formal verification offers no temporal guarantees required by real-time systems (other than eventual termination).

In this chapter, we present a case study of the seL4 microkernel and analyse its worst-case execution time and thus interrupt latency, with a view to tuning the kernel for hard real-time mixed-criticality applications. This case study is the first published complete interrupt-response-time analysis of an OS kernel providing full virtual memory and memory protection.

We show that realistic safe upper bounds on interrupt latencies can be determined for protected microkernel-based systems. We perform a full context-aware WCET analysis of all of seL4’s code paths on a modern embedded CPU architecture using a realistic pipeline model. We identify several properties of seL4’s code that assist in the analysis and make it possible to give tighter bounds on execution time. The structure of seL4 helps to resolve many of the difficulties encountered in previous analyses of kernels.

The analysis performs virtual inlining in order to be context-aware: each function is analysed under different calling contexts, which provides much tighter bounds on WCET. Such an approach is feasible due to seL4’s small code size (compared with other protected operating system kernels), at around 8 700 lines of C code. Despite this fact, it is, to our knowledge, still the largest code base where a full context-aware WCET analysis has been performed. We also measure the identified worst-case paths on real hardware, demonstrating that the WCET bounds obtained are not overly pessimistic and can be used in practical systems.

Section 3.2 summarises the state of the art of WCET studies of operating systems
3.2 Related work

Several studies have been performed to compute the interrupt latency of operating systems code, however none have successfully analysed a kernel providing memory protection and full virtual memory support. The most relevant analyses of RTOS kernels are summarised in this section.

RTEMS: The first major static WCET analysis of a real-time executive was published by Colin and Puaut (2001b), who analysed the C source code of the RTEMS operating system. Their version of RTEMS did not provide memory protection or any form of virtual address spaces. They used a tree-based static analysis tool, HEPTANE, targeting a Pentium processor. They encountered several issues such as unstructured loops with goto statements and function pointers, which all had to be resolved manually to complete the analysis.

The study was also faced with the problem of determining loop bounds which were tied to the dynamic run-time state of the system. This includes factors such as the number of tasks running, the structure of the system heap and the rate of interrupts. As such, the WCET of the RTEMS kernel is heavily dependent on the construction or design of the system in which it is used.

OSE: A WCET analysis of the microkernel used by the OSE delta operating system was undertaken by Carlsson et al. (2002) and Sandell et al. (2004) using the SWEET analysis tool (Gustafsson, 2000). OSE is widely used in embedded systems including mobile phones and for industrial control applications. The OSE kernel permits interrupts in most kernel code, except within 612 “disable-interrupt” regions. Despite the complex control flow of the kernel, most of the disable-interrupt regions were simple, well structured and free of function pointers, simplifying the
analysis. Caches were not modelled in the analysis. The microkernel analysed did not support memory protection.

\(\mu\)C/OS-II: Lv et al. (2009a) analysed the \(\mu\)C/OS-II kernel for the WCET of each system call. They used the Chronos analysis tool to model a MIPS processor with an L1 cache. The analysis was generally successful, but required a significant amount of manual intervention. The \(\mu\)C/OS-II kernel also does not provide memory protection.

L4: Singal and Petters (2007) attempted an analysis on the L4 N1 kernel, which does offer memory protection. They also found that unstructured code, inline assembly and context switching contributed to making the analysis difficult. They highlight the long execution paths associated with destroying kernel objects, due to the nature of dynamic memory structures of the kernel. Safe WCET bounds were never established.

Other studies: Lv et al. (2009b) have also conducted a survey of past WCET analyses of real-time operating systems. Their survey highlighted the need for context-specific WCET values, rather than a single absolute value, as well as a combined kernel/application analysis. They concluded that tools were not sufficiently mature to permit tight WCET estimates on modern RTOS kernels on modern CPU architectures.

What is a “tight” estimate depends on the application domain, which dictates how much over-provisioning of the system is permissible. In analysing the seL4 microkernel, we encountered overestimation of up to a factor of three, using state of the art tools (Figure 4.7).

Most past WCET analyses of real-time operating systems have been assisted or simplified by the designs of the kernels they were analysing. Our work is no different, as we describe in the following section. This trend suggests that operating systems code pushes the bounds of both WCET analysis techniques and in particular of static analysis methods.
3.3 seL4 design features

The seL4 microkernel has several properties that assist with automated static analysis. First and foremost is that its code base is small. We analyse the ARM version of the seL4 kernel, which has around 8,700 lines of C code and 887 lines of ARM assembly code. The analysis is performed using a modified version of Chronos 4.1 (Li et al., 2007), adapted for the ARM architecture, and requires around four hours to compute. The analysis is described further in Section 3.4.

seL4 is an event-based kernel—i.e. the kernel uses a single kernel stack irrespective of which thread it is servicing. Context switching between threads is performed by changing a variable pointing to the currently running thread. In contrast, process-based kernels, with dedicated per-thread kernel stacks, switch the stack pointer during a context switch. As a result, the entire call stack is invalidated, and execution resumes based on the call stack from a prior context switch. We explore this further in Section 4.2.1, but the key insight is that the event-based model aids static analysis, as control flow is more structured.

The seL4 microkernel was designed from its inception to be formally verified. Although the executable code is written in C, seL4 was initially developed in the functional language Haskell, to support rapid prototyping and provide a common ground for both the development team and verification team (Klein et al., 2009a). From the Haskell prototype, the development team implemented a high-performance C version, while the verification team mathematically formalised the expected behavior of the kernel into an abstract specification. The correctness of seL4 relies on a chain of proofs that the C code implements the Haskell prototype, and that the Haskell prototype conforms to the abstract specification.

As a result of this construction, the requirements of formal verification, as well as the security-driven desire for strong resource isolation, the C implementation of seL4 exhibits a number of properties that simplified our analysis:

- seL4 never stores function pointers at run-time. This allows all branches to be automatically resolved off-line (with the help of symbolic execution).
- seL4 never passes pointers to stack variables. This eliminates the possibility of variables aliasing stack memory, simplifying the analysis of memory aliasing for WCET.
• The task of memory allocation is delegated to userspace, avoiding complex allocation routines within the kernel. The kernel checks that regions do not overlap but these checks are much simpler than the code for a complete allocator.

• There are very few nested loops within seL4. Automatically identifying nested loops at the assembly level and their loop relations is not an easy task, or even well-defined, in the presence of heavy compiler optimisations.

• Most unbounded operations (such as object deletion) already contain explicit preemption points. If an interrupt is pending at a preemption point, seL4 will postpone the current operation and return up the call stack to a safe context to handle the interrupt. There still remained some unbounded loops, which we address in Section 3.5.

It is worth noting that many of these properties arose because of requirements of the formal verification process, without any regard to a WCET analysis. Despite the restrictions imposed by some of these properties, seL4 does not suffer a significant performance penalty—its hot-cache IPC performance is as good as the heavily optimised assembly IPC path found in the OKL4 2.1 microkernel (described further in Chapter 8).

The specification of seL4 guarantees that the kernel will never enter an infinite loop—i.e. all seL4 system calls eventually return to the user. This allows the analysis to ignore any infinite loops that exist in the kernel. Such loops are executed when assertions in the C code fail, however the proofs guarantee that these assertions are always true (under the assumptions of the proof, which include a correct C compiler and the absence of hardware bugs).

One issue arising during our analysis of seL4 is that in two places mutually-recursive functions are used. The formal proof guarantees termination, proving that the functions do not recurse more than once. This knowledge simplifies the analysis, as it allows us to simply virtually inline each function at most twice. However, for this analysis, we choose to unwind the recursion manually.

\(^1\) Sewell et al. (2013) have recently demonstrated work that eliminates this assumption in seL4 for binaries compiled with gcc’s -O1 optimisation level, and also potentially at higher optimisation levels.
3.4. ANÁLISIS MÉTODO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lines of C code</td>
<td>~8 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines of assembly code</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of C functions</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of loops</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code size (bytes)</td>
<td>42,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of instructions</td>
<td>10,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of functions</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of basic blocks</td>
<td>2,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of loops</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tabla 3.1:** Propiedades del código fuente analizado de seL4 (izquierda) y del código binario compilado (derecha).

En el modelo de eventos de seL4, casi todas las funciones retornan a su llamador, lo que simplifica el análisis estático. Sin embargo, esto no es cierto en uno específico de las rutas de código: seL4 presenta una rutina C altamente optimizada para manejar las operaciones de IPC más comunes, conocida como el *IPC fastpath*; mejora el tiempo promedio de estas operaciones de IPC en un orden de magnitud. La ruta rápida, aunque escrita en C, retorna directamente al espacio de usuarios (utilizando una rutina de ensamblaje encajonada), evitando la necesidad de deshacerse de la pila. El análisis de la cadena de herramientas requirió algún trabajo para soportar este flujo de control ya que previamente se asumía que todas las funciones retornarían a su llamador.

Finalmente, seL4 es acompañado por un gran cuerpo de pruebas de comprobación de máquinas que contiene miles de invariante y lemas. Es posible incorporar estas en un análisis WCET para ayudar en la exclusión de muchas rutas infeasibles. No se han utilizado en este análisis, pero presentan una oportunidad para el futuro de la investigación.

Algunas estadísticas interesantes de la ejecución del código binario de seL4 se resumen en **Tabla 3.1**.

### 3.4 Análisis método

Para calcular un límite seguro para el latencia de interrupción, construimos escenarios que ejercen las rutas de caso peor que se detectaron durante el análisis y ejecutadas en hardware real. Estas dos indican hasta qué punto los límites computados reflejan la realidad.

#### 3.4.1 Modelo procesador

seL4 puede ejecutarse en una variedad de arquitecturas ARM y plataformas. Para este análisis, utilizamos la plataforma BeagleBoard-xM con el procesador TI DM3730. Este procesador tiene un núcleo ARM Cortex-A8 a 800 MHz, con 32 KiB de cache L1 de instrucciones.
and data caches, both 4-way set-associative. Our analysis tools do not support modelling the L2 cache. As a result, the L2 cache is also disabled in hardware for our measurements.

The experiments were configured to use 128 MiB of physical memory. We measured the latency of a read or write to physical memory on this platform to vary between 80–100 cycles; in the static analysis we assume a 100-cycle penalty for all cache misses. The seL4 kernel locks its pages into the TLB so that there are no TLB misses during execution.

The Cortex-A8 has a 13-stage dual-issue pipeline, with in-order issue, execution and retirement. Most arithmetic instructions can be issued simultaneously with a subsequent arithmetic instruction or memory load, provided that there are no dependencies between them. Forwarding paths between stages permit single-cycle instructions to execute without stalls arising from register dependencies. The compiled seL4 binary happens to use only those arithmetic instructions which can be dual-issued—in particular, there are no multiplication or “rrx” operations which would incur a multi-cycle latency. Our static analysis models the dual-issue nature of the pipeline for arithmetic instructions.

All non-arithmetic instructions executed by the seL4 kernel fall into one of the following categories:

- load/stores—these incur a 100 cycle memory access penalty on a cache miss or with caches disabled;
- branches—these incur a 13 cycle penalty without prediction (see below);
- coprocessor operations mcr/mrc (move from coprocessor to register/move from register to coprocessor)—these include cache flushing, TLB flushing and address space switching which can take 120 cycles or more, depending on the particular operation and the state of the system;
- synchronisation instructions isb/dsb (instruction synchronisation barrier/data synchronisation barrier)—these instructions flush the instruction pipeline (13 cycles) or flush the CPU’s write buffers (29 cycles), respectively;

---

2 The analyses presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 use a newer version of Chronos which gained support for L2 cache analysis.

3 On ARM the “arithmetic instructions” also include logical primitives. The full list is: ADC, ADD, AND, BIC, EOR, ORR, RSB, RSC, SBC, SUB, CMN, CMP, TEQ, TST, MOV and MVN.
• processor state changes (cps)—these take 60 cycles.

The Cortex-A8 also supports speculative prefetching and branch prediction. These features were disabled in hardware in order to make measurements more deterministic, and were not included as part of the processor model.

The L1 caches on the Cortex-A8 have an unspecified random replacement policy. This prevents simulation of the exact cache behavior, and effectively forces any safe cache analysis to assume a direct-mapped 8 KiB cache. Furthermore, it makes it infeasible to construct a true worst-case scenario on hardware, Thus we can only determine an upper bound on the pessimism of our model.

3.4.2 Static analysis

We analyse seL4 for its interrupt latency by examining the worst-case execution time of all possible paths through the kernel. A path through the kernel begins at one of the kernel’s exception handlers, such as the system-call or page-fault handler. A path ends when control is passed back to the user, or at the start of the kernel’s interrupt handler code.

Being a non-preemptible kernel, seL4 disables interrupts at all times when executing kernel code, but checks for pending interrupts at explicit preemption points (typically in long-running unbounded loops). If an interrupt is detected at a preemption point, seL4 postpones the current operation and immediately handles the interrupt. As preemption points occur only at the end of loop iterations, we account for them in the analysis by forcing the iteration count of the loop to 1. The worst-case scenario for a path including a preemptible loop occurs when an interrupt arrives immediately after entry to the kernel. The kernel will still execute the operation with one iteration of the loop to ensure progress is made (avoiding livelock) and then handle the interrupt.

Interrupts arriving during kernel execution are handled immediately prior to returning to the user. The interrupt latency is therefore the sum of the WCET of any path through the kernel up to this point, and the time taken to dispatch the interrupt to a user thread.

The seL4 binary we analyse is compiled with gcc 4.5 (from CodeSourcery’s 2010.09 release) using the -O2 optimisation level and additionally the -fwhole-program flag.
which enables gcc to perform very aggressive optimisation and inlining of code. This means that most function boundaries are lost and functions are on average much larger because of inlining. Chronos has a feature to assist in correlating source code to instructions with the help of debug information. However, the structure of the output from our version of gcc bears very little resemblance to that of the source code, making this correlation difficult to automate. There exist solutions to compute the correspondence in the presence of heavy compiler optimisations (Sewell et al., 2013), but we have not investigated these.

Figure 3.1 outlines the tools and workflow used to analyse seL4. We wrote a program called Quoll to extract the control flow graph (CFG) of seL4 from the kernel binary. This step can be performed without any user guidance thanks to the absence of function pointers in seL4’s C sources.

Quoll uses symbolic execution to extract the CFG, by finding all reachable instructions within the kernel from the given set of entry points (system call and other exception handlers). Determining the destination of some branches requires evalu-
ating sequences of pointer arithmetic on read-write memory (e.g. return addresses pushed onto the stack). By symbolically executing the binary, Quoll can resolve all of these off-line. The symbolic execution is sound but not complete, and is sufficient to simulate any arithmetic operations, memory loads and stores which ultimately affect the possible destinations of a branch.

We specify the iteration counts of the 56 loops by hand. Due to compiler optimisations, some effort is required to correlate loops in the binary CFG to the source code. Most loops in seL4 have obvious fixed bounds which can be determined automatically with a rudimentary analysis utilising constant propagation. Some loops have iteration counts which would require more sophisticated analysis and reasoning—however there is sufficient information in the binary to ascertain all of these automatically.

We modified the kernel to ensure that all loop iteration counts were fixed and independent of any system state (described further in Section 3.5). Due to heavy inlining by the compiler, none of the iteration counts in the binary are context-sensitive, even though some are at the source level (e.g. memcpy). The analysis itself virtually inlines all function calls, so even if the compiler had not performed such aggressive inlining, context-dependent iteration counts could still be specified, or computed automatically (e.g. using our techniques presented in Chapter 6).

The control flow graph, along with the loop iteration counts, is passed to a modified version of Chronos 4.1 (Li et al., 2007).

The compiled binary exhibits optimisations such as tailcalls (where a function returning up the call stack shortcuts intermediate callers when possible) and loop rotation (where the loop body is “rotated” so that the entry and exit points of the loop are not necessarily the first and last instructions of the loop body). This required some modifications to Chronos, as these optimisations violated its assumptions about the structure of functions and loops.

### 3.4.3 Static timing analysis by Chronos

We use the Chronos tool, from the National University of Singapore, for our analysis because of its existing support for instruction and data caches, its flexible approach to modeling processor pipelines, and its open license.

Static timing analysis through Chronos is broadly composed of two parts: (i) micro-
architectural modeling and (ii) path analysis. Micro-architectural modeling involves estimating the timing effects of major micro-architectural components of the underlying hardware platform such as the pipeline and caches. Path analysis exploits infeasible path information in the control flow graph to estimate the execution time of the longest program path.

Chronos was written to target the MIPS-based SimpleScalar simulation platform, allowing a variety of processor features and configurations to be easily interchanged and tested against. We adapted Chronos to support the ARMv7 instruction set. Precise modeling of the Cortex-A8 pipeline is made difficult not only by its complexity, but also due to a lack of sufficient documentation. Even the official documents from the manufacturer have been shown to be inaccurate (Avison, 2010). We therefore use a conservative approximation of the pipeline, as described in Section 3.4.1.

Chronos models the pipeline on the granularity of a basic block. For each basic block, it constructs an execution graph. Nodes in the execution graph correspond to the different stages of the pipeline for each instruction in the basic block. Edges in the execution graph correspond to dependencies among pipeline nodes. Such a flexible modeling of pipeline behavior via dependence edges also allows Chronos to model advanced processor features such as superscalarity.

For a normal processor, there are dependent edges between the pipeline stages of subsequent instructions, for example $IF(I_{i+1})$ can only start after $IF(I_i)$ concludes, where $I_{i+1}$ is the instruction following $I_i$ and $IF$ denotes instruction fetch. For a superscalar processor with $n$-way fetch we add dependency edges between $IF(I_{i+n})$ and $IF(I_i)$, thereby allowing greater parallelism. The estimation method supports any execution graph; various pipeline models can be achieved by simply altering the automated mechanism for generating the execution graph from basic blocks.

Instruction cache modeling can be easily integrated with the pipeline modeling in Chronos. Chronos categorises each instruction memory block $m$ into one of the following: if $m$ is categorised as $HIT$, then the memory block is always a cache hit. If $m$ is categorised as $MISS$, then the memory block is always a cache miss. Finally, if $m$ is categorised as $UNCLEAR$, static cache analysis has failed to determine an accurate cache categorisation of $m$.

The instruction cache is accessed at the $IF$ stage. Pipeline modeling computes an interval of each pipeline stage for each instruction in the basic block. If an instruction is $HIT$, then we can add $[1,1]$ as the instruction cache latency to the
3.4. ANALYSIS METHOD

computed interval of the IF node. If an instruction is a MISS and miss penalty is \( \text{lat} \), we add \([\text{lat}, \text{lat}]\) to the computed interval. Finally, if the instruction cache categorisation is UNCLEAR, the exact latency is not known but we are sure that it is between the interval \([1, \text{lat}]\). Therefore, we add \([1, \text{lat}]\) to the computed interval.

A major source of imprecision in data-cache analysis comes from the “address analysis”—estimating the set of memory addresses touched by an instruction. Data-cache analysis in Chronos avoids this by determining which instances of a given instruction touch the same memory address. This leads to an analysis framework which is scalable, precise and also takes into account program scopes.

Chronos differentiates the cache contexts in terms of loop nests. For a single loop nest, Chronos considers two different contexts: the first iteration and all subsequent iterations. This contextual cache analysis greatly helps to give tighter estimates as the cache categorisation of a memory block may vary significantly, depending on its loop nest.

After the micro-architectural modeling, we obtain the WCETs of each basic block, which are fed to the program path analysis stage. Program path analysis in Chronos is performed using IPET, described earlier in Section 2.4.2. We refer the reader to other papers for details of the static analysis employed by Chronos (Li et al., 2006), and its techniques for data-cache modeling (Huynh et al., 2011).

All function calls are virtually inlined in Chronos so that the cache analysis is context-aware. This results in approximately 400,000 basic blocks after inlining. The output from Chronos is a system of linear constraints and an objective function to maximise subject to those constraints. With 400,000 basic blocks, Chronos creates 2.3 million variables and three million equations.

Finally, we utilise an off-the-shelf ILP solver—IBM’s ILOG CPLEX Optimizer 12.2—to solve the ILP problem generated by Chronos. The result gives the WCET value and the assignment of edge counts, which can be used to reconstruct a corresponding path. This is the most computationally intensive step of the process, and takes about four hours for the entire seL4 kernel, when performed on an Intel Xeon running at 2.66 GHz. Smaller portions of the kernel are solved much faster—within seconds for most. Section 3.6.4 details the time taken to analyse portions of the kernel.
3.4.4 Hardware measurements

In order to get an idea of the degree of pessimism in our WCET estimates, we measure the actual execution times on hardware for the feasible worst-case paths detected by static analysis. We measure timing using the Cortex-A8’s cycle counter, which is a part of its performance monitoring unit.

The results from the ILP solver specify the execution counts of basic blocks and edges of the worst-case path. We wrote a tool to determine the path itself. This is achieved by constructing a directed multigraph (a graph with potentially multiple edges between nodes) using the nodes of the original CFG, and replicating the CFG edges as many times as the execution count variable corresponding to that edge dictates. The path taken is then given by an Eulerian path from the source to sink—a path that traverses every edge once and only once. Such a path is guaranteed to exist in the graph because of the flow constraints for each node. Note that this path may not be feasible due to semantic behavior of the code which is not modeled in the static analysis.

In the absence of nested loops, this information is sufficient to uniquely identify the concrete path through the kernel. With nested loops, the edge counts in the ILP solution are insufficient to uniquely identify a path, as inner loop iterations could potentially differ between iterations of the outer loop. However, if the inner loop has a fixed iteration count, then the path is unambiguous. In our compiled seL4 binary, the few nested loops from the source code are unrolled by the compiler and thus we did not encounter this issue.

We manually construct test cases to approximate the worst-case path resulting from static analysis. In some cases, these paths turned out to be clearly infeasible, in which case we manually add constraints to exclude these paths.

3.4.5 Comparing static analysis with measurements

The results of our static analysis give an upper bound on the worst-case execution time of kernel operations. However, this upper bound is a pessimistic estimate. In practice, we may never observe latencies near the upper bound for several reasons:

- The conservative nature of our pipeline and cache models means we consider potential worst-case processor states which are impossible to achieve.
3.4. ANALYSIS METHOD

- Of the worst-case processor states which are feasible, it may be extremely difficult to manipulate the processor into such a state.

- The worst-case paths found by the analysis may be extremely difficult (but not impossible) to exercise in practice.

Only the first of these reasons contributes to actual pessimism in our system model, but attempts to measure pessimism will be affected by the latter two.

In order to compare our static analysis model with empirical results, we wrote a number of test programs to exercise various parts of the seL4 kernel API and analysed their WCET. The test cases were run on the QEMU simulator (QEMU), which provided us with a trace of the instructions that would be executed. We also ran the test case on hardware to obtain empirical timings. Our test programs pollute both the instruction and data caches with dirty cache lines prior to exercising the paths, in order to maximise execution time. All test cases are deterministic and so always produce the same execution paths in the simulator as on hardware (assuming there are no bugs in the simulator).

Using the instruction trace, we determined the precise iteration counts of the loops as executed and provided these as extra linear constraints to Chronos. Finally, we verified that the new path from our static analysis matched what was executed on the simulator. Note that this was only used for determining the amount of pessimism in our model, and not for the safe WCET bounds themselves.

Figure 3.2 shows the difference between the estimated execution time and the real execution time for typical uses of the system calls in Table 3.2. The average ratio of all system calls in Figure 3.2 is 6.0, and the largest ratio is 7.4. For each system call, because the estimated path and the executed path are identical, we attribute the error to conservatism in the pipeline and cache models and the inability to exercise the worst-case cache/pipeline behaviour of the processor.

3.4.6 Open vs. closed systems

We analysed seL4 for two different use cases—open systems and closed systems. We define an open system to be one where the system designer cannot prevent arbitrary code from executing on the system. This is in contrast to a closed system, where the system designer has full control over all code that executes. This is a coarse
parameterisation of the kernel, as suggested by Schneider (2002), in order to achieve tighter bounds on WCET in real-world use cases.

In seL4, all long-running system calls have preemption points to prevent unbounded execution with interrupts disabled. However, there still exist paths with a longer execution time than desirable for some hard real-time systems. Adding preemption points to some of these paths is difficult to both implement and reason about formally. For example, adding preemption points to certain object creation and deletion paths would lead to the existence of partially constructed (or deconstructed) objects. These objects must be handled specially by other kernel operations and considered throughout the formal proof. We address this in detail in Chapter 4.

In an open system, real-time subsystems may execute in conjunction with arbitrary and untrusted code (such code can be confined through the use of access control policies). seL4 uses a strict priority-based round-robin scheduler. In such a scheme, time sensitive threads must be assigned the highest priority on the system so that they may run as soon as required (typically when triggered by a hardware interrupt). seL4’s design disables interrupts whenever in the kernel, except at a few select preemption points. As a result, the interrupt latency for the highest-priority thread is the sum of the worst-case execution time of all possible non-preemptible operations performed by seL4, and the time taken to handle and dispatch an interrupt.
3.5. INITIAL WCET RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Call</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>seL4_Send()</td>
<td>Blocking send to an endpoint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4_Wait()</td>
<td>Blocking receive on an endpoint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4_Call()</td>
<td>Combined blocking send/receive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4_NBSend()</td>
<td>Non-blocking send to an endpoint (fails if remote is not ready).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4_Reply()</td>
<td>Non-blocking send to most recent caller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4_ReplayWait()</td>
<td>Combined reply and wait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4.Notify()</td>
<td>Non-blocking send of a one-word message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seL4_Yield()</td>
<td>Donate remaining timeslice to a thread of the same priority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: System calls permitted in a closed system (after initialisation)

In a closed system, the system designer has full control over all operations performed by the kernel. Therefore she can ensure that operations which have a significant impact on interrupt latency are avoided at critical times (e.g. by allocating all resources at boot and avoiding delete operations at run time). The interrupt latency in this scenario is defined by the WCET of a select number of paths within the kernel which are used by the running system—primarily inter-process communication (IPC) operations, as well as thread scheduling. The IPC operations are also used for receiving interrupts. Table 3.2 lists the permitted system calls.

Note that seL4_Call() can be invoked on an IPC object to perform IPC operations, but it is also used to interact with other kernel objects (e.g. for object creation and deletion). We exclude these latter operations from the analysis of closed systems, allowing only the IPC-related uses of seL4_Call(). This reflects the typical behaviour of static embedded systems, where no objects are created or destroyed at run-time.

3.5 Initial WCET results

Our initial analysis of seL4 pointed us to some serious latency issues under pathological circumstances. One such issue arose due to a scheduler optimisation used in seL4 known as lazy scheduling (Liedtke, 1993a). This optimisation improves the average-case performance of microkernel IPC operations, but creates a potentially unbounded worst-case execution path. In order to bound execution time, we replaced the lazy scheduling optimisation with a different approach (known internally
as “Benno scheduling”) which removes the unbounded loop from the scheduler and delivers equivalent average-case performance. We describe the scheduling issue further in Section 4.3.1, in the context of improving real-time kernel design.

We discovered other unbounded non-preemptible paths in our initial analysis, such as the object creation and deletion paths. For the experimental results given in the following section, we introduced additional preemption points so that all non-preemptible regions have bounded execution time. Combined with the removal of lazy scheduling, these modifications reduced seL4’s worst-case interrupt latency to a constant, independent of variables such as the number of objects on the system.

The modifications are detailed further in the following chapter (Chapter 4), along with the implications for the design of verified OS kernels suitable for real-time mixed-criticality systems. Only a subset of the modifications detailed in Chapter 4 were used for the following analysis—the minimum changes required to achieve a bounded interrupt latency, independent of system state.

### 3.6 Experimental results

#### 3.6.1 Open system

In analysing an open system, all possible seL4 operations are considered. Without any user input other than the loop bounds themselves, our toolchain determined the worst-case execution time to be in excess of 20 ms, and corresponded to an infeasible execution path. We excluded this and several other infeasible paths by adding additional constraints on the set of ILP equations until we found a feasible worst case.

We found the single longest path to occur when deleting an ASID pool. ASID pools are seL4 objects used to manage collections of virtual address spaces. Deleting an ASID pool requires iterating over each address space in the pool (of which there may be 1024), and invalidating the user’s TLB mappings associated with each one. Section 4.3.6 discusses this issue further and explores how ASID pools can be avoided.

Beyond this case, we also found that most of the long non-preemptible paths occurred when creating, deleting or recycling objects. The largest non-preemptible

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4An seL4 *recycle* operation is equivalent to deleting and re-creating the object, but is faster and
### 3.6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event handler</th>
<th>Computed</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syscall (open)</td>
<td>1634.8 µs</td>
<td>305.2 µs</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syscall (closed)</td>
<td>387.4 µs</td>
<td>46.4 µs</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown syscall</td>
<td>173.3 µs</td>
<td>17.9 µs</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined instruction</td>
<td>173.4 µs</td>
<td>17.1 µs</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page fault</td>
<td>175.5 µs</td>
<td>18.9 µs</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt</td>
<td>104.7 µs</td>
<td>13.1 µs</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.3:** Computed WCET versus observed WCET for feasible worst-case paths in seL4

loop in seL4, by measure of iteration count, is in one of these paths and iterates over a 16 KiB page directory in order to clear all of its associated mappings.

The other entry points into the kernel (unknown system calls, undefined instructions, page faults, interrupts), do not invoke the creation or deletion paths. Their worst cases involve a simple asynchronous message delivery to a specific thread on the system and are therefore very lightweight.

The results of these are shown in Table 3.3.

#### 3.6.2 Closed system

Within a closed system, we permit only the system calls outlined in Table 3.2, along with page faults, undefined system calls and invalid instructions (commonly used for virtualisation), and of course, interrupts. The only difference between the open and closed analysis is in the system-call handler. All other exception paths are identical to the open-system case.

The most significant worst-case scenario that arose was the `sel4.ReplyWait()` system call. `sel4.ReplyWait()` is used to respond to the most recently received message, and then wait for a new incoming message. The particular scenario detected was infeasible and is described below. It is an interesting infeasible case as there are in fact invariants in the formal proof that could potentially be utilised to exclude this automatically.

In seL4, threads do not communicate with each other directly. Rather, they construct IPC “endpoints” which act as communication channels between threads. Multiple threads are permitted to wait to receive (or send) a message on an endpoint—requires less authority than re-creating the object.
threads join a queue and are woken in turn as partners arrive. Deleting an endpoint in such a state leads to a long-running operation as threads are unblocked and moved back onto the scheduler’s run queue. Although this is done preemptibly, it still adds a non-trivial amount of work to this path. On closed systems, we do not permit a delete operation, so this scenario is not considered there.

However, \texttt{sel4\_Reply()} and \texttt{sel4\_Wait()} utilise a one-time endpoint (known as a reply cap) which is stored in a dedicated location in each thread control block (the reply slot). The kernel must delete the existing reply cap before a call to \texttt{sel4\_Wait()} and after a call to \texttt{sel4\_Reply()}.

The analysis detected that deleting this reply cap could lead to a longer execution time as it entered the deletion path. Even though we excluded explicit delete operations from our analysis, this implicit delete operation was exposed. However, it is impossible to construct this scenario, as a reply cap can only be used by other threads if it is first removed from the reply slot. Therefore the delete operation on the reply slot never needs to enter the longer deletion path.

With this knowledge, we added an extra constraint which excluded this infeasible path. The new analysis determined that the worst-case path for each kernel entry point was bounded by the time taken to perform an IPC.

In a feasible IPC operation, we identified three factors which affected execution time. The first is that endpoints are addressed using a structure resembling guarded page tables (Liedtke, 1993b); decoding the address involves traversing up to 32 edges of a directed graph. The second is, unsurprisingly, the size of the message to be transferred, on which \texttt{sel4} places a hard limit of 120 32-bit words. Finally, an IPC may also grant the recipient access to \texttt{sel4} objects, which requires additional bookkeeping to be done by the kernel. With these three factors exercised to their limits, the worst-case latency is still bounded to a reasonable value.

We reproduced this case on hardware and measured its execution time, as shown in Table 3.3.

### 3.6.3 Analysis of results

The results in Table 3.3 show that there is a factor of up to 10.2 between the observed and computed execution times. This disparity can be attributed to both the random cache replacement policy of the instruction and data caches, and conservatism
3.6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

in modeling the Cortex-A8 pipeline. It is extremely difficult to model worst-case scenarios for these without very fine control over the processor’s state.

Part of this disparity is also because the worst-case paths identified by the analysis are in fact infeasible. Although we manually excluded some infeasible paths, the final paths detected may still contain smaller portions that cannot be executed in practice. There is scope here to improve the bounds further, to the degree permitted by the inherent unpredictability of the hardware.

To compute the worst-case interrupt latency of the system, from interrupt arrival to a userspace interrupt handler executing, we take the largest WCET value from the given scenario and add the WCET of delivering an interrupt to the highest priority thread on the system.

Overall, these results show that seL4 could be used as a platform for closed systems and provide a guaranteed interrupt response time of \( 387.4 + 104.7 = 492.1 \) \( \mu s \) on this hardware. In open systems, the interrupt response time is \( 1635 \mu s + 104.7 \mu s = 1.74 \) ms, which is still quite reasonable for many applications. However there is clearly scope to improve the response times for both open and closed systems.

In this thesis, we focus primarily on the interrupt response time for high-priority threads which are ready to execute in response to an interrupt. Based on the results we have obtained, it is possible to compute the worst-case execution time for individual system calls—i.e. the time between a system call being issued and its completion. Such an analysis must account for several factors: (1) the amount of state affected by the operation (e.g. number of objects, size of memory regions, etc); (2) all possible preemptions of higher priority operations and their execution times; and (3) whether the amount of work for a preempted system call can be increased while preempted. The first two factors are heavily dependent on the design of the overall system, and seL4 alone cannot make any guarantees. However, seL4 is designed to mitigate the third factor, ensuring that the amount of work required for an operation cannot be increased after the operation begins. For example, cancelling all pending messages on an endpoint will only cancel those messages which were pending when the system call was issued (other access control mechanisms exist to ensure that new messages cannot be enqueued, but these need not be utilised). Similarly, when a deletion commences, it is possible to compute precisely how much work is required to complete the operation, regardless of other system activities.
CHAPTER 3. A PRELIMINARY WCET ANALYSIS OF SEL4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>BBs before</th>
<th>BBs after</th>
<th>Chronos</th>
<th>CPLEX</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>arm_swissyscall</td>
<td>2,384</td>
<td>433,085</td>
<td>6m52s</td>
<td>227m37s</td>
<td>234m29s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>handleSyscall</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>433,082</td>
<td>6m42s</td>
<td>226m9s</td>
<td>232m51s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decodeInvocation</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>139,066</td>
<td>2m49s</td>
<td>44m11s</td>
<td>47m0s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>handleInvocation</td>
<td>2,237</td>
<td>140,890</td>
<td>2m20s</td>
<td>14m50s</td>
<td>17m10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decodeCNodeInvocation</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>32,106</td>
<td>37s</td>
<td>4m59s</td>
<td>5m36s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decodeTCBInvocation</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>100,810</td>
<td>2m11s</td>
<td>2m14s</td>
<td>4m25s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Most computationally intensive seL4 functions when solving for WCET, showing the analysis time spent by Chronos and the ILP solver

3.6.4 Computation time

To examine the scalability of our analysis method on seL4, we computed the worst-case execution time for not only the top-level entry points, but also all subroutines in the seL4 binary. Table 3.4 shows the functions in seL4 that took the longest time to analyse. All results were obtained on an Intel Xeon running at 2.66 GHz with 10 GiB of memory.

arm_swissyscall is the assembly-level entry point for all system calls. It directly or indirectly calls the other functions listed in the table. All other functions within the kernel are solved much faster (in minutes or seconds, rather than hours). The table also shows the number of basic blocks (BBs) before and after virtual inlining, as a measure of how complex the computation is.

Only five functions took more than five minutes to solve. They contain the largest number of basic blocks of any function in the kernel, once virtual inlining has been performed. From this table we can see that, given a little patience, our approach scales up to the size of seL4.

3.7 Summary

This chapter presented an interrupt-response-time analysis of the seL4 microkernel, highlighting the properties of the code base that make it amenable to static analysis. This is the first such published analysis of a protected operating system kernel providing virtual memory. There are many properties of seL4 that both ease the analysis process and reduce the interrupt latency, without the need for a fully-preemptible kernel. Our analysis shows that seL4’s WCET can be kept low enough
for many closed- as well as many open-system applications.

seL4 is designed as a highly-secure general-purpose OS kernel, suitable for a large class of real-time, best-effort and hybrid systems. One of the design decisions supporting these goals is to disallow interrupts in the kernel, and instead limit interrupt latencies via specific preemption points. seL4’s latencies are currently over one millisecond in the worst case. With the introduction of additional preemption points, and guided by this analysis, seL4’s interrupt latency can be reduced significantly. The following chapter investigates how to achieve this without compromising on the verifiability of the kernel.

There are still significant differences between the results of static analysis and measurements on hardware. A part of this is due to conservatism in the pipeline and cache model used by static analysis (mostly inevitable due to the degree of undocumented behaviour in the processor). Another factor is code paths which are difficult to reproduce from userspace because of very fragile pathological cases. It may be possible to set up the state of the relevant data structures from within the kernel to force these paths, but this may not result in a realistic scenario.

Finally, some amount of pessimism comes from undetected infeasible paths in the control flow graph. While some of these paths could be eliminated manually in our analysis, there is scope for automation which would remove both human effort and the potential for human error. Since performing this analysis, we have automated the determination of loop bounds (Chapter 6), and the detection of some of the infeasible paths (Chapter 7).

Despite the limitations of the analysis, we have been able to analyse the complete seL4 kernel. In conjunction with a formal proof of functional correctness, this already makes seL4 a compelling platform for safety-critical applications.

Whilst the focus of this thesis has been WCET analysis for determining the interrupt response time of the kernel, the results of our analysis can also be used to determine bounds on the execution time of individual kernel operations. The bounds for non-preemptible kernel operations are directly obtainable using the tools and analysis presented, whilst bounds for preemptible operations need to consider the running system and its possible preemptions. This knowledge forms part of a schedulability analysis which is crucial for designing reliable hard real-time systems.
Chapter 4

Formal verification vs interrupt latency

This chapter is based on work published at EuroSys 2012 in which I was the primary author (Blackham, Shi, and Heiser, 2012a). Many members of the seL4 team contributed to the ideas presented in this chapter, including Kevin Elphinstone (lead seL4 architect), Adrian Danis, Dhammika Elkaduwe, Gernot Heiser, Ben Leslie, Thomas Sewell and Gerwin Klein. However, the final design and implementation of the modifications described are my own work. The WCET analysis in this chapter was performed primarily by myself, with assistance from Yao Shi. The correctness proofs of the seL4 scheduler changes were completed by Timothy Bourke and the seL4 verification team.

4.1 Overview

The previous chapter presented a worst-case execution time analysis of seL4 which required some modifications in order to ensure bounded interrupt latencies. We saw that despite being bounded, the interrupt response time was still significantly large for open systems (over 1 millisecond). Although we could avoid large interrupt latencies through careful system construction (using the “closed system” model), we would prefer to remove the sources of interrupt latency from the kernel itself. Our aim is to be able to give shorter guarantees on seL4’s interrupt response time without the need for artificial limitations.

Like most of its predecessor L4 kernels, seL4 disables interrupts throughout kernel execution, except at specific preemption points. This was originally done to optimise average-case performance, at the expense of increased average-case inter-
rupt latency. However, it was also essential to making the formal verification of the functional behaviour of seL4 tractable. This suggests that constructing a kernel which can guarantee acceptably short interrupt latencies, and be amenable to formal verification, requires careful design.

In this chapter, we explore the limits of response time of a verified protected microkernel such as seL4, and the design implications for kernels for real-time mixed-criticality systems. We describe the bottlenecks encountered in achieving suitable real-time performance and the challenges associated with overcoming them, whilst retaining the ability to be verified and thereby ensure strong functional guarantees. We introduce the notion of incremental consistency as a design philosophy which can ease the formal verification of real-time kernels and applications.

We have implemented changes to seL4 which reduce its interrupt latency by an order of magnitude—from milliseconds to hundreds of microseconds. Although re-verification of these changes is ongoing work, it is largely mechanical and similar in nature to other proof maintenance activities over the past four years since the original completion of the seL4 proof (Klein et al., 2009b).

The previous analysis of seL4’s response time in Chapter 3 targeted an 800 MHz OMAP3 CPU. The work in this chapter uses a different platform, the i.MX31, in order to benefit from better cache management. The OMAP3 differs from the i.MX31 in CPU speed, micro-architecture and memory latency. We have repeated our previous analysis on the i.MX31 platform to obtain directly comparable results.

4.2 Design considerations

4.2.1 Multi-threading models

In Section 3.3, we introduced the concepts of event-based and process-based approaches to support multi-threading in a kernel. These concepts are orthogonal but related to the notion of fully-preemptible or non-preemptible kernels, as described in Section 2.2.1. In this section, we address all combinations of the two and examine the implications for formal verification and interrupt latency.

In the process-based model, each thread is allocated a dedicated kernel stack. This kernel stack is used for handling requests on behalf of the thread. It implicitly stores
the state of any kernel operation in progress within the contents of the call stack and local variables stored on the stack. A context switch alters the stack pointer and thereby modifies the entire calling context. This poses challenges for both formal verification and static analysis—in both domains, many techniques are dependent on the notion of a “calling context” of a function, which implicitly encodes part of its execution history. The context switch in a process-based kernel stymies the use of any techniques that depend on the calling context.

A process-based kernel lends itself to being made fully preemptible (Ford et al., 1999). With some defensive coding, an interrupt can be permitted almost anywhere in the kernel. Therefore a fully-preemptible process-based kernel allows for very short interrupt response times, despite significantly complicating WCET analysis. The process-based kernel was also originally thought to be more efficient in the presence of frequent context switching (Liedtke, 1993a). However, results on modern ARM hardware have shown the difference to be negligible and in fact event-based kernels have been shown to perform better in macro benchmarks (Warton, 2005).

An event-based kernel uses a single kernel stack to handle requests for all threads on the system. This reduces memory consumption significantly, but changes the way in which preemption can be handled. As the stack implicitly encodes an ordering on function returns, it cannot be shared amongst multiple threads as doing so could result in deadlock due to stack blocking. Scheduling disciplines such as the stack resource policy (Baker, 1991) are able to overcome this, however they enforce specific scheduling requirements, limiting system flexibility.

Some event-based kernels such as QNX Neutrino (QNX) are made fully preemptible by discarding the shared stack on preemption. The preempted operation is later restarted from the kernel’s entry point. However, under high interrupt rates, such a model cannot guarantee forward progress of a preempted thread, as the preemption may occur before any progress is made.

In fully-preemptible kernels, under both the process-based and event-based models, the control flow can be diverted at any point by an incoming interrupt. This is a significant challenge for formal verification and also static analysis (particularly for static WCET analysis).

L4 kernels have traditionally been process-based but not fully preemptible.¹ In a

¹ There are some exceptions: the L4-based Fiasco kernel (Hohmuth, 2002) is process-based and also preemptible; both OKL4 (Heiser and Leslie, 2010) and seL4 use a single kernel stack and are
CHAPTER 4. FORMAL VERIFICATION VS INTERRUPT LATENCY

microkernel-based system, kernel execution tends to be dominated by fast inter-
process communication (IPC) operations; there is little benefit in making the mi-
crokernel fully-preemptible, as long as the worst-case latencies of the longer-running
operations are kept reasonable through well-placed preemption points.

The design used by seL4 is non-preemptible and event-based, and thereby provides
reasonable average-case performance and guarantees forward progress under high
interrupt rates. It also simplifies formal verification and static analysis, as the seL4
code has a standard procedural control flow like any regular C program.

4.2.2 Saving preempted state

In seL4’s non-preemptible event-based model, preemption points are manually in-
serted to detect and handle pending interrupts in long operations. If an interrupt
is found to be pending, the state of the current operation must be explicitly saved.
There are several ways in which this state can be saved (and the operation later
resumed).

One possibility is to use continuations to efficiently represent the saved state of
a blocking or preempted kernel operation (Draves et al., 1991). A continuation
specifies (a) the function that a thread should execute when it next runs; and (b) a
structure containing any necessary saved state. Using continuations allows a thread
to discard its stack whilst it is blocked or preempted.

An alternative is to treat a preempted operation effectively as a restartable system
call. In this case, when a preemption point detects an interrupt, any necessary
state for the preempted operation is saved as the kernel returns up the call stack.
The thread is left in a state where simply re-executing the original system call will
continue the operation.

seL4 uses the restartable system call model over continuations. It uses a common
entry point for both new and restarted kernel operations, which means that the
code to validate an operation can be shared between both cases. For example, both
a new and a resumed deletion operation must check if the object to be deleting
(still) exists. This reduces code duplication and also verification effort, as kernel re-
entry automatically re-establishes the required invariants. It also simplifies reasoning
about the kernel’s correctness: it is not necessary to reason about what state a

not fully preemptible.
4.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

preempted thread is in and whether it was performing an operation. Instead, it suffices to only reason about the state of objects in the system.

This design leads to a small amount of duplicated run-time effort, as the system call must be decoded again each time a preempted operation is resumed. However, the code paths taken are likely to be hot in the CPU’s caches. Work on the Fluke kernel demonstrated that these overheads are negligible (Ford et al., 1999).

4.2.3 Incremental consistency

A noteworthy design pattern in seL4 is an idea we call incremental consistency: large composite objects are composed of individual components that can be added, deleted, or updated one-at-a-time. Specifically, there is always a constant-time operation that will partially construct, deconstruct, or modify a large composite object and still maintain a coherent system. In seL4, this is relevant to objects such as address spaces and book-keeping data structures, which commonly pose significant issues in deletion paths.

Incrementally consistent designs have several benefits:

1. they provide invariants which are almost certainly required for verification;

2. they reduce the verification burden as such invariants are only violated for brief periods before being reestablished;

3. they provide natural locations for inserting preemption points, helping to reduce the interrupt latency of real-time systems.

Although a simple concept, it is not always easy to maintain in a system with complex data structures and intricate dependencies between them.

4.2.4 Proof invariants of seL4

In seL4, consistency of the kernel is defined by a set of formalised invariants on the kernel’s state and in turn all objects in the kernel. There are in fact hundreds of invariants and lemmas that are maintained across all seL4 operations. These include:
• well-formed data structures: structures such as linked lists are well-formed—i.e. there are no circular links and all back-pointers point to the correct node in doubly-linked lists;

• object alignment: all objects in seL4 are aligned to their size, and do not overlap in memory with any other objects;

• algorithmic invariants: some optimisations in seL4 depend on specific properties being true, allowing redundant checks to be eliminated;

• book-keeping invariants: seL4 maintains a complex data-structure that stores information about what objects exist on the system and who has access to them. The integrity of seL4 depends on the consistency of this information.

The formally-verified seL4 code base proves that all kernel operations will maintain all of the given invariants. Any modifications to seL4 require proving that these invariants still hold, in addition to proving that the code still correctly implements the specification of the kernel. Therefore, for each preemption point that we add to seL4, we must correspondingly update the proof in order to maintain these invariants.

In some cases, it is not possible to maintain all invariants, in which case the invariant may be replaced by a weaker statement. The weakened invariant must be sufficient to satisfy the remainder of the proof over the whole kernel. If an aspect of the proof fails with the weakened invariant, this generally suggests that a bug has been introduced and that extra safety checks may be required in the code.

4.3 Areas of improvement

In this section, we look at some of the long-running operations in seL4 and examine how to either add suitable preemption points or replace the operations with better algorithms. Most of these operations, whilst presented in the context of seL4, are typical of any OS kernel providing abstractions such as protected address spaces, threads and IPC.

There are some operations that may be found in other OS kernels which are not present in seL4. One example is the absence of any memory allocation routines. Almost all allocation policies are delegated to userspace; seL4 provides only the
mechanisms required to enforce policies and ensure they are safe (e.g. checking that objects do not overlap) (Elkaduwe et al., 2007). This design decision removes much of the complexity of a typical allocator from seL4 as well as some potentially long-running operations.

4.3.1 Removal of lazy scheduling

As mentioned in Section 3.5, our initial WCET analysis identified a problematic optimisation in seL4 known as lazy scheduling. Lazy scheduling attempts to minimise the manipulation of scheduling queues on the critical path of IPC operations (Liedtke, 1993a), and has traditionally been used in almost all L4 kernels (Fiasco is an exception). It is based on the observation that in L4’s synchronous IPC model, threads frequently block while sending a message to another thread, but in many cases the other thread replies quickly. Multiple such ping-pongs can happen on a single time slice, leading to repeated de-queueing and re-queueing of the same thread in the scheduler’s run queue.

Lazy scheduling leaves a thread in the run queue when it executes a blocking IPC operation. When the scheduler is next invoked, it dequeues all threads which are still blocked. Pseudo-code for a scheduler implementing lazy scheduling is shown in Figure 4.1.

Lazy scheduling can lead to pathological cases where the scheduler must dequeue a large number of blocked threads (theoretically only limited by the amount of memory available for thread control blocks), which leads to unbounded worst-case latency. As the scheduler is responsible for determining which thread to run next, it is not always feasible or even meaningful to add a preemption point to this potentially long-running operation.

We therefore had to change the scheduling model so that only runnable threads existed on the run queue. In order to maintain the benefits of lazy scheduling, we use a different scheduling trick, (internally known as “Benno scheduling”, after the engineer who first implemented it in an earlier version of L4): when a thread is unblocked by an IPC operation and, according to its priority, it is able to execute immediately, we switch directly to it and do not place it into the run queue (as it may block again very soon). In particular, the currently running thread does not need to be on the run queue. This has the same best-case performance as lazy
thread_t chooseThread() {
    foreach (prio in priorities) {
        foreach (thread in runQueue[prio]) {
            if (isRunnable(thread))
                return thread;
            else
                schedDequeue(thread);
        }
    }
    return idleThread;
}

Figure 4.1: Pseudo-code of scheduler implementing lazy scheduling

thread_t chooseThread() {
    foreach (prio in priorities) {
        thread = runQueue[prio].head;
        if (thread != NULL)
            return thread;
    }
    return idleThread;
}

Figure 4.2: Pseudo-code of scheduler without lazy scheduling
4.3. AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT

scheduling, but maintains good worst-case performance, as only a single thread (the presently running one) may have to be enqueued lazily.

In this model the implementation of the scheduler is simplified, as it now just chooses the first thread of highest priority, as demonstrated in the pseudo-code listing in Figure 4.2. There is an existing invariant in the kernel that all runnable threads on the system are either on the run queue or currently executing. This is sufficient for lazy scheduling, but Benno scheduling obviously requires an additional invariant which must be maintained throughout the kernel: that all threads on the scheduler’s run queue must be in the runnable state.

This seemingly simple C code change impacts the proof in all functions that alter a thread’s state, or modifies the scheduler’s run queue. The invariant must be proven true when any thread ceases to be runnable and when any thread is placed onto the run queue. The removal of lazy scheduling has since been implemented and proven correct in the formally-verified kernel with these updated invariants.

4.3.2 Scheduler bitmaps

We added one more optimisation to the scheduler: a bitmap representing the priorities that contain runnable threads. We make use of ARM’s count leading zeroes (CLZ) instruction which finds the highest set bit in a 32-bit word, and executes in a single cycle. seL4 supports 256 thread priorities, which we represent using a two-level bitmap. The 256 priorities are divided into 8 “buckets” of 32 priorities each. The top-level bitmap contains 8 bits each representing the existence of runnable threads in any of the 32 priorities within a bucket. Each bucket has a 32-bit word with each bit representing one of the 32 priorities. Using two loads and two CLZ instructions, we can find the highest runnable priority very efficiently, and have thus removed the loop from Figure 4.2 altogether.

This optimisation technique is commonly used in other OS schedulers and has reduced the WCET of seL4 in several cases. However, it introduces yet another invariant to be proven: that the scheduler’s bitmap precisely reflects the state of the run queues. As this is an incremental change to the existing scheduler, the re-verification effort is significantly lowered.
4.3.3 Aborting IPC operations

Threads in seL4 do not communicate directly with each other; they instead communicate via endpoints which act as communication channels between threads. Multiple threads may send or receive messages through an endpoint. Each endpoint maintains a linked list of all threads waiting to send or receive a message. Naturally, this list can grow to an arbitrary length (limited by the number of threads in the system, which is limited by the amount of physical memory that can be used for threads, which in turn is theoretically limited by the size of free physical memory after the kernel boots). The length of this list is not an issue for most operations, as they can manipulate the list in constant time.

The only exception is the operation to delete an endpoint. Deletion must iterate over and dequeue a potentially large number of threads. There is an obvious preemption point in this operation: after each thread is dequeued. This intermediate step is fortunately consistent with all existing invariants, even if the thread performing the deletion operation is itself deleted. Forward progress is ensured by deactivating the endpoint at the beginning of delete operations, so threads (including those just dequeued) cannot attempt another IPC operation on the same endpoint.

The preemption point here is obvious because it is a direct result of the incremental consistency design pattern in seL4. As a result, the impact of these changes on the proof are minimal.

4.3.4 Aborting badged IPC operations

A related real-time challenge in seL4 is the aborting of badged IPC operations. Badges are unforgeable tokens (represented as an integer) that server processes may assign to clients. When a client sends a message to the server using a badge, the server can be assured of the authenticity of the client. A server may revoke a specific badge, so that it can ensure that no existing clients have access to that badge. Once revoked, the server may re-issue the badge to a different client, preserving guarantees of authenticity.

In order to revoke a badge, seL4 must first prevent any thread from starting a new IPC operation using the badge, and second ensure that any pending IPC operations using the badge are aborted. This second operation stores book-keeping information in a multiset data structure, to track threads and their badges, and requires a
compromise between execution time, memory consumption and ease of verification. The choice of data structure used has a significant impact on all three factors.

For example, a balanced binary-tree structure has very good worst-case and average-case execution time, but requires more work in the verification effort; the invariants involved in self-balancing binary tree structures are more tedious than linear data structures. A hash-table-based data structure may be easier to verify, and has good average-case performance, but raises challenging memory allocation issues in seL4, where memory allocation is handled outside the kernel. It also does not improve worst-case execution time, as a determined adversary could potentially force hash collisions.

Instead, seL4 uses a simple linked list containing the list of waiting threads and their associated badges, as described in Section 4.3.3. Enqueuing and dequeuing threads are simple O(1) operations. In order to remove all entries with a specific badge, seL4 must iterate over the list; this is a potentially unbounded operation, and so we require a preemption point. Unlike the simple deletion case where we simply restart from the beginning of the list, here we additionally need to store four pieces of information:

1. at what point within the list the operation was preempted, so that we can avoid repeating work and ensure forward progress;

2. a pointer to the last item in the list when the operation commenced, so that new waiting clients do not affect the execution time of the original operation;

3. the badge which is currently being removed from the list, so that if a badge removal operation is preempted and a second operation is started, the first operation can be completed before starting the new one;

4. a pointer to the thread that was performing the badge removal operation when preempted, so that if another thread needs to continue its operation, it can indicate to the original thread that its operation has been completed.

With all this information, we are able to achieve our goal of incremental consistency. The above information is associated with the endpoint object rather than the preempted thread (as would be done in a continuation). In doing so, we can reason simply about the state of objects in our invariants, rather than the state of any preempted thread.
CHAPTER 4. FORMAL VERIFICATION VS INTERRUPT LATENCY

Note that although the preemption point bounds interrupt latency, this approach gives a longer than desirable execution time for the badged abort operation, as every waiting thread must be iterated over, rather than only threads waiting for a specific badge. This has not yet been an issue in real systems, however, should it cause problems then we may replace it with an alternative such as a self-balancing binary tree data structure and undertake the extra verification effort required.

4.3.5 Object creation

When objects, such as threads, page tables or memory frames, are created on behalf of the user, their contents must be cleared and/or initialised in order to avoid information leakage. Clearing an object may be a long-running operation, as some kernel objects are megabytes in size (e.g. large memory frames on ARM can be up to 16 MiB in size; capability tables, used for managing authority, can be of arbitrary size).

The code to clear an object was previously deep inside the object creation path, and replicated for each type of object. Additionally, the code updated some of the kernel’s state before objects were cleared, and the rest of the kernel’s state after objects were cleared. Adding a preemption point in the middle of clearing an object would therefore leave the kernel in an inconsistent state.

To make clearing of objects preemptible, seL4 required significant restructuring of the object creation paths. We chose to clear out the contents of all objects prior to any other kernel state being modified. The progress of this clearing is stored within the object itself. The remainder of the creation code that manipulates the state of the kernel (e.g. updating the kernel’s book-keeping data structures) can usually be performed in one short, atomic pass.

Page directories (top-level page tables) however pose an added complication. The top 256 MiB of virtual address space is reserved for the seL4 kernel, and is mapped into all address spaces. When a new page directory is created, the kernel mappings for this region must be copied in. This copy operation is embedded deep within the creation path of page directories. There is also an seL4 invariant specifying that all page directories will contain these global mappings—an invariant that must be maintained upon exiting the kernel.

Preempting the global-mapping copy poses significant (though not insurmountable)
challenges for verification. Fortunately, on the ARMv6 and ARMv7 architectures, only 1 KiB of the page table needs to be updated. We chose to make all other block copy and clearing operations in seL4 preempt at multiples of 1 KiB, as smaller multiples would not improve the worst-case interrupt latency until the global-mapping copy is made preemptible. Given that the time required to copy 1 KiB of data is in the order of microseconds, such operations no longer contributed to the worst-case execution time.

We address the issue of how to reduce this further, forgoing the requirements of formal verification, in Section 5.3.4.

4.3.6 Address space management

In a virtual address space, physical memory frames are mapped into page tables or page directories, creating a mapping from virtual address to physical address. In order to support operations on individual frames, seL4 must additionally maintain the inverse information: which address space(s) a frame has been mapped into, and at which address.

In seL4, all objects are represented by one or more capabilities (Dennis and Van Horn, 1966), or *caps*, which encapsulate metadata about the object such as access rights and mapping information. Capabilities form the basic unit of object management and access control in seL4 systems, and a typical system may have tens or hundreds of thousands of caps. As such, the design of seL4 endeavours to keep caps small to minimise memory overhead. seL4 caps are 16 bytes in size: 8 bytes are used for pointers to maintain their position in a “derivation tree”, and the other 8 bytes are used for object-specific purposes.

8 bytes of extra information suffices for almost all objects, however caps to physical memory frames are an exception. To support seL4’s object deletion model, frames are required to store their physical address, the virtual address at which they are mapped, and the address space into which they are mapped. This, along with some extra bits of metadata, exceeds the 8-byte limit inside a cap.

In order to squeeze this information into 8 bytes, the original seL4 design uses a lookup table to map from an 18-bit index to an actual address space. The index is called an *address space identifier*, or *ASID*, and is small enough to be stored inside a frame cap. The lookup table is stored as a sparse 2-level data structure in order
to minimise space usage—the first 8 bits of the ASID are an index into the first level (the ASID directory), and the remaining 10 bits are an index into the second level (an ASID pool). Each ASID pool provides entries for 1024 address spaces. The objects and references required for using ASIDs are shown in Figure 4.3.

Using ASIDs offered the additional benefit of enabling dangling references to deleted address spaces to safely exist. If frame caps were to store a reference to the address space itself, then when the address space is deleted, all frame caps referring to it would need to be updated to purge this reference. By instead indirecting through the ASID table, the references from each frame cap, whilst stale, are harmless. Any time the ASID stored in a frame cap is used, it can be simply checked that the mapping in the address space (if any still exist) agrees with the frame cap. As a result, deleting an address space in this design simply involves: (a) removing one entry from the ASID lookup table, and (b) invalidating any TLB entries from the address space.

However, the use of ASIDs poses issues for interrupt latency in other areas, such as locating a free ASID to allocate, and deleting an ASID pool. Locating a free ASID is difficult to make preemptible—in the common case, a free ASID would be found immediately, but a pathological case may require searching over 1024 possible
ASIDs. Similarly, deleting an ASID pool requires iterating over up to 1024 address spaces. Whilst we could play with the size of these pools to minimise latency, the allocation and deallocation routines are inherently difficult to preempt, and so we decided to seek an alternative to ASIDs.

By removing ASIDs, we needed some other method to prevent dangling references within frame caps. In particular, we needed to store a back-pointer from a virtual address mapping to the frame cap used for the mapping. We chose to store these pointers in a *shadow page table*, mapping from virtual address to frame cap (as opposed to mapping to the frame itself). This effectively doubles the amount of space required for each page table and page directory. We store this data adjacent to the page table in order to facilitate fast lookup from a given page table entry, as shown in Figure 4.4. Now, all mapping and unmapping operations, along with address space deletion, must eagerly update all back-pointers to avoid any dangling references.

This design removes the ability to perform lazy deletion of address spaces, but
resolves many of the latency issues surrounding the management of ASID pools. We needed to insert preemption points in the code to delete address spaces, however this is trivial to do and can be done without violating any invariants on the kernel’s state. The natural preemption point in the deletion path is to preempt after unmapping each entry in a page table or page directory. To avoid repeating unnecessary work, we also store the index of the lowest mapped entry in the page table and only resume the operation from that point.

We observe that the ability to add a preemption point here is again a direct result of the shadow page table design adhering to the incremental consistency design pattern.

**Memory Overhead of Shadow Page Tables** The space overhead of shadow page tables might be considered detrimental on some systems. We can compare it to an alternative solution, where we utilise a frame table to maintain bookkeeping information about every physical page on the system. This is the approach used by many other operating systems, including Linux.

The frame table incurs a fixed memory overhead and removes the need for shadows. In its simplest form, without support for sharing pages between address spaces (which the shadow page table solution does support), a frame table would require a single pointer to track each frame cap created. On a 32-bit system with 256 MiB of physical memory and 4 KiB frames, the frame table would occupy 256 KiB of memory. On ARMv6 platforms, page directories are 16 KiB and page tables are 1 KiB (each page table spans 1 MiB of virtual address space). A densely-packed page directory covering 256 MiB of virtual address space would use an extra 256 KiB in shadow page tables, and an extra 16 KiB per address space in page directories. In this scenario, the difference between the two approaches is negligible (16 KiB).

Shadow page tables have higher memory overheads when address spaces are sparsely-populated. However, even without shadow page tables, sparsely-populated address already incur wasted space in the page table structures. The use of shadow page tables only amplifies (doubles) this wastage.
4.4 L1 cache pinning

In order to achieve faster interrupt delivery and tighter bounds on the worst-case execution time (WCET) of seL4, we modified seL4 to pin specific cache lines into the L1 caches so that these cache lines would not be evicted. We selected the interrupt delivery path, along with some commonly accessed memory regions to be permanently pinned into the instruction and data caches. The specific lines to pin were chosen based on execution traces of both a typical interrupt delivery, and some worst-case interrupt delivery paths.

As the cache on our target platform (described in Section 4.5.1) supports locking one or more complete cache ways, we can choose to lock $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$ of the contents of the cache. We selected as much as would fit into $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cache (4 KiB), without resorting to code placement optimisations. A total of 118 instruction cache lines were pinned, along with the first 256 bytes of stack memory and some key data regions.

The benefit of cache pinning on worst-case execution time is shown in Table 4.1. On the interrupt path, where the pinned cache lines have the greatest benefit, the worst-case execution time is almost halved. On other paths, the gain is less significant but still beneficial.

Of course, these benefits do not come for free; as a portion of the cache has been partitioned for specific code paths, the remainder of the system has less cache for general usage which can adversely affect average-case performance if not carefully managed. A system with hard real-time requirements may also require that code and data used for deadline-critical tasks are pinned into the cache. Methods to optimally select cache lines to pin for periodic hard-real-time task sets have been the subject of previous research (Campoy et al., 2001; Puaut and Decotigny, 2002).

Our platform has a 128 KiB unified L2 cache with a hit access latency of 26 cycles (compared with external memory latency of 96 cycles). Our compiled seL4 binary is 36 KiB, and so it would be possible to lock the entire seL4 microkernel into the L2 cache. Doing so would drastically reduce execution time even further, but our analysis tools did not yet provide such support when this analysis was performed. In Chapter 5, our newer analysis tools allow us to add this support and reduce the worst-case latency even further as a result.
CHAPTER 4. FORMAL VERIFICATION VS INTERRUPT LATENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event handler</th>
<th>Without pinning</th>
<th>With pinning</th>
<th>% gain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System call</td>
<td>421.6 µs</td>
<td>378.0 µs</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined instruction</td>
<td>70.4 µs</td>
<td>48.8 µs</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page fault</td>
<td>69.0 µs</td>
<td>50.1 µs</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt</td>
<td>36.2 µs</td>
<td>19.5 µs</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Improvement in computed worst-case latency by pinning frequently used cache lines into the L1 cache

4.5 Analysis method

After making the changes outlined above, we analysed seL4 to compute a new safe upper bound on its interrupt latency. The analysis was performed on a compiled binary of the kernel and finds the longest paths through the microkernel using a model of the hardware. We also evaluate the overestimation of the analysis by executing the longest paths on real hardware.

4.5.1 Evaluation platform

seL4 can run on a variety of ARM-based CPUs, including processors such as the ARM Cortex-A8 which can be clocked at over 1 GHz. However, we were unable to obtain a recent ARM processor (e.g. using the ARMv7 architecture) which also supported cache pinning. In order to gain the benefits of cache pinning, we ran our experiments on a somewhat older processor, the Freescale i.MX31, on a KZM evaluation board. The i.MX31 contains an ARM1136 CPU core with an 8-stage pipeline and is clocked at 532 MHz.

The CPU has split L1 instruction and data caches, each 16 KiB in size and 4-way set-associative. These caches support either round-robin or pseudo-random replacement policies. The caches also provide the ability to select a subset of the four ways for cache replacement, effectively allowing some cache lines to be permanently pinned. Alternately, the caches may also be used as tightly-coupled memory (TCM), providing a region of memory which is guaranteed to accessible in a single cycle.

As our analysis tools do not yet support round-robin replacement (and pseudo-random is not feasible to analyse), we analysed the caches as if they were a direct-mapped cache of the size of one way (4 KiB) or, viewed alternately, as if the other
three cache ways were pinned with user data. This is a pessimistic but sound approximation of the cache’s behaviour, as only the most recently accessed cache line in any cache set is guaranteed to reside in the cache when next accessed.

The i.MX31 also provides a unified 128 KiB L2 cache which is 8-way set-associative. The KZM board provides 128 MiB of RAM with an access latency of 60 cycles when the L2 cache is disabled, or 96 cycles when the L2 cache is enabled. Due to this significant disparity in memory latency, we analysed the kernel both with the L2 cache enabled and with it disabled.

We disabled the branch predictors of the ARM1136 CPU both on hardware used for measurements and in the static analysis itself, as our analysis tools do not yet model them. Interestingly, using the branch predictor increases the worst-case latency of a branch: with branch predictors enabled, branches on the ARM1136 vary between 0 and 7 cycles, depending on the type of branch and whether or not it is predicted correctly. With the branch predictor disabled, all branches execute in a constant 5 cycles.

The effect of disabling these features on execution time is quantified in Section 4.6.4.

### 4.5.2 Static analysis for worst-case execution time

Our analysis to compute the interrupt response time of seL4 is based upon work described in Chapter 3. This section summarises the method used for this analysis and highlights improvements over the previous analysis technique.

We use a newer version of Chronos (4.2), which provides support for a combined L1 and L2 cache analysis (Chattopadhyay and Roychoudhury, 2009). As before, we use Chronos to compute the worst-case execution time of seL4 and evaluate our improvements to seL4. We had previously modified Chronos to analyse binaries on the ARMv7 architecture using a model of the Cortex-A8 pipeline. For this analysis we adapted the pipeline model to support the ARM1136 CPU on our target hardware. ARM’s documentation of the ARM1136 describes the performance characteristics of the pipeline in detail (ARM, 2005).

Additional constraints were added manually in order to exclude certain infeasible paths. As the analysis only considers the control flow graph, it has no insight into the values of variables in the kernel. Therefore, it may consider paths that are not actually realisable. In order to exclude these paths, we manually added extra
constraints to the ILP problem where necessary. These constraints take one of three forms:

- **a conflicts with b in f**: specifies that the basic blocks at addresses a and b are mutually exclusive, and will not both execute during an invocation of the function f. If f is invoked multiple times, a and b can each be executed under different invocations.

- **a is consistent with b in f**: specifies that the basic blocks at addresses a and b will execute the same number of times during an invocation of the function f.

- **a executes n times**: specifies that the basic block at address a will only ever execute at most n times in total in all possible contexts.

It would be possible to transform these extra constraints into *proof obligations*—statements which a verification engineer could be asked to prove formally. This would remove the possibility of human error mistakenly excluding a path which is in fact feasible, resulting in an unsound analysis. We validate some of these constraints automatically in Chapter 6.

### 4.5.3 Comparing analysis with measurements

As in Section 3.4.5, we aim to gain some insight into how close our upper bounds are. We wrote test programs to exercise the longest paths we could find ourselves (guided by the results of the analysis) and ran these on the hardware. We measured the execution time of these paths using the cycle counters available on the ARM1136’s performance monitoring unit.

In order to quantify the amount of pessimism introduced by conservatism in the hardware model, we use our static analysis model to compute the execution time of paths that we are able to reproduce, and compared them with real hardware. The results of this are shown in Figure 4.7. These are upper bounds on the amount of pessimism, as we cannot guarantee that we have truly hit the worst-case scenario for the hardware.
### 4.6. RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Before L2 off</th>
<th>After L2 off</th>
<th>After L2 on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>computed</td>
<td>observed</td>
<td>ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syscall</td>
<td>3851 µs</td>
<td>332.4 µs</td>
<td>101.9 µs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undef. inst.</td>
<td>394.5 µs</td>
<td>44.4 µs</td>
<td>42.6 µs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page fault</td>
<td>396.1 µs</td>
<td>44.9 µs</td>
<td>42.9 µs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt</td>
<td>143.1 µs</td>
<td>23.2 µs</td>
<td>17.7 µs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2:** WCET for each kernel entry-point in seL4, before and after our changes to reduce WCET. Computed results are a safe upper bound on execution time. Observed results are our best-effort attempt at recreating worst cases on hardware.

### 4.6 Results

We first computed the worst-case execution time of our modified seL4 kernel binary using only the loop iteration counts and no other human input. This provided us with an upper bound on the execution time of the kernel of over 600 000 cycles (1.2 ms). We converted the solution to a concrete execution trace. However, from looking at these traces it was quickly apparent that the solution was in fact infeasible as the path it took was meaningless—no input could possibly result in execution of the path.

We then added additional constraints of the form described in Section 4.5.2, in order to eliminate paths that were obviously infeasible. Each of these constraints was derived by observing why a given trace could not be executed. The biggest cause of these infeasible paths was due to the style of coding in seL4, which stems from its functional roots. Many functions in seL4 contain switch statements that select code based on the type of cap passed in, as shown in Figure 4.5. If \(f()\) and \(g()\) both use this style then, due to virtual inlining, much of the inlined copy of \(g()\) will never be executed, as the return value of \(\text{getCapType}()\) is guaranteed to be the same in both functions.

Our analysis detects the WCET of \(g()\), which only occurs for one specific cap type, as contributing to every invocation of \(g()\) from \(f()\). This leads to significant overestimation of the WCET. Based on this, we added several constraints of the form \(a\) is consistent with \(b\), where \(a\) and \(b\) were the blocks corresponding to the same types in \(f()\) and \(g()\). Later, we show how these constraints can be automatically validated (Chapter 6), or detected (Chapter 7).
void f(cap_t cap) {
  ...
  switch (getCapType(cap)) {
    case frame_cap:
      ...
      g(cap);
      ...
      break;
    case page_table_cap:
      ...
      g(cap);
      ...
      break;
    ...
  }

Figure 4.5: Example of the coding style used in many seL4 functions. This arises from the use of pattern matching over type constructors in its Haskell specification.

We added additional constraints until we obtained a path that appeared to be feasible. This path has an execution time estimate of 232,098 cycles with the L2 cache enabled, or 176,851 cycles with the L2 cache disabled. On the 532 MHz i.MX31, this corresponds to an execution time of 436.3 \( \mu s \) with L2 and 332.4 \( \mu s \) without L2.

The full results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.2. The first column shows the WCET before we modified seL4 as outlined in this chapter, making the results comparable to our previous analysis in Chapter 3 (the previous analysis was on the OMAP3 platform and thus is not directly comparable).\(^2\) For the system call path, we observe a factor of 11.6 improvement in WCET, largely due to the added preemption points. The other kernel entry points also see a significant improvement because the scheduler bitmaps and the new address-space management techniques remove two potentially long-running loops.

The worst-case interrupt latency of seL4 is the sum of the WCET for the system call path (the longest of all kernel operations), and the interrupt path. This gives an upper bound on the interrupt latency of 481 \( \mu s \) with L2 and 336 \( \mu s \) without.

\(^2\) The i.MX31 processor in this analysis has half the L1 cache of the OMAP3 from our previous analysis, a 33% slower clock, and only a single-issue pipeline. Additionally, the difference in latency between a cache hit and a cache miss is much smaller on the i.MX31 (when the L2 is disabled), reducing the amount of overestimation in the analysis.
For all entry points except the system call handler, we were able to construct scenarios that produced execution times that were within 31% of the computed upper bound when the L2 cache was disabled. Enabling the L2 cache increases the amount of pessimism in our upper bounds, and thus the disparity is much higher (e.g. 3.13 for the interrupt path). Recreating the path identified by the system call handler proved to be extremely complicated and our best efforts only achieved a case that was within 5.4 times of our computed upper bound.

### 4.6.1 Analysis

The worst-case we detected was a system call performing an atomic two-way (send-receive) IPC operation, using all the features seL4 provides for its IPC, including a full-length message transfer, and granting access rights to objects over IPC. The largest contributing factor to the run-time of this case was address decoding for caps. Recall that caps are essentially pointers to kernel objects with some associated metadata. In seL4, caps have addresses that exist in a 32-bit capability space; decoding an address to a kernel object may require traversing up to 32 edges of a directed graph, as shown in Figure 4.6. In a worst-case IPC, this decoding may need to be performed up to 11 times, each in different capability spaces, leading to a significant number of cache misses. Note that most seL4-based systems would be designed to require at most one or two levels of decoding; it would be highly unusual to encounter anything close to this worst-case capability space on a real system, unless crafted by an adversary.

This worst case demonstrates that our work has been successful in minimising the interrupt latency of the longer running kernel operations, such as object creation and deletion. In previous analyses of seL4, a distinction was made between open and closed systems, where closed systems permitted only specific IPC operations to avoid long interrupt latencies, and open systems permitted any untrusted code to execute. Our work now eliminates the need for this distinction, as the latencies for the open-system scenarios are no more than that of the closed system. However, retaining a closed system distinction would permit the latency to be reduced further, as the worst-case lookup of a 32-level-deep capability could be avoided in such a design.

The atomic send-receive operation exists in seL4 primarily as an optimisation to avoid entering the kernel twice for this common scenario—user-level servers in an event loop will frequently respond to one request and then wait to receive the next.
Figure 4.6: A worst-case address decoding scenario uses a capability space that requires a separate lookup for each bit of an address. Here, a binary address 010...0 would decode to object A, but may need to traverse up to 32 levels of this structure to do so.

If necessary, the execution time of this operation could be almost halved either by inserting a preemption point between the send and receive phases, or by simply forcing the user to invoke the send and receive phases separately. This latter approach would be detrimental to average-case throughput. We investigate placing a preemption point between the two phases in Section 5.3.6 of the following chapter.

Other entry points to the kernel show no unexpected pathological cases; these entry points are largely deterministic and have little branching. Like the IPC operations, the worst case for these require decoding a capability that exists 32 levels deep in the capability space. However only one such capability needs to be decoded in the other exception handlers (to the thread which will handle the exception).

The improvements outlined in this chapter do not significantly affect the best- or average-case execution time of the kernel, because IPCs are the most frequent operations in microkernel-based systems. seL4 already provides fastpaths to improve the performance of common IPC operations by an order of magnitude—fastpaths are highly-optimised code paths designed to execute a specific operation as quickly as possible. The fastpath performance is not affected by our preemption points. In
fact, the IPC fastpath is one of the fastest operations the kernel performs (around 185 cycles on the ARM1136) and hence there would be no benefit in making it preemptible.

For complete systems, the in-memory working set of the typical workload must be considered to determine if reducing the available cache memory will have any detrimental effects—particularly for memory-bound applications.

### 4.6.2 Conservatism of hardware model

Our hardware model is conservative to guarantee a safe bound on execution time. In order to determine the amount of pessimism this adds to our upper bounds, we computed the execution time of the specific paths we tested in our analysis. We achieved this by adding extra constraints to the ILP problem to force analysis of the desired path. The results are shown in Figure 4.7. The observed execution times were obtained by taking the maximum of 100,000 executions of each path.

The disparity between the computed and observed time is attributable to both conservatism in our pipeline and cache models of the processor, and the difficulty in forcing a worst-case processor state. To identify the amount due to conservatism in cache modelling, we also configured the cache to allow only a single cache way for replacement (i.e. emulating a direct-mapped cache) and observed the worst-case execution times on hardware. This resulted in a negligible change in overestimation on all paths except for the system call path, where overestimation was reduced by 16%.

As the system call path is much longer than the other three paths (by an order of magnitude), contention within each cache set is more likely. However, the small differences suggest that our measurement tests exhibit little cache contention—longer paths with pathological cache conflicts could still arise.

### 4.6.3 Computation time

The entire static analysis ran in 65 minutes on an AMD Opteron (Barcelona) system running at 2.1 GHz. We repeated all analysis steps for each entry point—system calls, undefined instructions, page faults and interrupts. The analysis of the latter three entry points completed within seconds, whilst the analysis of the system call
entry point took significantly longer. This is to be expected, as the system call handler is the entry point for the majority of seL4’s code.

For the system call handler, the most computationally-intensive step of the analysis was running Chronos, taking 61 minutes. Over half the execution time of Chronos was spent in the address and cache analysis phases—these phases compute worst-case cache hit/miss scenarios for each data load, store and instruction fetch.

We went through numerous iterations of adding additional constraints to the ILP problem in order to exclude infeasible paths, with each iteration taking around an hour to execute.

### 4.6.4 Impact of L2 and branch predictors

As mentioned in Section 4.5.1, we disabled the branch predictors on our platform and in our model as we are presently unable to analyse their effect. We also compare the effects of enabling or disabling the L2 cache. Figure 4.8 shows the impact of enabling these features both individually and together on actual execution time.
It is interesting to note that some of the observed times actually increased when enabling the L2 cache, by up to 8% for the page fault path. This is because the worst-case scenarios execute with cold caches that are polluted with data which must first be evicted. Enabling the L2 cache increases the latency of the memory hierarchy—from 60 cycles to 96 cycles for a miss serviced by main memory—which is particularly detrimental to cold-cache performance. The code paths executed in seL4 are typically very short and non-repetitive, thereby gaining little added benefit from the L2 cache that is not already provided by the L1 caches.

Enabling the branch predictor gave a minor improvement in all test cases. The benefit is minimal again because of the cold-cache nature of these benchmarks; the benefit of the branch predictor barely makes up for the added costs of the initial mispredictions.

Despite these results, the L2 cache and branch predictors greatly improve performance in the average case. Reduced run-time translates directly to increased battery life for hand-held devices such as mobile phones, and so the slightly detrimental effect on interrupt latency is almost certainly worthwhile on such devices.

As noted earlier, it is possible to lock the entire seL4 microkernel into the L2 cache, giving a substantial benefit to worst-case interrupt latency of the kernel whilst also reducing non-determinism. We pursue this idea in Section 5.3.7.

### 4.7 Related work

The intersection of formal verification, kernel design and real-time kernels is not an area previously explored in the literature. However, each of these areas individually have been researched in quite some depth. This section will cover the most relevant related work.

**Ford et al. (1999)** have explored the differences between process-based and event-based kernels, and presented the Fluke kernel which, like seL4, utilises restartable system calls rather than continuations to implement an atomic kernel API. They outline the advantages of this model, including ease of userspace checkpointing, process migration and aided reliability. They also measured the overhead of restarting kernel operations to be at most 8% of the cost of the operations themselves.

Several subprojects of Verisoft have attempted to formally verify all or part of dif-
different OS kernels. They have verified a very small and simple time-triggered RTOS called Olos (Daum et al., 2009b), as well as parts of their VAMOS microkernel (Daum et al., 2009a). These kernels are also based on the event-driven single-kernel-stack model. They are much simpler kernels than seL4 (e.g. VAMOS supports only single-level page tables) and are designed for the formally-verified VAMP processor (Beyer et al., 2006). Whilst the VAMP processor is a real-world product, it is not widely used.

A related project has constructed and verified a small hypervisor on the VAMP processor down to the assembly level (Alkassar et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2012). The verification process uses the C verification tool, VCC (Cohen et al., 2009), linked by a pen-and-paper proof to semantics on a simple C intermediate language and a macro assembler language. VCC has also been used to verify parts of the Microsoft Hyper-V hypervisor, although neither of these hypervisors provide real-time guarantees.

A second related project began to verify the PikeOS RTOS, which consists of a multi-threaded, preemptible, L4-based microkernel acting as a hypervisor for paravirtualised guests (Baumann et al., 2010, 2012). PikeOS is a commercial product used in safety-critical real-time systems such as aircraft and medical devices, but

Figure 4.8: Effects of enabling L2 cache and/or branch prediction on worst-case observed execution times. Each path is normalised to the baseline execution time (L2 and branch predictors disabled).
there has been no indication of a sound worst-case interrupt latency analysis.

Some progress has been made towards verifying code that executes in the presence of interrupts. Feng et al. (2008) have constructed a framework on which to reason about OS code in the presence of interrupts and preemption. Gotsman and Yang (2011) have also constructed frameworks for verifying preemptible and multiprocessor kernels, and have used theirs to verify an OS scheduler.

Chapman et al. (1994) propose the idea of reusing a proof system and the invariants proven within it to aid worst-case timing analysis. They use symbolic execution to analyse a program in order to compute verification conditions for correctness proofs, and compute path conditions for timing analysis. They use SPARK Ada which integrates partial proof information such as pre- and post-conditions into the language. Although this idea has promise, their paper describes a work-in-progress implementation that does not appear to have been completed.

Klein (2009) provides thorough overview of the state of formal verification of operating systems.

4.8 Summary

In this chapter we have explored how to reduce the worst-case interrupt response time of a verified protected microkernel such as seL4. We have added preemption points into some of seL4’s operations, and have restructured others in order to remove all non-preemptible long-running operations from the kernel. These improvements have been guided by an analysis of the kernel’s worst-case execution time.

From its inception, the design of seL4 was intended to limit interrupt latency to short bounded operations, although this was not true of the original implementation. Using static analysis to compute interrupt latencies, we could systematically validate and improve the design where necessary.

As a verified microkernel, seL4 imposes additional constraints on how preemption may be introduced. We must take care when adding preemption points to ensure that the effort of re-verifying the kernel is minimised. This effort can be reduced by avoiding unnecessary violations of global kernel invariants, and searching for intermediate states that are generally consistent with the kernel’s normal execution.
CHAPTER 4. FORMAL VERIFICATION VS INTERRUPT LATENCY

With careful placement of preemption points, we have eliminated large interrupt latencies caused by longer running operations inside seL4. This enables seL4 to host execution of untrusted code, confined by the capabilities given to it, and still safely meet real-time deadlines within 189,117 cycles. On modern embedded hardware this translates to a few hundred microseconds, which is ample for many real-time applications.

The biggest issue with seL4’s design in terms of interrupt latency, is the decision to use a versatile 32-bit capability addressing scheme—each of the 32 bits that need to be decoded can theoretically lead to another cache miss, and decoding several such addresses results in significant interrupt latencies. Practical systems can use the seL4 authority model to prevent this scenario by not allowing an adversary the ability to construct their own capability space.

We have shown that the event-based model of seL4 can offer sub-millisecond latencies, making it acceptable for many real-time application domains. The event-based model also brings the benefits of reduced kernel complexity. We assert that a process-based kernel without preemption would attain interrupt latencies in the same order of magnitude as the event-based model. A fully-preemptible process-based kernel may attain much smaller latencies, but forgoes the possibility of formal verification using present state-of-the-art techniques. We investigate this notion further in the following chapter.

Verification technology may some day be able to reason about the correctness of fully-preemptible kernels. Until then, a formally-verifiable event-based microkernel such as seL4 provides a very high assurance platform on which safety-critical and real-time systems can be confidently built.
Chapter 5

Limits of interrupt latency in non-preemptible kernels

This chapter is partly based on work published at APSys 2012 in which I was the primary author (Blackham, Tang, and Heiser, 2012b). The analysis of the QNX microkernel in Section 5.4 was performed by Vernon Tang.

5.1 Overview

In the previous chapter, we saw that the interrupt latency of a non-preemptible kernel could be limited to the order of hundreds of microseconds using a design that employs the idea of incremental consistency and appropriately placed preemption points. This is suitable for a large class of systems, but some systems demand even shorter interrupt latencies—for example, high-end motion control systems require response times in the order of tens of microseconds. Such applications presently use a fully-preemptible RTOS, often without memory protection, to ensure interrupt latency is minimised.

The interrupt latencies obtained in the previous chapter are an order of magnitude worse than what these application domains require. However, we were working under the additional constraint that the resulting kernel code could still be functionally verified, something that is presently not achievable at all for preemptible kernels.

A fully-preemptible kernel design exhibits lower average-case latencies but they do so at a cost: RTOS code must be reentrant and is full of critical sections, which
must be protected by locks. Not only do locks introduce run-time overhead (which affects average-case performance), the resultant highly-concurrent code is difficult to reason about and therefore highly error-prone, significantly increasing the potential for obscure bugs which can be extremely hard to find and eliminate. We are facing a trade-off between assurance and timeliness.

Mixed-criticality systems necessitate the use of isolation between components (and the RTOS). In a protected-mode OS, hardware-imposed overheads significantly increase the cost of switching between application and OS operation, and the cost of switching between user contexts (e.g. to handle an interrupt destined for a partition different from the one presently executing).

In fact, these hardware costs are in the order of dozens or even hundreds of cycles, in the same magnitude as the (generally simple) functions performed by an RTOS. This means that the cost of preempting the RTOS operation is similar to the time required for letting it complete uninterrupted, resulting in a significant shift in performance trade-offs compared to classical, unprotected RTOSes.

Yet, the belief persists in academia and industry that an RTOS must be fully preemptible: for example, commercial RTOSes supporting memory protection, such as QNX Neutrino (QNX), VxWorks (Wind River) and INTEGRITY (Green Hills Software), are fully preemptible.

We claim that the perceived need for a fully-preemptible design of a protected RTOS is a myth. Specifically, we assert that for mixed-criticality systems, or any system employing dual-mode execution and memory protection, a non-preemptible design can achieve acceptable worst-case performance for many applications, while remaining much simpler (and therefore more trustworthy) and providing better average-case performance. We claim that this is largely because of the inherently high costs of delivering an interrupt to userspace, compared with in-kernel interrupt delivery.

In this chapter, we demonstrate modifications to the non-preemptible seL4 kernel to significantly reduce its interrupt latency, and describe how preemption points can be added with minimal performance impact (Section 5.3). We extrapolate this to what could be hypothetically achieved with a dedicated engineered effort, and also compare with the worst-case interrupt response time for a mature commercial fully-preemptible RTOS, QNX Neutrino. The results are given in Section 5.5, showing that the non-preemptible approach can achieve a guaranteed latency of under $50\,\mu$s, making it highly competitive for low-latency applications. This supports our claim
that there is no inherent advantage to the fully-preemptible design that would justify
the added complexity and reduced average-case performance.

5.2 Related work

Our work relates closely to previous experiments by Ford et al. (1999) on the Fluke
kernel. They found that a fully-preemptible kernel provided the lowest latency
for dispatching kernel threads, however their evaluation only addressed observable
latency using hardware measurements, and not necessarily the true worst cases. The
analyses presented in this thesis use static analysis to compute safe upper bounds on
the worst-case latency, which can be relied upon for hard real-time systems. Ford
also measure latencies only on long IPC operations, and add preemption points
only for IPCs. Our results find that while IPC is a bottleneck, there exist other
long-running kernel operations which are more difficult to preempt.

Swartzendruber (1994) investigated making the Mach microkernel fully-preemptible,
by reusing the work that had been done to support multi-processor systems. He
observed that a multi-processor-capable kernel is easier to migrate to be fully-
preemptible, by reusing existing locking protocols as critical sections for a preempt-
able uni-processor kernel. Although neither latency or performance were measured,
he estimated that uni-processor performance would decrease by roughly 10%.

The monolithic Linux kernel originally used a non-preemptible design, but has
evolved incrementally towards increased preemptibility. McKenney provides a good
summary of the various attempts to retrofit real-time behaviour onto a Linux kernel.
For mixed-criticality real-time systems, the only viable approaches are those taken
by projects such as L4Linux (Härtig et al., 1998), where Linux is ported to run para-
virtualised on top of a real-time capable microkernel. This approach sidesteps the
preemptibility issue of Linux entirely, whilst reducing the trusted computing base.
We note that seL4 also supports running para-virtualised Linux as an unprivileged
user process.

We are not aware of any work which considers the extent to which worst-case latency
can be reduced in a non-preemptible kernel.
5.3 A non-preemptible kernel

We choose to adapt seL4 as our non-preemptible target, primarily because we already have a working worst-case execution time analysis workflow for seL4, as described in previous chapters. Starting with the results achieved in Chapter 4, we perform a series of modifications to seL4 to reduce its interrupt latency further, dropping the requirement of formal verification. Forgoing this requirement enables optimisations such as more liberal use of preemption points, and other common C optimisation tricks.

Given the proliferation of preemption points, minimising their impact on worst-case and average-case performance is an important goal. Section 5.3.1 describes how preemption points can be implemented with minimal impact. Subsequent sections elaborate on the changes made, analysing what bottlenecks need to be overcome to improve real-time performance.

5.3.1 Minimal impact preemption points

We have seen that introducing preemption points into a non-preemptible kernel allows the interrupt latency to be bounded and reduced when executing long code paths. However, there are a number of ways to implement them, each with their own trade-offs in the design space. The features and timing characteristics of the target hardware often influence the best choice of implementation for a kernel. For example, some hardware imposes a much higher cost to poll for pending interrupts than to simply take the interrupt. On some CPUs, disabling and enabling interrupts can also be expensive operations, taking dozens of cycles or more.

The following sections describe three possible implementations of preemption points for non-preemptible kernels.

Explicitly enabling interrupts

One possible method runs the kernel with interrupts disabled. Within long-running loops, the state of the kernel is made consistent at the end of each loop iteration (leveraging the principle of incremental consistency described in Section 4.2.3). Once consistent, the kernel can enable interrupts and then immediately disable them.
/* Begin long-running operation. */
for (...) {
    /* Perform incremental progress. */
    ...

    if (++amountOfWork >= 100) {
        /* Make kernel state consistent. */
        ...

        amountOfWork = 0;

        interruptEnable();
        /* If any interrupts are pending, they
         * will be handled immediately here. */
        interruptDisable();
    }
}

Figure 5.1: A preemption point implemented by enabling and disabling interrupts when
the kernel’s state is consistent.

If any interrupts are pending, the CPU will immediately branch to the interrupt
handler. If no interrupts were pending, the kernel can continue with the long-
running operation.

The performance impact of this method depends on the execution cost of enabling
and disabling interrupts on the CPU. As this is typically at least tens of cycles,
it is common to only enable interrupts after a specific amount of work has been
completed. Setting the “amount of work” becomes a trade-off between the average-
case performance degradation and the worst-case interrupt latency. The structure
of such a loop is shown in Figure 5.1.

Polling for pending interrupts

A second method also runs the kernel with interrupts disabled, but instead of en-
abling and disabling interrupts, it simply polls the hardware for any pending inter-
rupts, as shown in Figure 5.2. The advantage of this method is that the kernel’s
state need only be made consistent if there is actually an interrupt pending, which
may be more efficient for some operations.
/* Begin long-running operation. */
for (...) {
    /* Perform incremental progress. */
    ...

    if (++amountOfWork >= 100) {
        amountOfWork = 0;

        if (interruptPending()) {
            /* Make kernel state consistent. */
            ...

            handleInterrupt();
        }
    }
}

**Figure 5.2:** A preemption point implemented by polling the interrupt controller for pending interrupts.

The performance of this method is heavily dependent on the execution cost to query for pending interrupts. On some platforms, notably on many ARM-based platforms, there is no mechanism within the CPU to discover pending interrupts, and a request must be made to the off-core interrupt controller to learn this information. If the cost of accessing the interrupt controller is negligible, then this approach is superior to the method above. However, on some hardware, accessing the interrupt controller could be more expensive than enabling or disabling interrupts.

**Software-emulated polling for pending interrupts**

The third approach we present is similar to the previous, but emulates a “pending interrupt” flag in software in order to overcome the high cost of polling the hardware for interrupts. To emulate the flag, the kernel runs with interrupts enabled. However, the interrupt handler routine first checks if it was the kernel that was interrupted. If so, it (1) sets the pending interrupt flag, (2) disables further interrupts, and (3) returns directly to the code it interrupted.

Like in the second approach, a long-running operation polls for pending interrupts, but this time using the pending interrupt flag. When an interrupt is detected, it
5.3. A NON-PREEMPTIBLE KERNEL

/* Begin long-running operation. */
for (...) {
    /* Perform incremental progress. */
    ...

    if (interruptPending == true) {
        /* Make kernel state consistent. */
        ...

        handleInterrupt();
    }
}

Figure 5.3: A preemption point implemented by a software-emulated pending interrupt flag.

makes the kernel’s state consistent so that the interrupt can be handled, as shown in Figure 5.3. The common case now contains no slow interrupt-management code. The pending interrupt flag check is a single memory access which by its nature will almost always be hot in the CPU’s L1 cache. This also means that “amount of work” counter seen in the previous two approaches is no longer necessary, as it serves no benefit here.

The impact on the average case performance is reduced to a hot-cache memory load, an arithmetic comparison and an untaken branch. On a typical ARM platform such as the ARM1136, hot-cache accesses are single-cycle (although with a 3-cycle load delay) and correctly predicted branches are folded (i.e. completely removed from the instruction stream). For a well-crafted (or well-compiled) loop which avoids the pipeline stall created by the memory load, the average-case execution time per iteration can be as little as two cycles greater than the equivalent non-preemptible code section.

It is easy to be enamored with the elegance of this approach to preemption points. However, there are ugly artefacts of real-world systems and CPUs which mean developers need to be careful when implementing this. Namely, numerous ARM implementations have errata which can cause incorrect behaviour, or even deadlock the CPU, if interrupts arrive at inopportune times during certain system operations.

1 Strategic data placement can ensure the address of this flag can be easily computed (and thus does not require an additional literal load), reducing excess register pressure, as well as minimising the impact on the kernel’s cache footprint.
Running the kernel with interrupts enabled by default means that special care must be taken to ensure that such errata cases cannot occur, typically by disabling interrupts before issuing the offending operations. Note that this is no different from the level of care which would be required when implementing a fully-preemptible kernel.

A note on verifiability

The first two approaches align with the existing seL4 verification, as the single-threaded nature of the kernel is maintained, and the interrupt-specific functions are modelled as non-deterministic inputs. In fact, the second approach is what is currently used by the verified seL4 kernel.

It is not clear how to integrate the third approach into the high-assurance verification of the seL4 kernel, as the verification assumes that all code executes sequentially. Enabling interrupts during execution breaks a fundamental assumption of the proof. Despite that, it could be proven that the interrupt handler itself has no visible effects on the state of the system (beyond the pending interrupt flag). Combined with a proof of kernel correctness that assumes single-threaded execution, this gives a strong guarantee that the system still behaves as specified.

Of course, as described earlier, it is possible that hardware bugs and errata may partly undermine these guarantees, but this remains a problem for any system, notably fully-preemptible systems.

For the analysis performed in this chapter and presented in Section 5.5, we implement the third approach in the seL4 microkernel.

5.3.2 Preserving the fastpath

In order to achieve good performance, microkernel-based systems rely on very fast IPC operations, typically provided by IPC fastpaths (Liedtke et al., 1997; Blackham and Heiser, 2012). A fastpath usually improves IPC times by orders of magnitude, as it handles only the most commonly executed operations, deferring other operations to the conventional slowpath. As adding preemption points in a code path generally increases its uninterrupted execution time, making the IPC fastpath preemptible would degrade average-case performance.
5.3. A NON-PREEMPTIBLE KERNEL

The IPC fastpath in seL4 has already been heavily optimised for fast context switching. Given this, we can aim to reduce the kernel’s overall interrupt latency down to that of the WCET of the fastpath, as there is little benefit from going further. There may be other limitations on how low the interrupt latency can be made, but the WCET of the fastpath certainly marks the point beyond which there will be diminishing returns.

5.3.3 Removing capability addressing

Our previous analysis of seL4 identified the longest execution path being a worst-case IPC operation. As described in Section 4.6.1, seL4’s flexible capability addressing creates a worst case of hundreds of cache misses on certain IPC operations.

The WCET for seL4 is improved drastically by forgoing its flexible capability addressing scheme, ensuring that all capabilities can be resolved by traversing only a single level within the capability space (not 32 as was previously possible). Most RTOSes do not offer anything comparable to the flexible addressing scheme of seL4. At worst this makes seL4’s addressing on par with other RTOSes, where a single level of indirection is typically used to address kernel objects.

By limiting the lookup depth to just one level, we reduce the number of potential cache misses caused by address lookups by a factor of 32.

5.3.4 Global kernel mapping copy

The seL4 kernel is mapped into virtual memory in the top 256 MiB of every address space on the system. This mapping is represented by 1 KiB of data in every page directory, which must be copied each time a new page directory is created. The process of copying these mappings was non-preemptible and therefore a contributor to potentially long execution times. The seL4 proof depends on having a flat 1:1 mapping of physical memory, as it cannot reason about the safety of mapping or unmapping kernel pages in which seL4 itself may be executing. However, beyond the proof, the kernel is not intrinsically linked to this model.

Possible solutions to overcome the copy latency include:

1. simply adding preemption points to the copy operation;
2. moving the entire seL4 kernel into its own 32-bit address space;

3. lazily populating the address space as the kernel faults on memory accesses within the kernel mapping; or

4. reducing the size of the global kernel mapping.

The first solution impacts many parts of the kernel, as address space objects must now be checked for completeness before being used, or alternately an intermediate object type could be added. Either approach increases the complexity of kernel invariants, and therefore the verification process. The second solution simplifies the kernel, avoiding the address space copy entirely. However, it also impacts negatively on overall performance, as a context switch is then required for every kernel entry and exit.

The third solution is very difficult to verify within the seL4 proof, as the proof assumes that faults do not occur inside the kernel. It is relatively straightforward to implement though, and has negligible run-time overhead. However it does increase the worst-case execution time, as memory accesses can now induce an additional fault. We chose to implement this option. As the code to map a kernel page on fault is hand-coded in assembly, it runs very efficiently and its impact can be easily bounded.

The final possible solution, reducing the size of global kernel mapping, requires dynamically mapping and unmapping memory frames containing kernel objects as they are required. This allows the size of the global kernel mapping to shrink to only a few megabytes—the kernel code itself and all its internal global data structures sum to at most a few hundred kilobytes. This approach is effectively equivalent to the third solution (lazily populating the address space), as the kernel maps pages only as they need to be accessed. However, the average-case performance and kernel complexity suffer, because mapping operations must be done explicitly on every access to any kernel object.

5.3.5 Breaking long code paths

Despite making all loops within seL4 preemptible using preemption points, there are still large sections of loop-free code which contribute to long worst-case execution times (over 100 $\mu$s). We analysed the offending code paths, and found that none of
the long paths *required* atomicity—they were simply performing multiple operations, which could theoretically be implemented as separate calls.

For example, seL4 offers a system call which configures several independent aspects of a thread—its address space, its capability space, its IPC buffer and its priority. Calls such as this exhibit the incremental consistency property, because they perform several small updates, whilst retaining global consistency of kernel data structures between changes. It is easy to make them preemptible by adding preemption points between each of the steps, and we do so for the analysis described later in Section 5.5.

### 5.3.6 Non-preemptible IPC

Another contributor to worst-case interrupt latency was the seL4 IPC slowpath, which is used for copying messages between communicating processes. We do not wish to make the slowpath preemptible, as this would require adding complexity to the IPC fastpath, which would significantly impact average-case system performance.

With non-preemptible IPC, the maximum length of an IPC message is a convenient variable which can be tuned to alter the kernel’s worst-case latency. Shorter IPCs will reduce the bandwidth between communicating processes, but for applications requiring high-bandwidth communication, shared memory regions are a more appropriate choice. Of course, there is some minimum message length required to maintain reasonable system performance, which is application-dependent.

To minimise latency, the maximum IPC length should be chosen so that the WCET of an IPC is equal to the largest WCET of any other kernel operation. Reducing it below this value provides no benefit, while raising it above this value directly increases the worst-case latency. Given this, we reduce the maximum message length of seL4 to from 480 bytes to 240 bytes.

If every other kernel operation’s WCET could be made fast enough that the equivalent IPC lengths were too short (and causing performance issues), then preemptible IPC may need to be reconsidered. Otherwise it is a premature optimisation.

Another issue affecting seL4 was a specific IPC operation known as *ReplyWait*, which atomically performs the functionality of two operations commonly called together: *Reply* (send) and *Wait* (receive). The IPC fastpath relies on the atomicity of these operations to significantly improve performance, as no scheduler interactions are
required. We expect that if an IPC operation falls back to the slowpath, there is a negligible penalty in adding a preemption point between the send and receive phases. Doing so effectively halves the WCET of this path.

There is still room for improvement in seL4 by making the copy operation more efficient (e.g. with multi-word copies, using preloading tricks, etc). Doing so would allow for longer IPCs, but would not reduce the worst-case latency of the kernel, assuming the kernel adheres to the above rule to determine IPC length.

5.3.7 L2 cache pinning

Although CPUs have increased in performance by several orders of magnitude in the past 30 years, memory latencies have not kept the same pace (Patterson, 2004). Operations which are inherently memory-intensive and have unpredictable access patterns have seen almost no benefit from newer technologies. The increased disparity between CPU and memory speeds have pushed hardware manufacturers to include one or more levels of caches even in embedded systems.

CPU caches can be accessed significantly faster than main memory. For example, the KZM ARM11 platform has two levels of caches—the first can be accessed in a single cycle and the second in 26 cycles, compared with external memory access latencies of 96 cycles (with the L2 cache enabled).

Considering the effect of caches is a challenge for hard real-time systems as it increases the gap between the worst case (which must be allowed for) and the average case (which is the common operating point). To mitigate the unpredictability caused by caches, many platforms provide the ability to pin data or instructions into the cache. Pinned data and instructions are never evicted from the cache, and therefore guarantee a shorter bound on access times.

As fast caches are typically much smaller than main memory, the choice of what to pin must normally be made with great care. Pinning data into the cache precludes the pinned portion of cache from being used for the rest of the system, where it may actually be better utilised to improve average-case performance.

As microkernels are intended to provide the bare minimum functionality for ensuring security of a system, they are typically very small. Our modified seL4 microkernel executable can fit into 29.5 KiB. The L2 cache on our platform is 128 KiB, which
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means that the entire kernel code fits into $\frac{1}{4}$ of the L2 cache. It would be unlikely, if not impossible, for monolithic kernels to fit into this space, nor even many larger microkernels.

Given that we have gone to great lengths to make loops in the kernel preemptible, the remaining non-preemptible code is likely to only ever execute once. Therefore without cache pinning the worst-case execution time is never improved by the cache—in the worst case, none of the kernel’s instructions are in the cache, and so every execution path will encounter a swarm of cache misses.

By pinning the instructions into the L2 cache, the latency of L1 instruction cache misses is reduced by 73% on our platform. This drops the upper bound on CPU time that is wasted waiting for memory, and therefore significantly improves the worst-case execution time.

Furthermore, the interrupt delivery path can be pinned into the L1 cache to reduce interrupt latency further, as was shown in Section 4.4.

Note that a fully-preemptible microkernel, if sufficiently small, could also employ the same approach. However, we argue that because interrupt delivery paths in both the fully-preemptible and non-preemptible designs are significant contributors to response time, the improvements gained when applied to either approach would be comparable.

5.4 A fully-preemptible kernel

As we know by now, the latency of userspace interrupt delivery on a kernel is determined by two independent factors:

- the *in-kernel dispatch latency*: the latency between the arrival of an interrupt to the CPU hardware and executing the in-kernel interrupt handler; and

- the *kernel-userspace dispatch latency*: the time taken between the in-kernel interrupt handler executing and the start of the userspace interrupt handler.

For a “fully-preemptible” kernel, the in-kernel dispatch latency is determined by all code paths where interrupts are disabled—these are mostly between interrupt

\footnote{The L2 cache on our platform permits pinning in multiples of $\frac{1}{8}$ of the size of the cache, so falling just under $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cache minimises the amount of wasted memory.}
disable/enable pairs used for concurrency control, but they can also arise where the hardware may disable interrupts (e.g. on the transition from user mode into kernel mode upon an exception). A carefully designed fully-preemptible kernel can minimise this latency for many operations; however, the critical aspect is the worst case—i.e. the longest of any such paths. Most importantly, avoiding unbounded non-preemptible loops is crucial for bounding interrupt latency.

The kernel-userspace dispatch latency is affected by both the design of the kernel and inherent limitations of the hardware’s context switching and interrupt processing time. These considerations are shared by fully-preemptible and non-preemptible kernel designs alike.

There are several commercial fully-preemptible, general-purpose kernels used in real-time systems today, such as QNX Neutrino (QNX), VxWorks (Wind River) and INTEGRITY (Green Hills Software). Most high-performance microkernels are commercial endeavours and the cost of obtaining binaries for these is often substantial. Their sources are considered to be of great commercial value, thus getting access to the source for independent analysis is nearly impossible.

One we were able to get access to was the QNX Neutrino microkernel. The QNX sources were made publicly available in 2008, and binaries are also available. Although our WCET analysis works on the compiled binary, the availability of source code was crucial—the analysis required a significant amount of manual intervention, which benefited substantially from the understanding of QNX’s internals gleaned from the source code.

We analyse the QNX Neutrino microkernel and use it as a representative of the fully-preemptible approach due to its maturity and broad real-world adoption.

5.4.1 “Fully-preemptible” vs “fully-preemptible”

In the traditional RTOS mindset, a fully-preemptible kernel can execute an interrupt handler with very short latencies because interrupts are rarely disabled. However, this ability generally extends only to interrupt handlers that run within the kernel. In a mixed-criticality system, in-kernel interrupt handlers are unacceptable, as an error in an interrupt handler can crash the entire system. In order for the kernel of a mixed-criticality system to be considered fully-preemptible, not only must the kernel run with interrupts enabled, but upon receiving an interrupt, it must be able
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to dispatch that interrupt to userspace immediately.

We note that the design of QNX is not actually suited to mixed-criticality systems—although QNX is fully-preemptible by the traditional RTOS definition, the scheduling of a userspace interrupt handler can be delayed, not just by regions where interrupts are disabled, but also by any code that “locks” the kernel.

In QNX, the kernel must be locked before performing any non-idempotent modification to the kernel state (e.g. a heap allocation). When the kernel is executing unlocked, any interrupt can preempt the current operation to schedule a userspace thread. The preempted operation is simply restarted later. However, if an interrupt arrives when the kernel is locked, a userspace thread cannot be scheduled until the kernel operation is completed.

A brief inspection of QNX shows that several code paths which execute when locked contain unbounded loops that are dependent on system state (e.g. paths which are affected by the amount of heap fragmentation). The worst-case response time must consider all such code paths in the kernel, significantly complicating a worst-case execution time analysis. This design is perfectly reasonable for the traditional RTOS model where interrupts are largely handled within the kernel. However, for mixed-criticality systems, userspace interrupt delivery must have bounded interrupt latency guarantees.

Despite not being suitable for mixed-criticality systems, we use QNX Neutrino as a conservative representative of the fully-preemptible approach. We assume that the kernel could be made fully-preemptible to userspace, and focus only on the userspace interrupt delivery path of QNX as a measurable data point. This underestimates the WCET that can be achieved by a true fully-preemptible kernel, as the overheads of making a kernel support full preemption to userspace are not considered. As this chapter proposes that the non-preemptible model can be competitive with fully-preemptible kernels, this conservatism is in favour of the fully-preemptible kernel.

5.4.2 Analysis details

Our analysis is based on a binary of the QNX 6.5.0 kernel (the latest available at the time), compiled for ARMv6 systems (QNX). We were guided by an older snapshot of the source code from July 2009, as QNX sources are unfortunately no longer available to the general public. Despite the disparity in versions, we were able to
use the sources to glean sufficient understanding of the binary for analysis.

Our analysis tools were originally designed for analysing seL4, and as such they made some assumptions about the structure of analysed code. Some of these assumptions proved to be invalid when analysing QNX, and required us to modify our tools to support them. We found that many of the techniques employed by QNX made static analysis more difficult. In particular, the presence of function pointers, exception-defined control flow (e.g. instructions or memory accesses which are permitted to cause exceptions) and dynamically-generated code required some manual intervention in the analysis.

**Control-flow graph extraction**

Our analysis tools are able to automatically extract the control flow graph of seL4, because there are no function pointers in the C code, and all branch instructions in the binary can be resolved easily using simple symbolic execution. QNX, on the other hand, uses function pointers extensively, making automated extraction infeasible. Instead, we manually specified the targets of function pointers. Determining the destination addresses of various function pointers was (unsurprisingly) significantly easier with access to the source code.

As the QNX code base is far larger than seL4’s, we found the generated CFG was prohibitively large and complex for our WCET analysis. To overcome this, we limited the analysis to the smaller relevant fragments of the CFG, by forcing specific branches to be marked as taken or ignored. We maintained the soundness of our analysis by ensuring that the subset analysed contained the critical path for interrupt delivery.

Our tools are still limited in what they can analyse, and we had to take a few shortcuts. To ensure the validity of our hypothesis, our analysis always underestimates, where necessary, the worst-case interrupt response time of QNX.

For instance, we ignored QNX’s support for sporadic scheduling, as this would have significantly complicated our analysis; not ignoring this would only increase the worst-case response time of QNX further. Furthermore, we found that QNX has a suboptimal implementation of a priority queue (a sorted linked list with $O(n)$ complexity); we ignored this as there is obviously a better $O(\log n)$ implementation.

In addition to manually forcing specific branches as taken, it is also possible to au-
tomatically prune some infeasible branches using symbolic execution. Our existing symbolic execution engine was previously only sufficient for determining the destination address of branches. We have enhanced it to also take into account the results of prior arithmetic operations (when known with certainty) so that it can determine if a conditional branch will always be taken (or always not taken).

**Analysing runtime-generated code**

The QNX Neutrino RTOS follows a generic pattern in its design. For each supported processor architecture (ARM, x86, etc.), QNX provides a single kernel binary named procnto. QNX also provides generic board support package (BSP) code. System integrators provide their own machine-specific code (for booting, hardware control, etc.) using the QNX BSP code as a base.

A large proportion of the interrupt-handling code depends on the specifics of the machine. Unfortunately, QNX accomplishes this in a way that complicates the static analysis process. At boot time, the interrupt vector code is dynamically generated based on the system’s interrupt topology, and is interspersed with integrator-provided code to interface with the interrupt controllers. While this has allowed QNX to ship a single binary that does not need static relocation or other build-time transformations, it also means that the interrupt vector code is not directly available.

We had observed that the generated interrupt vector code in memory did not change after booting and so we were able to simply dump the generated code from a running system. We proceeded with our analysis by re-assembling and linking the dumped code with the rest of the procnto image. In this way, we were able to preserve symbols, aiding in the maintenance of our manual annotations.

**Event handling**

QNX provides a number of different event delivery methods:

- Simply ignoring the event.
- Sending a POSIX signal to a given process or thread.
- Executing a given routine in a new thread.
CHAPTER 5. INTERRUPT LATENCY IN NON-PREEMPTIBLE KERNELS

- Forcing a blocked thread to resume (returning an ETIMEOUT error).
- Resuming a thread that was waiting on a MsgReceive system call.
- Resuming a thread that was waiting on an InterruptWait system call.

We chose only to consider the last of these methods, and then only the Interrupt-Wait case (SIGEV_INTR) in our analysis. This mechanism is functionally equivalent to that used in seL4. More importantly, of the different interrupt delivery methods available, it represents a best case and therefore a lower bound on the time required to dispatch an interrupt to userspace code. Other methods, such as signal delivery or thread creation, require significantly more work to process an interrupt, compared with waking an existing blocked thread.

5.5 Results and analysis

5.5.1 Limits of a non-preemptible kernel

We compute the worst-case interrupt response time of the modified seL4 kernel binary using our static analysis framework. The analysis method is similar to that used in the previous chapter, but has been improved to incorporate the infeasible path detection algorithm described in Chapter 7.

Also, unlike in the previous analyses, we do not treat preemptible loops as though they have an iteration count of 1. Although this is a sound approximation, it overestimates the interrupt response time of any path containing multiple loops. In the case of a pending interrupt, only the first loop would execute in practice, whereas our analysis assumed that both loops would execute once. The approach also fails if preemption points are used outside of loops. These cases did not arise previously, but with the proliferation of preemption points through seL4, our previous analysis methods are no longer suitable.

In this analysis, we instead consider each preemption point separately. For each preemption point, we compute the worst-case execution time between the preemption point and the beginning of a userspace interrupt handler thread (running at the highest priority). These correspond to the worst-case scenarios of an interrupt arriving immediately after a preemption point has found no pending interrupts. We
Figure 5.4: The worst-case execution times for all 125 non-preemptible regions in our modified seL4 kernel (including duplicates from virtual inlining). Each bar measures the time from the start of the non-preemptible region to the beginning of a userspace handler thread. The blue (dotted) lines identify points which may present significant hurdles to further reducing WCET.

Also compute the WCET starting from the entry point of the kernel and ending at a userspace interrupt handler. For all of these scenarios, we assume that any encountered preemption points are always taken (i.e. that the “interrupt pending” flag, described in Section 5.3.1, is always true).

Although there are only 23 preemption points in total within the seL4 code, our analysis sees many more (124, in fact) due to all functions being virtually inlined. The WCET from each preemption point, and kernel entry, are shown in Figure 5.4, sorted in descending order of execution time. The maximum of all these is 25 850 cycles. On our 532 MHz ARM platform, this corresponds to a hypothetical worst-case execution time of 48.6\(\mu\)s (hypothetical because our system model is conservative).

**Worst-case breakdown:** The longest paths that remain after our modifications to seL4 are related to the deletion of objects. Resource deletion and revocation mecha-
nisms are often the most complicated part of any resource management system\(^3\) and are common sources of system-state-dependent execution times (Colin and Puaut, 2001b; Singal and Petters, 2007).

The worst case for our modified seL4 is a specific instance of a deletion operation for deleting a thread, which begins at the entry point of the kernel. As such, the longest path includes (re-)validation of the arguments passed to the kernel, and ensures that all relevant objects exist. In seL4, one stage of thread deletion requires turning the thread into a *zombie*, which prevents the thread from executing or being further manipulated by the user, and allows the deletion of any resources held by the thread to proceed preemptibly. It is this scenario which incurs the worst-case.

The computed worst-case execution time of this operation is 25,850 cycles. A breakdown of the time spent in this operation is roughly as follows:

- 25% is devoted to decoding the system call and validating arguments from the user;
- 30% is control code which decides what actions need to be taken (e.g. ensuring there are no other references to the thread to be deleted);
- 12% is devoted to actually modifying kernel state (updating scheduler data structures and turning the thread into a zombie); and
- 33% is spent dispatching the userspace interrupt handler.

The state modifications need to be done atomically, and they contribute a relatively small fraction of the overall cost. Thus this path cannot be easily made shorter by introducing a preemption point. Instead, one would need to micro-optimise the code paths to reduce the cost of the validation and checks required for deletion.

Other operations which also exhibit a WCET of ~25,000 cycles include unmapping a frame from an address space, and replacing a thread’s IPC buffer. These have similar execution profiles to thread deletion—i.e. small (non-preemptible) changes to the kernel state, accompanied by lots of book keeping for deletion.

As described in Section 5.3.6, the length of an IPC was chosen in order to exhibit a WCET of under 25,000 cycles.

\(^3\) It is interesting to note that the original seL4 object deletion code had to be rewritten a number of times, when the formal verification process identified subtle flaws in several iterations of the design. Preemptible deletion, it turns out, hides a lot of corner cases for the unwary.
5.5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

**Focusing on interrupt delivery:** The computed worst-case interrupt response time when already running in userspace (i.e. no kernel preemption) is 9,217 cycles. Both this case, and the global worst-case could be improved by integrating scheduling decisions into the body of the kernel—at present, the decision to execute the high-priority interrupt handler is only made once the kernel is about to return to userspace. For the scenario where a high-priority interrupt is being processed, this entails more manipulation of the run-queue than is strictly required.

The case of IRQ delivery during userspace execution can be improved by implementing a fastpath, much like the existing IPC fastpath. Although we did not implement an IRQ fastpath, the WCET of the existing IPC fastpath provides a good indication of what may be achievable. Removing the message copy from the IPC fastpath reduces its WCET to 2,571 cycles. Without a message copy, what remains is simply a context switch and the checks to ensure the target thread is ready to receive a message—this is also what is required for a fastpath IRQ delivery. We claim this is a reasonable target for what worst-case interrupt latency may be achievable with either a non-preemptible or a preemptible kernel. Yet, it could still be reduced further by pinning critical carefully chosen instructions and data into the L1 cache (which we have not done in this analysis).

**Possible further improvements:** It would be possible to expend more work to eliminate the remaining longest execution paths. Many deletion paths could be improved by caching some information or using an alternate representation—one specific example is determining whether or not any references to an object remain. Other micro-optimisations such as avoiding stack unwinding on preemption would also be beneficial.

During our analysis, we found that the results for several preemption points which are clustered together are often attributed to the same code path. Reducing the execution time of one such code path improved the results for many of these preemption points. There are several such clusters visible in Figure 5.4. Also worth noting is that only 4% of the preemption points are above 20,000 cycles, and 25% of the preemption points are above 17,000 cycles.

**Extrapolating:** Our intuition suggests that reducing the worst-case execution time below 17,000 cycles will require significantly more effort again than getting to 17,000
CHAPTER 5. INTERRUPT LATENCY IN NON-PREEMPTIBLE KERNELS

Figure 5.5: The worst-case response time (to userspace) of (1) our modified seL4, (2) our prediction of further modifications, (3) our modified seL4 interrupting userspace (no kernel preemption) and delivering an interrupt to a waiting thread, (4) seL4’s IPC fastpath, and (5) our fully-preemptible representative, QNX (a lower bound using a subset of the code paths for interrupt delivery). All results are measured in cycles on the KZM11 platform.

cycles. Given that the worst-case execution times are dominated by cache misses, at 96 cycles per cache miss, this translates to an estimated worst-case cache footprint of roughly 180 cache lines (recall that, although the kernel code is locked into the L2 cache, the kernel data being manipulated is not). These estimates are reflected in the second bar of Figure 5.5.

5.5.2 Comparison to a fully-preemptible kernel

As noted earlier, QNX is not designed for mixed-criticality systems, as the worst-case interrupt response time to userspace depends on large amounts of code within the kernel, including many potentially long-running loops. However, we were optimistic that it may still give a useful data point with regard to interrupt delivery to userspace in the design of a fully-preemptible kernel.

The results of our analysis on QNX’s interrupt delivery path, shown in the last bar of Figure 5.5, have subsequently removed our optimism. As can be seen, this number is significantly larger than seL4’s interrupt delivery time. It appears that the QNX kernel simply has not been optimised for userspace interrupt delivery. Manual inspection of the path shows numerous detours that the kernel may take when delivering a userspace interrupt, including updating kernel bookkeeping to
support re-entrancy.

We are unable to draw conclusive results from the analysis of QNX, particularly as it does not support bounded preemption latencies to userspace when running inside the kernel. However, we assert that a fully-preemptible kernel could achieve similar worst-case userspace interrupt latencies to non-preemptible kernels for the case when userspace is preempted, by using a non-preemptible IRQ delivery fast-path. A non-preemptible fastpath means that the overall kernel interrupt latency is at least double the worst-case latency of this fastpath (the worst-case is at least that of the interrupt fastpath beginning execution when a higher priority interrupt arrives, therefore needing to execute again). It remains to be seen if all other non-preemptible kernel paths can be made this short.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the limits of interrupt latency for a non-preemptible kernel design. We also attempted a comparison with a fully-preemptible kernel, which did not turn out to be fruitful as the selected kernel was not optimised for mixed-criticality applications.

We made a number of changes to reduce the interrupt latency of the non-preemptible seL4 microkernel from 100 000s of cycles, down to 25 850 cycles. The results suggest that further improvements could reduce this to approximately 17 000 cycles. Using low-overhead preemption points, this can be done without incurring any significant performance penalty. To reduce this further requires rethinking the data structures used for bookkeeping in the kernel. This is an opportunity for future research directions.

We provide a lower bound on what may be achievable even by fully-preemptible kernels, based on the worst-case execution time of a heavily optimised fastpath for IPC. The difference between this limit and what was achieved with a non-preemptible kernel differs by a factor of 10, but only by a factor of 6.6 to what may be achieved with extra effort.

On a modest embedded processor such as our 532 MHz ARM11, our results provide a guaranteed worst-case latency of 48.6 $\mu$s. This would suffice for many applications including standard industrial motion control applications. Our evidence suggests
that there is room to reduce this even further with careful kernel design.

Although we have forgone the immediate possibility of formal verification in order to achieve these results, traditional validation methods, such as testing, code inspection, and model checking, can still be used. Even if not formally verified, the resulting non-preemptible kernel is much less complex, and thus easier to assure than a fully-preemptible one.
Chapter 6

Checking properties on binaries

This chapter is based on work published at RTAS 2013 in which I was the primary author (Blackham and Heiser, 2013a).

6.1 Overview

Through the previous three chapters, we have performed a number of worst-case execution time analyses on the seL4 code base. As noted in Section 3.4.5, a precise timing analysis of non-trivial programs such as seL4 running on modern processors is infeasible due to the need to consider the exponential number of states of both the program and the machine. These analyses therefore required that conservative over-approximations be made in order to reduce the number of states considered and make the problem tractable. In general, the longer the execution paths the more pessimistic the approximations become.

As seL4 is a non-preemptible kernel, we need to analyse much longer code paths than in the case of a fully-preemptible kernel, where only short sections of code run with interrupts disabled. To mitigate the over-approximation in computing seL4’s WCET, our analyses added manual annotations for excluding paths which were deemed infeasible, reducing our computed WCET by 68%. Additionally, we manually annotated the binary with bounds of the number of iterations of each loop.

However, these manual annotations are tedious to construct and error-prone. For a hard real-time system, these annotations become part of the trusted computing base. Errors threaten the soundness of the analysis, and undermine the real-time
guarantees desired from a high-assurance kernel.

This chapter describes a framework called sequoll,\(^1\) which aims to fully automate this analysis and thus eliminate the need to trust hand-specified annotations. We show that sequoll can compute most of the loop bounds in seL4 automatically, detect some unreachable code paths (in the form of “0” loop bounds), and validate hand-specified infeasible path information.

Sequoll performs model checking on a control flow graph (CFG) derived from the binary. We restrict sequoll to analysing single-threaded code as our motivating application of non-preemptible kernels is inherently single threaded. Using a symbolic model checker, we can validate properties of the code such as loop bounds, infeasible paths and more general invariants of functions. We utilise an existing high-fidelity specification of the ARM instruction set created by Fox and Myreen (2010), which avoids the tedious and error-prone task of expressing semantics of instructions.

The main contribution of this chapter is the use of symbolic model checking on binaries to automatically compute both simple and more complex loop bounds, as well as to verify infeasible path information without additional compiler assistance. We describe the approach in detail in Section 6.4. The second contribution is the demonstration that our approach is applicable to a real-world, highly-optimised yet non-preemptible kernel, where we show (Section 6.5.1) that sequoll determines the bound of the majority of loops, eliminates most manual interference in the

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\(^1\) Sequoll is the successor to our previous analysis tool, quoll.
WCET analysis, and improves the WCET estimate of seL4 by 27% over the baseline (Figure 6.1). We also evaluate sequoll on the Mälardalen WCET benchmark suite (Gustafsson et al., 2010), and show that it computes 64% of the loop counts, without any source-level analysis or manual annotations (Section 6.5.2). We finally discuss the limitations which currently prevent the remaining loops and annotations from being analysed (Section 6.6).

6.2 Background

There is a large body of research related to the ideas behind sequoll—computing loop bounds, modelling instruction set architectures, reasoning about behavioural guarantees of systems, and reverse-engineering binaries to obtain control flow graphs. This section highlights the state-of-the-art in each of these areas.

The specific problem of computing loop bounds on binaries has received much attention, particularly from WCET researchers for whom it is a fundamental hurdle. Manual annotation is a common but error-prone approach, where annotations are specified at the source code level, and compilers must ensure these annotations are carried through to the generated assembly (Metzner, 2004). Pattern matching on the binary can be used to search for common loop structures, but is fragile and compiler-specific. The aiT WCET analyser uses dataflow analysis to identify loop variables and loop bounds for simple affine loops in binary programs (Cullmann and Martin, 2007). Abstract interpretation, polytope modeling and symbolic summation have also been used to compute loop bounds on high level source code (Lokuciejewski et al., 2009; Blanc et al., 2010). The SWEET toolchain for WCET computation uses abstract execution to compute loop bounds on binaries, and is aided by tight integration with the compiler toolchain which improves the knowledge of memory aliasing (Gustafsson et al., 2006b). The r-TuBound tool uses pattern-based recurrence solving and program flow refinement to compute loop bounds, and also requires tight compiler integration (Knoop et al., 2012).

Rieder et al. (2008) has shown that it is straight-forward to determine loop counts at the C source-code level through model checking. Attempting to automatically find a correspondence between source code and its compiled binary, in the presence of arbitrary compiler optimisations, is a difficult challenge. Although not fully solved by any single approach (Narasamdy and Voronkov, 2005), significant progress has
been made recently on finding such a correspondence using an SMT solver (Sewell et al., 2013).

Model checking is significantly harder to apply to binaries than to source code, as there is less syntactic information available such as data types and structure layout, and there is limited information on what memory can potentially alias. Our work has similarities to Cassez’s methods to compute WCET (2011), but we do not attempt to compute the overall WCET using a model checker. Although seL4 is a small microkernel (∼ 8 000 LoC), using model checking for WCET computation does not (yet) scale to programs of this size.

Eliminating infeasible paths is also crucial for WCET analysis, as such paths may dramatically worsen the pessimism of WCET estimates. Several techniques have been proposed to detect infeasible paths, including abstract execution (Gustafsson et al., 2006b), conflict detection (Suhendra et al., 2006) and pattern matching (Ngo and Tan, 2007). In the following chapter, we also build upon the sequoll framework to detect infeasible paths. However, the work presented in this chapter focuses specifically on the problem of validating manually-specified infeasible paths. This is computationally less expensive in the general case, whereas many techniques for detecting infeasible paths do not scale for larger programs.

Model checkers can be used to perform static analysis of high-level languages, with a number of popular free and commercial tools available. For example, BLAST performs model checking on C sources using counter-example guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) in order to check for desired safety properties (Beyer et al., 2007). Goanna also uses model checking but tests for common violations, such as use-after-free bugs (Fehnker et al., 2006).

Closely related to our work is that of Thakur et al. on the McVeto framework for directed proof generation (Thakur et al., 2010). They use model checking on an abstraction of arbitrary program binaries to determine if specific target instructions are reachable. Sequoll instead reasons about paths which may be infeasible in order to refine WCET analysis.

In addition to model checking, symbolic execution is becoming a popular option for exploring paths through a program. Symbolic execution groups together all inputs which may take the same path through a program. This technique is employed by TRACER (Jaffar et al., 2012) to analyse C code and also by S²E (Chipounov et al., 2012), a selective symbolic execution platform. These techniques aim to analyse the
properties and behaviour of a program or system under all possible input conditions. Although symbolic execution would be a suitable alternative for our analysis, we still chose to write sequoll based upon model checking as we ultimately intend to integrate invariants based on formal proofs of the code. Model checking supports a more natural expression of such invariants, and has previously been used in conjunction with formal proof (Daum et al., 2005).

Conceptually, both loop bounds and infeasible paths could be proven within the verification of seL4. In practice, seL4’s proofs heavily rely on a functional model of the code in which “paths” are ill-defined. Termination of the specification is proven (and must be for the specification to be well-defined), but this does not require explicit loop bounds. Although proving loop bounds is possible, it is not immediately useful, as compiler optimisations can (and do) affect these in the binary.

To reconstruct control flow graphs from binaries, various solutions have been presented and implemented in static analysis frameworks for binaries such as Jakstab (Kinder and Veith, 2008), BINCOA (Bardin et al., 2011a) and McVETO (Thakur et al., 2010). These frameworks implement an intermediate assembly language, for which translators are written for each architecture. To date, none exist for the ARM architecture.

6.3 The problem

Sequoll was motivated by the desire to validate user-provided annotations about local code properties which were needed to perform a WCET analysis. Without independent (and, ideally, automatic) validation, such manual annotations significantly weaken the high degree of dependability we expect from the kernel.

Specifically, we seek to (a) automatically compute loop counts, and (b) verify claims of path infeasibility. We focus on binaries in order to avoid limiting compiler optimisations and to remain independent of any specific toolchain.

6.3.1 Loop bounds

The difficulty in determining loop counts in binaries depends heavily on the structure and invariants on the loops. Compilers may perform optimisations such as loop
unrolling, rotation or reversal; loop variables may be saved to and restored from
global memory; and loops may not have explicit or obvious loop counters. An
example of this last issue can be seen in the code of Figure 6.2. This function counts
the number of bits which are set in a word. It can be shown that the loop executes
no more than 32 times, despite there being no explicit loop counter. We aim to
compute loop bounds using only knowledge available from the binary.

6.3.2 Infeasible paths

Adding infeasible path information can improve the precision of WCET analyses
considerably. By using knowledge that specific paths are infeasible, seL4’s WCET
estimate can be reduced by 68%. Previously, we obtained this information by iter-
atively examining the worst-case path reported by our WCET toolchain manually.
If we determined that it was infeasible, we constructed a constraint annotation to
eliminate it. We repeated this until the worst-case path represented a valid execu-
tion.

The infeasible path constraints are used to augment the system of integer linear
equations which is solved to find the WCET. We consider constraints expressed in
one of the following two forms:

- $a$ conflicts with $b$ in $f$: specifies that the instructions at addresses $a$ and $b$
  are mutually exclusive, and will not both execute during an invocation of the

Figure 6.2: A sample C function with no explicit loop variable, and the function com-
plied to ARM assembly.
function \( f \). If \( f \) is invoked multiple times, \( a \) and \( b \) can each be executed under different invocations.

- \( a \) is consistent with \( b \) in \( f \): specifies that the instructions at addresses \( a \) and \( b \) will execute the same number of times during an invocation of the function \( f \).

The process of creating these annotations is error-prone, yet it is a trusted part of the WCET computation. Being able to validate these annotations will substantially increase the confidence in the WCET results, improving suitability for critical hard real-time applications.

### 6.4 Anatomy of sequoll

The primary inputs to sequoll are a program binary and a property of interest such as a loop bound or an infeasible path constraint. From this we generate a model which is tested by a model checker. Figure 6.3 gives an overview of the key steps.
required to produce this model. In this section, we cover the techniques we use in sequoll to generate a suitable model from the binary.

Our motivation stems from WCET analysis of the seL4 microkernel, whose code has some restrictions that make verification tractable. We carry some of these restrictions to sequoll, because they simplify our implementation. In particular, we assume that program binaries:

- do not contain recursive functions;
- do not contain self-modifying code;
- do not make use of function pointers; and
- are not affected by interrupts, signals, or other asynchronous control flow.

These hold for a large class of programs, particularly critical code running on top of the real-time OS. For example, the OS shields applications from the visible effects of interrupts (other than the rate of progress).

We have implemented sequoll in around 10 000 lines of code, excluding external tools such as the model checker.

### 6.4.1 Decoding instruction semantics

A prerequisite to performing static analysis on binary code is a representation of the semantics of instructions. Producing this is typically a complex, error-prone task and requires careful validation, as any inconsistencies can impact the soundness of our analysis.

We mitigate these issues and reduce engineering effort by reusing Fox & Myreen’s formalisation of the ARM instruction set written in the HOL4 theorem prover (2010). This formalisation has been extensively tested against hardware. It is used in a number of other projects (Zhao et al., 2011), including within the verification team at NICTA to prove that a compiled seL4 binary correctly implements the seL4 specification (Sewell et al., 2013).

For a given instruction and system state, it can generate a precise set of semantics. We handle conditional instructions by adding any conditions to a set of preconditions
6.4. ANATOMY OF SEQUOLL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine code:</th>
<th>E2813002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disassembly:</td>
<td>add r3, r1, #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantics:</td>
<td>r3 ← r1 + 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r15 ← r15 + 4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine code:</th>
<th>E8A0028</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disassembly:</td>
<td>stmia r13!, {r3, r5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantics:</td>
<td>mem r13 ← r3&lt;7:0&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 1) ← r3&lt;15:8&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 2) ← r3&lt;23:16&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 3) ← r3&lt;31:24&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 4) ← r5&lt;7:0&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 5) ← r5&lt;15:8&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 6) ← r5&lt;23:16&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mem (r13 + 7) ← r5&lt;31:24&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r13 ← r13 + 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r15 ← r15 + 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.4: Example instruction semantics from the formalisation of the ARM instruction set. Note that ARM maps the program counter onto general-purpose register r15.

under which the instruction may execute. We can obtain a simple representation even for quite complex instructions, as the example in Figure 6.4 shows.

Due to the use of this formalisation, we currently only support binaries for the ARM architecture. However, specifications of other architectures could be substituted, as all other concepts used in sequoll are architecture-independent.

6.4.2 Control flow graph reconstruction

Extracting the control flow graph of a program is a difficult task in the general case. However, the restrictions listed above considerably simplify the task.

Given the entry point to the program, sequoll explores all reachable instructions. Although we preclude the use of function pointers at the source level, the binary may still contain indirect branches (i.e. those via a register) which require extra work to resolve. Computing the possible destinations of function pointers is a much more challenging task as it requires reasoning globally across the entire binary, whereas the indirect branches generated by compilers can almost always be resolved locally.
We use a simple symbolic execution engine to determine the destination of indirect branches. It performs value analysis and tracks loads and stores into memory. This allows us to resolve:

- function returns—these typically involve storing the function’s return address into stack memory and later reading it back either directly into the program counter, or via another register;
- indirect branches via literal loads—i.e. where the destination address is stored as data, interspersed within the instruction stream in the binary;
- switch statements—these presently require compiler-specific pattern matching to decode, as in the general case this is also a difficult problem.

We expand function calls in the control flow graph through virtual inlining. This is necessary in order to compute loop bounds that are dependent on function arguments or calling context (e.g. in `memcpy`).

Although this analysis normally works for compiled programs, more sophisticated compiler optimisations or hand-crafted assembler code can conceivably result in binaries where our simple symbolic execution engine fails. More comprehensive analyses exist and these could be implemented and substituted within sequoll if required (Thakur et al., 2010; Kinder et al., 2009; Bardin et al., 2011b).

Figure 6.5 shows the control-flow graph for our simple example from Figure 6.2.

### 6.4.3 Loop identification

Given the control flow graph of a program, we can identify loops and classify them as **reducible** or **irreducible**. A reducible loop has a single entry point from outside the loop body, whereas irreducible loops may have multiple entry points (Tarjan, 1974). Irreducible loops are problematic for any WCET analysis that relies on specifying loop bounds relative to a unique entry point. They also lead to ambiguity in program structure, such as the relationship between nested loops (Havlak, 1997).

We currently restrict sequoll to analysing reducible loops and failing when an irreducible loop is encountered. If required, irreducible loops could be handled by duplicating them in the CFG—once for each entry edge. We have not done this in sequoll as it adds unnecessary complexity for our use cases.
Figure 6.5: The control flow graph of the assembly code in Figure 6.2, and its SSA representation. The nodes outlined in (thick) red are those in the computed slice to deduce the upper bound of the iteration count of the loop at node 6.
Given a node \( E \) as a possible candidate for a loop entry point, we define a loop as the largest strongly connected component (SCC) that includes \( E \), such that \( E \) dominates all other nodes within the loop. If no such SCC exists, then \( E \) does not induce a loop. This gives a one-to-one relationship between entry points and loops (under the reducibility criterion).

Sequoll finds reducible loops via a depth-first search, identifying for every instruction its inner-most loop, and reconstructing the loop nests of the program.

### 6.4.4 SSA transformation

We convert the program to single static assignment (SSA) form, as this simplifies later stages of our analysis. A program in SSA form has the property that each variable is assigned to at most once. Using SSA makes it much simpler to track the dependencies between variables. Where program paths merge with potentially different values for a variable, a special function known as a \( \phi \) (“phi”) function is used to represent the choice of values based on path.

The primary advantage of using SSA representation is that it can greatly reduce the number of states required for model-checking; we describe this further in Section 6.4.7. We use standard techniques to convert the program’s representation into SSA form (Cytron et al., 1991).

Figure 6.5 shows the SSA representation of our example from Figure 6.2 (with the irrelevant portions elided). Multiple edges reach node 6 in this diagram, and hence \( \phi \) functions define the values of \( r0 \) and \( r3 \).

### 6.4.5 Simplification

Once transformed to SSA form, there are many opportunities to simplify expressions within the analysis. For example, a program increments and decrements the stack pointer as it pushes or pops data on and off the stack. As Figure 6.6 shows, constant propagation often allows us to condense these chains of arithmetic to a simple expression, specifying the offset against the original stack pointer.

The \( \phi \) functions generated by SSA transformation can also be simplified if all possible values are equivalent. This is particularly pertinent for the stack pointer, which generates a significant number of \( \phi \) functions as its value is frequently modified.
6.4. ANATOMY OF SEQUOLL

\[
\begin{align*}
sp_1 & \leftarrow sp_0 + 8 \\
sp_2 & \leftarrow sp_1 + 16 \\
sp_3 & \leftarrow sp_1 + 16 \implies sp_3 \leftarrow sp_0 + 24 \\
sp_4 & \leftarrow \phi(sp_2, sp_3) \\
sp_5 & \leftarrow sp_4 - 24
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
sp_1 & \leftarrow sp_0 + 8 \\
sp_2 & \leftarrow sp_0 + 24 \\
sp_3 & \leftarrow sp_0 + 24 \\
sp_4 & \leftarrow sp_0 + 24 \\
sp_5 & \leftarrow sp_0
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 6.6: Using constant propagation, sequoll can convert all stack pointer references to precise offsets relative to an initial stack pointer. This enables the stack to be treated independently from memory in the analysis of seL4.

However, the value of the stack pointer at any given program point is typically a fixed offset from its value at function entry, regardless of execution history or any other program state. With virtual inlining of functions, the offset is fixed relative to the initial stack pointer value of the program. The only case where this condition may be violated is when dynamically sized arrays are allocated on the stack (e.g. using the \texttt{alloca} function). This does not occur in seL4.

If all pointer accesses were to known addresses, we could convert all accessed memory locations into simple variables, allowing us to track and simplify them further. Unfortunately, memory addresses cannot always be determined, and they frequently depend on function inputs. This impacts even on those memory addresses which we can determine, due to the possibility of pointer aliasing: a write to an unknown address may affect a later read from a known address.

However, there are cases where we may know that memory accesses do not alias. For example, C/C++ compilers provide the \texttt{restrict} keyword, which lets programmers hint that a memory region has no aliases. Similarly, the formal verification of seL4 guarantees that the C code will never take a pointer to a local variable (Klein et al., 2009b). This ensures that stack memory will never alias with any other pointers.

Using this knowledge about seL4, we can treat each byte of stack memory as a local variable, thereby eliminating all accesses to stack memory from our model. This allows sequoll to track and analyse parameters passed via the stack. It also eliminates the pushing and popping of callee-saved registers, frequently emitted in function prologues and epilogues, from later analysis.

We also resolve accesses to read-only memory, such as constants loaded using PC-relative addressing.
6.4.6 Program slicing

Often, the property we wish to check involves a small portion of the entire program. We can speed up the analysis significantly by computing a smaller, equivalent program which preserves the property of interest, precisely what the technique of program slicing achieves (Weiser, 1984). Given a property of interest, known as the slice criterion, we recursively follow all data-flow and control-flow dependencies to compute an equivalent program with respect to this property.

We select the slice criteria based on the variables or control flow nodes relevant to our desired property. For instance, to compute loop bounds, we count the maximum number of times that the head of a loop may execute. Here the slice criterion simply consists of the loop head node (containing the first instruction in the loop). The slicing algorithm will begin by finding the control-flow dependencies for the loop head. This will include any conditional statements outside the loop which may prevent its execution, as well as any nodes inside the loop which may conditionally exit it.

It is possible that we over-approximate the slice, however it is guaranteed to be equivalent with regard to the slice criteria. Slices that are too large can make model checking prohibitively expensive. The simplification step described in Section 6.4.5 helps to minimise the size of the slice.

Some loops are bounded only because of earlier conditions on the path leading to them. Consider the code below—the loop is only bounded because it does not execute if the preceding condition fails. The slicing algorithm will identify the relevant parts of the execution history and preserve those in the slice.

```java
if (c < 100) {
    for (i = 0; i < c; i++) {
        ...
    }
}
```

The trail of dependencies leading up to the head of the loop can be quite long, with much of it irrelevant for a tight bound. Consider a loop with two possible exit conditions—one exits the loop when an iteration count variable exceeds a hard-coded upper bound, while a second tests the iteration count variable against a complex expression computed before the loop. If we only care about the hard-coded
upper bound then we can prune the slice to ignore the computation of the complex expression, significantly speeding up the analysis.

For this purpose, we allow the user to pass in a parameter specifying a region of interest—this is a subset of nodes of the control-flow graph that are considered by the slice, excluding statements outside the region. We convert variables that are modified outside the region of interest, but used inside, into non-deterministic inputs.

In order to preserve soundness, the chosen region of interest must maintain an important property: the region must have a unique entry node and this node must be a dominator of all other nodes in the region. If this property is not met, it may be possible to execute the region of interest without executing the entry node, invalidating any results established by the model checker.

We construct a reduced control flow graph representing only the nodes in the program slice, and collapse all consecutive nodes into one node where possible (i.e. any sequence of nodes with no branches originating from or destined for any nodes in between).

For loops with a fixed iteration count, the reduced control flow graph can have as few as three nodes. Figure 6.7 shows the reduced control flow graph of our example.
code from Figure 6.2; in this case, 11 nodes were reduced to three. More complex loop structures will obviously introduce more nodes, but our evaluation (Table 6.1) shows that in most cases the graph remains very small.

### 6.4.7 Translation to a symbolic model

The final step in processing the binary is to convert the reduced graph of our program slice into a symbolic model, which can be checked by a model checker. We use the NuSMV model checker (Cimatti et al., 2002) which supports assertions expressed in temporal logic such as linear temporal logic (LTL) or computational tree logic (CTL). These logics are able to express useful properties such as “the value of some variable is always less than \(k\)” or “state \(A\) is not reachable until state \(B\) has occurred”.

We convert variables in our SSA representation into one of three types of expressions in the model:

- **stateful variables**: these variables are updated by transitions in the model and contribute to the state space which the model checker must explore;

- **frozen variables**: these variables retain their value throughout the program, and also contribute to the state space which must be explored; and

- **definitions**: these incur no state of themselves (much like C preprocessor macros), and act merely as syntactic sugar for building larger models.

We translate the variables of the reduced control flow graph into a symbolic model as follows:

- Variables that are used but not defined anywhere in the SSA representation are inputs to the program. These are converted to frozen variables.

- Both \(\phi\) functions and memory reads are converted to stateful variables in the model.

- All other SSA variables become definitions, as they themselves do not need to incur any state in the model.
6.4. ANATOMY OF SEQUOLL

The key observation here is that there are only two cases in which the program’s execution may diverge, requiring the model checker to explore multiple states. The first is at memory reads when the result is unknown, either due to potential aliasing or otherwise being unable to identify a corresponding memory store.

The second case is when multiple paths can be taken through the control flow graph. Perhaps somewhat unintuitively, we only need to consider points where program paths converge rather than diverge. Given a node with multiple incoming edges, the choice of incoming edge implicitly defines which outgoing edges were taken earlier in the execution. This fits naturally with the SSA representation of \( \phi \) functions which assign variables only at converging nodes.

For the example in Figure 6.5, we only need to create a single stateful variable for the expression \( r_{3.2} \leftarrow \phi(r_{3.3}, r_{3.1}) \). This is defined in the model checker as follows:

\[
\text{next}(r_{3.2}) := \begin{cases} 
\text{n}=1: & r_{3.1} \\
\text{n}=2: & r_{3.3} \\
\text{TRUE}: & r_{3.2} 
\end{cases}
\]

This intuitive syntax states that when visiting node 1 (in the reduced control flow graph of Figure 6.7), \( r_{3.1} \) should be assigned to \( r_{3.2} \); similarly at node 2, \( r_{3.3} \) should be assigned. The variable retains its value at all other nodes.

The input variable \( r_{0.0} \) is specified as a frozen variable. All other information needed for the program slice is specified as definitions which incur no additional state.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{psrZ}_3 & := r_{3.3} = 0; \\
\text{psrZ}_1 & := r_{3.1} = 0; \\
r_{3.3} & := r_{3.2} \gg 1; \\
r_{3.1} & := r_{0.0}; \\
\end{align*}
\]

In addition to the SSA variables, we represent the reduced control flow graph of the program slice as an additional stateful variable. The transitions between nodes are represented in the model by conditional assignments to this stateful variable. For example, the reduced control flow graph in Figure 6.7 becomes:
init(n) := 1;
next(n) := case
n=1 & !psrZ_1: 2;
n=1 & psrZ_1: 3;
n=2 & !psrZ_3: 2;
n=2 & psrZ_3: 3;
n=3: 3;
esac;

6.4.8 Loop bound checking

To solve the example loop bound from Figure 6.2, we assign a stateful variable $C$ in the model checker which counts the number of times the loop entry node executes. The variable is reset to zero at nodes outside the loop that are immediate predecessors of the loop entry node.

Although the model checker cannot directly compute the loop bound for us, we can ask the model checker a statement of the form “is $C \leq k$”. We can then perform a binary search to find the smallest value of $k$ for which the statement holds true. This value is the maximum number of times that the loop may iterate.

6.4.9 Path feasibility testing

As described in Section 6.3.2, we express the path infeasibility constraints in terms of pairs of instructions which either conflict with each other (are mutually exclusive), or are consistent with each other (both execute the same number of times).

These constraints translate naturally to expressions suitable for model checking, as follows. For conflict constraints, we create boolean flags $a$ and $b$ for the two instructions of interest. These flags are set to true when the respective node is visited. We can then express the infeasibility condition as the assertion that $a$ and $b$ are never simultaneously true. For consistency constraints, we use execution counters instead of flags, and assert that all paths finish with both counters equal.
6.5 Evaluation

6.5.1 seL4

Our primary motivation for developing sequoll was to validate annotations on our timing analysis of the seL4 microkernel, hence this is the obvious test case.

We use sequoll to automatically compute the loop bounds on all loops within the seL4 binary, which contains 32 loops in 11 functions. Regions of interest were specified on many of these loops—in particular, loops where there were exit conditions with long chains of data dependencies that have no effect on the worst-case iteration count. Sequoll succeeds in computing precise bounds on 18 loops (56%). The analysis on the remaining loops presently fails for one of several reasons, which we discuss in detail in Section 6.6:

- one loop is only bounded thanks to an invariant maintained by its environment;
- one loop sequoll cannot analyse due to complex exit conditions;
- on 12 loops, all of identical structure, sequoll fails to determine a bound due to poor memory aliasing analysis;

Of the 18 loops, 13 loop bounds are computed within 10 seconds each, three further loops within one minute, and two more complex bounds in 28 minutes—99% of which is spent performing SSA transformation and simplification. This step is slow primarily because of the expensive live variable analysis on the inlined control flow graph, which consists of over one million nodes. The analysis of seL4 used at most 6 GiB of memory.

Our best (manual) analysis eliminated 35 infeasible paths by manually adding appropriate constraint annotations, reducing the computed WCET bound from 657 000 cycles to 213 000 cycles, a 67% improvement. Of these, sequoll validated 4, which was sufficient to reduce the bound to 481 000 cycles (a 26% improvement), see Figure 6.1.

One of our manual constraints turned out to be wrong, as we found through sequoll! Fortunately, this somewhat embarrassing fact had no effect on the WCET estimate,
but serves as a clear warning about the fickle nature of annotations derived from path inspections.

Of the remaining 30 constraints,

- 11 relate to infeasible paths which depend on values read from memory that can potentially alias. The loss of information makes it impossible to determine if these paths are truly infeasible.

- 19 depend on invariants which are not possible to ascertain from the binary.

### 6.5.2 WCET benchmarks

We use the Mälardalen WCET benchmark suite (Gustafsson et al., 2010) to further evaluate sequoll’s ability to deduce loop bounds. We compile the C sources for the ARMv6 architecture, using gcc 4.4.1 and the -O2 optimisation level. We omit benchmarks using floating-point arithmetic, as the ARM formalisation does not presently support the instructions used for hardware floating point (Fox and Myreen, 2010). We also omit the RECURSION benchmark, as our analysis does not presently support recursive functions. Finally, we do not analyse two programs containing irreducible (multiple-entry) loops, as “iteration count” is ill-defined on these structures. However, this does not preclude them from being checked for other properties.

Table 6.1 presents the results. Because of the compiler’s aggressive optimisation, loops present in the C code were sometimes partially unrolled, completely unrolled or occasionally duplicated. Hence, the total number of loops listed in Table 6.1 differs in many cases from those evident in the C code.

The benchmark binaries we analysed have a total of 66 loops. Of these, sequoll computed the bounds of 41 automatically (62%). Sequoll could compute the bound of one further loop (in expint) after specifying a region of interest, as described in Section 6.4.6.

Analysis of the remaining 24 loops fails for a number of reasons. We assume failure when the model checker either exhausts system memory or shows no signs of progress within 12 hours. Note that some loops fail for multiple causes, and we count those under each cause:
### Table 6.1: Results of evaluating sequoll on programs from the Mälardalen WCET benchmark suite. Each benchmark lists the number of successfully computed loop bounds, and the maximum number of stateful variables and control flow graph nodes required.
• **Memory accesses**: 9 failures are due to loop bounds subject to memory aliasing, as discussed above.

• **Complex early exits**: 7 loops clearly have fixed upper bounds, but can exit early in certain cases. The conditions for early exit depend on complex expressions, such as tests for divisibility in the PRIME benchmark. These expressions generate dozens of stateful variables, preventing the model checker from solving them in a timely fashion.

• **Complex loop bounds**: 8 loops have bounds which are complex expressions. Most of these are inner loops, where the state of the outer loop determines the iteration count. Our model checker fails to determine these loop bounds within several hours.

• **Software division**: 6 loops fail because their loop bounds depend on the result of an integer division—on our ARM platform, integer division is emulated in software, and the routines are far too complex for our model checker.

**Analysis time**: 28 of the 41 loops are computed by the model checker within five seconds each, and 39 within one minute. Two computations take significantly longer to run: analysis of one loop in BSORT100 takes 14 minutes, and one loop in ADPCM requires 9 hours. Both of these cases are due to a loop exit condition which requires the model checker to explore the state space across two nested loops simultaneously. The loop in ADPCM also has an upper bound of 999—the largest of any of our benchmark results.

As the loop bounds increase, the model checker requires more time to explore the state space, and the binary search for the loop bound requires more iterations. Thus, in general, smaller loop bounds will inherently be faster to compute.

Note that these durations do not include the time required by the ARM formalisation to generate the instruction semantics. This step is particularly slow in its current version, taking around one second per instruction. We mitigate this by caching the instructions as they are generated so that subsequent analyses of the same binary are much faster.

The analysis phase of sequoll used at most 300 MiB of memory for all benchmarks, whilst the NuSMV model checker consumed up to 1.5 GiB.
6.6 Discussion

While the results so far are encouraging, we would ideally like to automate all loop analysis. Here we take a closer look at what we can do to improve the success rate.

- **Potentially aliasing memory accesses** affect loops and infeasible paths fairly frequently. In the problematic loops, the binary computes the upper bound and stores it into memory, where it vanishes from the view of our analysis. Improved alias analysis may resolve this and result in the automatic computation of the bounds of all affected loops (12 in seL4 and 11 in the WCET benchmarks). Applied to infeasible path detection on seL4, this alone would improve the WCET estimate from 27% to 54% over the baseline. Techniques such as those developed for McVeto (Thakur et al., 2010) are appropriate candidates, as they can be used to identify aliasing conditions relevant to specific properties of interest, and operate on compiled binaries.

- **Complex early exits** within single loop nests we could handle by considering each exit edge individually—the lowest result of any successfully analysed exit edge can be used as a safe upper bound. This works in single loop nests, as following any exit edge precludes the loop from iterating further. It is also suitable for simple inner loops where there are no dependencies on variables defined by outer loops, as the iteration count of an inner loop can be computed without regard to outer loop iterations. However, it is unsound for inner loops with dependencies on the outer loops, as the exit edge taken may vary with each execution of the loop.

- **Complex loop bounds** may be out of reach of model checkers for now, notwithstanding advances in model checking technology. Other techniques such as symbolic execution may be more appropriate to solve these.

- We could deal with *software division* by catching calls to the software emulation routines and replacing them with the model checker’s native division operator.

- Loop bounds and infeasible paths which depend on *invariants maintained in the code’s environment* cannot be computed by local static analysis. A good example of this (from seL4) is equivalent to the following C code:
CHAPTER 6. CHECKING PROPERTIES ON BINARIES

```c
uint32_t i = 1 << b;
if (i > 256)
    i = 256;
while (i != 0) {
    /* ... */
    i -= 4;
}
```

Although there appears to be a loop variable with an upper bound, there exist values of the input `b` for which this loop will never terminate (`b ≤ 1` or `b ≥ 32`). An invariant from the seL4 proof states that `b` is always in the range `[4, 31]`. Thus the loop is safe in its context of use, but our analysis tool is unable to deduce this fact. In fact, any sound method of detecting infeasible paths could not discover this without effectively reproducing a substantial part of the seL4 proof.

In principle we can address such cases by importing invariants from the formal verification of the kernel into sequoll. Using such information is an interesting challenge for future research. On top of what is achievable by alias analysis, this would achieve a near-optimal WCET (68% better than baseline) with a very strong level of confidence.

Finally we observe that there are very few infeasible paths in the Mälardalen benchmarks, as these are mostly single-path programs. However, sequoll in fact detected some infeasible paths as loops with an iteration count of 0 (due to virtual inlining, some loops became unreachable).

### 6.7 Summary

We have presented sequoll, a framework for verifying local properties of binaries such as loop counts and path infeasibility information. Using symbolic model checking on program binaries can avoid a major source of human error, and in turn strengthens the assurances on a WCET analysis.

We evaluated sequoll on the seL4 microkernel, a challenging target due to its non-preemptible design, resulting in long code paths to be analysed. We were able to automatically compute the majority of loops and found that almost all failures could
be avoided by the use of a more sophisticated memory aliasing analysis. We also validated several of the infeasible path constraints, gaining a 27% improvement in WCET, without trusting any user annotations.

We also used the Mälardalen benchmark suite, where sequoll computes 64% of the loop bounds from the binary alone, alias analysis being again the dominating limitation. However, some issues still remain on complex loops.

The speed of the ARM formalisation is problematic for larger programs, contributing to the majority of the computation time (although its results can be cached). Future versions of the ARM formalisation aim to improve its speed, however the construction within an LCF-style theorem prover inherently limits its performance. Work is under way to formalise the ARMv7 instruction set using a domain-specific language, which can be retargeted for different environments such as theorem provers and other analysis tools (Fox, 2012). Once this work comes to fruition, we can easily substitute the results into sequoll, or indeed any other formalisation.

Opportunities for future research directions include eliminating further sources of human error, improving memory alias analysis, and incorporating formally-proven invariants of the source code into the model. In the following chapter, we build upon the framework of sequoll and extend it to automatically detect infeasible paths.
Chapter 7

Automated infeasible path detection

The ideas and algorithms behind this chapter were partly inspired by conversations with Mark Liffiton, creator of the CAMUS algorithm. The integration of CAMUS into the WCET analysis and evaluation presented is entirely my own work.

7.1 Overview

Infeasible paths in WCET analyses are a source of overestimation and thus inaccuracy. Such paths arise when an abstraction of a program is too coarse, and can be eliminated by refining the abstraction to remove the infeasible paths. The process of refining the abstraction can be done manually, but this is often tedious and error-prone. In the WCET analyses performed in this thesis, a significant amount of effort was spent eliminating infeasible paths manually in order to eventually arrive at a feasible path. In the previous chapter, we demonstrated how the correctness of some infeasible path constraints could be validated using a model checker. While this helps to avoid errors introduced by manual annotations, it does not reduce the amount of developer effort required to construct the constraints.

There are two categories of infeasible paths eliminated from our WCET analyses: those that rely on knowledge of global invariants, and those which can be deduced through local reasoning. The first category can generally be identified quickly by a developer with an understanding of the code base, but is significantly more difficult to automate. This is because automatically deducing global invariants is computationally expensive—although some techniques exist to “guess” possible program
CHAPTER 7. AUTOMATED INFEASIBLE PATH DETECTION

```c
int f(int a) {
  if (a < 0)
    slow();
  else
    fast();
  if (a >= 0)
    slow();
  else
    fast();
}
```

Figure 7.1: A program with a typical “double diamond” control flow graph. There are two infeasible paths in this program as the if statements are mutually exclusive. This is not our motivating example.

invariants (Ernst et al., 2007). It is much easier to automatically detect infeasible paths which fall into the second category (i.e. due to local reasoning). It is these paths which we focus on in this chapter.

In this chapter, we present a method which automatically refines the abstraction used by IPET-based WCET analyses. We build upon Sequoll (Chapter 6) and its ability to reason about binaries. Instead of model checking, we utilise an SMT solver, and integrate the CAMUS algorithm for identifying unsatisfiable subsets within a system of constraints. This algorithm automates the process of eliminating infeasible paths by hand, speeding up computation of the worst-case execution time, as well as removing potential for human error.

The method we present has two key advantages over past approaches: (1) unlike many traditional abstraction-refinement techniques, this method is well-suited to IPET-based WCET analyses, as the structure of the infeasible paths found can be expressed precisely as integer linear equations; and (2) this method can detect infeasible paths attributable to the interaction of an arbitrary number of mutually unsatisfiable conditions, whereas some techniques are limited to only pairwise conflicts.
7.2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE

int f(int a, b) {
    if (a == 0)
        ...;
    if (a == b)
        ...;
    if (b == 1)
        ...;
}

Figure 7.2: Our motivating example: a program containing a “3-diamond”. Any two conditionals can be simultaneously satisfied, but all three cannot.

7.2 Motivating example

There has been a significant amount of past research on finding infeasible paths, especially for WCET analysis (described further in Section 7.6). Many algorithms are framed in the context of a common construction known colloquially as the “double diamond”. Such a case arises from two mutually exclusive conditional statements, such as the example shown in Figure 7.1. However, that is not our motivating example.

Instead, consider the program in Figure 7.2 with the control flow graph shown in Figure 7.3. No pair of conditionals in this program are mutually exclusive, however all three conditionals cannot be simultaneously satisfied. One distinct advantage of the approach presented in this chapter is that it generalises naturally to infeasible paths involving an arbitrary number of conflicting edges, such as those arising from \(n\)-diamonds. An infeasible \(n\)-diamond configuration consists of \(n\) conditionals such that any strict subset may be simultaneously satisfiable, but the set of all \(n\) conditionals are not.

7.3 Background

This section summarises the relevant background behind the implicit path enumeration technique used to compute worst-case execution time, and introduces the CAMUS algorithm developed by Liffiton and Sakallah (2008).
Figure 7.3: Control flow graph corresponding to the program in Figure 7.2, showing variables for the execution counts of each basic block and edge.
7.3. BACKGROUND

7.3.1 WCET computation by IPET

As described in Section 2.4.1, there are many approaches to computing the worst-case execution time of a program, each with their own advantages and drawbacks. Computing precise WCET on large programs executing on modern CPU architectures requires using abstractions of the program and/or CPU. The choice of abstraction selects a compromise between accuracy and scalability. Here, we only focus on refining the program abstraction, not the CPU.

We use the implicit path enumeration technique pioneered by Li et al. (1995) and implemented in Chronos (Li et al., 2007). Recall from Section 2.4.2 that IPET computes the WCET by viewing it as a linear optimisation problem. It formulates a set of integer linear equations where variables are used to represent the execution counts of each basic blocks, as well as each edge between blocks. The flow constraints from the control flow graph of the program are encoded as linear equations in an integer linear programming problem, as are the constraints on loop bounds.

In its primitive construction, the equations encode only the structure of the control flow graph and ignore the flow of any data through the program. It is entirely possible for a worst-case path found in this construction to be infeasible in practice, for example, because of conditional branches that cannot be satisfied. If the constraints which cause a path to be infeasible can be expressed as a linear equation, then we can add the equation to the ILP problem to exclude it. Note that not all infeasible paths can be expressed this way—for example, any constraint involving non-linear arithmetic.

In the remainder of this chapter, we use $b_i$ to both identify the basic block, and as a variable denoting the execution count when part of an equation. Similarly $e_{ij}$ identifies the edge from $b_i$ to $b_j$, as well the variable denoting the number of times that edge is taken.

Given our example in Figure 7.3, we can express the fact that all three conditionals are mutually unsatisfiable by the following equation:

$$e_{01} + e_{34} + e_{67} \leq 2$$

This equation states that the sum of execution counts of the three “true” edges in the CFG is at most two, therefore no path will take all three edges. Note that this expression is only correct if this fragment of the control flow graph only executes
CHAPTER 7. AUTOMATED INFEASIBLE PATH DETECTION

once (i.e. if it is not part of a loop). We address loops in Section 7.4.

7.3.2 Computing all minimal unsatisfiable subsets

Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers can be used to determine if a given set of constraints is satisfiable. Modern SMT solvers can reason about constraints expressed as formulae over booleans, integers, bitvectors, lists and more. If the constraints are not satisfiable, many SMT solvers simply return the unenlightening result “unsatisfiable”. However, some will endeavour to provide a smaller unsatisfiable subset of the original problem to explain why the problem is unsatisfiable, weeding out irrelevant information.

In the context of worst-case execution time, every edge of a loop-free control flow graph can be viewed as a boolean formula of the conditions that must hold for the edge to be traversed. By expressing a set of edge conditions to an SMT solver, it can answer if the edge conditions can be simultaneously satisfied. If not, the unsatisfiable subset can be used as an additional constraint to eliminate a class of infeasible paths.

A minimal unsatisfiable subset (MUS), or unsatisfiable core, is an unsatisfiable subset of constraints of which removing any individual constraint allows the others to be satisfied. A set of formulae may contain multiple MUSes, which themselves may be disjoint or overlap. The problem of finding MUSes has seen an increased interest recently due to its increasing importance in formal verification (Nadel, 2010). Two approaches have been proposed for finding all minimal unsatisfiable subsets (Bailey and Stuckey, 2005; Liffiton and Sakallah, 2008).

In this chapter, we apply the compute all minimal unsatisfiable subsets (CAMUS) algorithm developed by Liffiton and Sakallah (2008). The full details of the algorithm are given in their paper, however we will present a brief overview here to give an understanding of the limitations when applied to WCET analysis.

An MUS is closely related to the concept of a minimal correction subset (MCS). An MCS is a minimal subset of constraints in an infeasible constraint system such that when the MCS is removed, the remaining constraints are feasible. Each MCS is the set-wise complement of a maximal satisfiable subset (MSS)—a satisfiable subset of the constraints which cannot be expanded any further without making it unsatisfiable.
Let $\Omega$ be a collection of sets of elements from some domain $\mathcal{D}$. $H \subseteq \mathcal{D}$ is a hitting set of $\Omega$ iff every set within $\Omega$ is “hit” by an element of $H$—i.e. each set of $\Omega$ shares a common element with $H$. An irreducible hitting set of $\Omega$ is a hitting set where no element can be removed without losing the hitting set property. For example, let $\Omega = \{\{A, D\}, \{B, C, D\}\}$ (and our domain $\mathcal{D} = \{A, B, C, D\}$). Then $H_1 = \{A, B, C\}$ and $H_2 = \{A, B\}$ are both hitting sets of $\Omega$ but only $H_2$ is irreducible.

A duality exists between the MUSes and MCSes of an infeasible constraint system: every MUS is an irreducible hitting set of the set of all MCSes. Similarly, every MCS is an irreducible hitting set of the set of all MUSes. The CAMUS algorithm leverages this duality to compute all MUSes, by first computing the set of all MCSes (as the MCSes are easier to compute). Only once all MCSes are found can the MUSes be computed.

This method of construction gives rise to some challenges in managing the computational complexity when trying to compute MUSes. In particular, given a set of disjoint MUSes, the number of MCSes is the combined product of the cardinalities of each MUS—i.e. given the disjoint MUSes $\{M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n\}$, the number of MCSes is given by $|M_1| \times |M_2| \times \ldots \times |M_n|$. This is a worst case for the CAMUS algorithm as the number of MCSes grows exponentially with the number of MUSes.

The CAMUS algorithm builds upon an existing constraint solver. It searches for all maximal satisfiable subsets, giving all minimal correction sets as their complement, which in turn are used to compute all minimal unsatisfiable subsets as their hitting sets. The CAMUS algorithm has been applied to both boolean satisfiability (SAT) and SMT solvers. Our work builds upon the SMT implementation of CAMUS using the Yices SMT solver (Dutertre and de Moura, 2006).

### 7.4 Details

The outline of our algorithm is shown in Figure 7.4. Using the sequoll framework, we first precompute the edge conditions of every edge in the control flow graph. An edge condition is a boolean expression corresponding to a condition which must hold in order for that edge to be traversed. For example, the edge condition on $e_{34}$ from Figure 7.3 is $a = b$, and similarly for $e_{35}$ is $a \neq b$. As sequoll has transformed our program into SSA form (Section 6.4.4), all edge conditions relate to SSA variables, making them natural to express to an SMT solver.
CHAPTER 7. AUTOMATED INFEASIBLE PATH DETECTION

Using standard IPET techniques, we generate a set of integer linear equations which encode the structure of the control flow graph. This is generated using the Chronos tool (Li et al., 2007), as described in Chapter 3. As Chronos also models the instruction and data caches, the resulting ILP equations are more complex, but have the same inherent structure as produced by the standard IPET approach.

By solving the ILP equations, we obtain an assignment of values to our basic block

---

**Figure 7.4:** An outline of our algorithm
and edge count variables. From these values, we can reconstruct the path through
the program using an Eulerian path algorithm. Such a path is guaranteed to exist
due to the flow constraints for each node.

Given the longest path through the control flow graph, we can collect all edge
conditions of all edges on this path. This gives us our set of constraints which we
can then pass to the CAMUS algorithm. The CAMUS algorithm will return a set
of MUSes (which may be the empty set) corresponding to all sets of edge conditions
that are mutually unsatisfiable. Each such set describes a class of paths which are
infeasible.

If the CAMUS algorithm returns no MUSes, then the SMT solver is unable to find
any infeasible paths. In this case, there may still be infeasible paths in the control
flow graph, but these cannot be reasoned about using SMT. Such paths may arise
due to loops (discussed below), non-linear arithmetic, unresolvable memory accesses,
or invariants on the code which are not expressed to the SMT solver. If no MUSes
are found, we terminate and return the most recent worst-case path.

On the other hand, if the CAMUS algorithm returns sets of infeasible constraints,
we convert each set (MUS) into an equation and augment the existing ILP in order
to refine our abstraction. For example, consider the program listed in Figure 7.2,
with its control flow graph shown in Figure 7.3. Assume that the worst-case path
detected so far included the edges $e_{01}$, $e_{34}$ and $e_{67}$ (and possibly others beyond
the graph shown). The CAMUS algorithm would detect that these edges are not
satisfiable and return the single MUS \( \{e_{01}, e_{34}, e_{67}\} \). This can be converted into a
constraint of the form:

$$e_{01} + e_{34} + e_{67} \leq 2$$

In general, any such MUS on a loop-free control flow graph $M = \{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n\}$ can
be converted into an ILP constraint of the form:

$$e_1 + e_2 + \cdots + e_n \leq |M| - 1$$

We repeat the process again using the original set of ILP equations, augmented
with any constraints derived from MUSes, until no further MUSes are found. By
eliminating the class of all paths containing any MUS found, the ILP solver will not
find them on subsequent iterations, guaranteeing progress.
Now we have seen the general idea behind the algorithm, there are some details to be addressed.

**Loops:** The approach presented is intrinsically tied to loop-free control flow graphs. The reason for this limitation is two-fold: first, SMT solvers cannot natively reason about loops except by explicitly unrolling them, or by incorporating loop invariants (Leino, 2012); second, even if we could find infeasible paths across loop iterations, constructing a corresponding ILP constraint is difficult, if not impossible.

However, we can detect infeasible paths if they lie within a single iteration of a loop. Our approach considers each loop within a program separately. For each loop $L$ (a strongly connected component in the CFG), we select the edges that are contained in $L$, but are not a part of any nested loops within $L$. In the example CFG shown in Figure 7.5, there are two loops, one nested within the other. We consider the set of edges of the outer loop $\{e_{12}, e_{34}, e_{41}\}$, and the set of edges of the inner loop $\{e_{23}, e_{32}\}$. As we do not consider irreducible loops in our analysis, the nesting of loops is always well-defined (see Section 6.4.3).

Model checkers are better suited to exploring iterations of a loop, however any resulting infeasible paths may not be expressible as ILP constraints. One simple method to simultaneously overcome the limitation of loops in SMT solvers, and the
problem of constructing corresponding ILP constraints, is to (partly or fully) unroll loop iterations. We have not done so in our analysis, but this is an area for future work.

**ϕ-elimination:** In SSA representation, ϕ-functions (and the ϕ-variables to which they are assigned) are used to represent a value that depends on the path taken through the program. They are located at nodes in the control flow graph with multiple incoming edges. For example, Figure 7.6a shows part of a control flow graph where a ϕ-function is used. In the general case, the value of $x_4$ here depends on which incoming edge was taken. However, as our algorithm evaluates the feasibility of a specific path, we can transform the ϕ-function into edge conditions on the incoming edges, as shown in Figure 7.6b. This allows the SMT solver to track the variable through the path.

This process of ϕ-elimination actually gives rise to some of the “triple-diamond” scenarios described in Section 7.2 (although such scenarios can exist without ϕ-
elimination). To see how this arises in practice, consider the code in Figure 7.7. Any loop-free path that executes both lines 3 and 7 is infeasible. We have not shown the full control flow graph for this example, but there are three edge conditions in the infeasible set: \{a = x, c = a, c \neq x\}.

Curbing complexity: Due to the inherently exponential nature of SMT solving, and the exponential complexity of the CAMUS algorithm in the presence of multiple MUSes, we must choose our candidate edges to test with CAMUS carefully. For programs with longer paths (e.g. 200 edges), there may easily be 10 or more MUSes on a given worst-case path.

To reduce the complexity of finding these MUSes, we use the observation that conflicting edges are generally in close proximity. Given this, we use a small sliding window over the edges of the candidate path, and use CAMUS to find conflicts over smaller segments. The sliding window begins with a fixed initial size \(s_0\), and moves forward incrementally by \(d\) for each query to CAMUS, partially overlapping with the previous query. This detects many of the common conflicts quickly. The variables \(s_0\) and \(d\) can be tuned based on the efficiency of the SMT solver.

If no conflicts are found after the first pass with the sliding window, we repeat the process but increasing the size of the sliding window until it either contains an MUS, or covers the entire path (at which point we know the SMT solver has deemed the path feasible). In extreme circumstances, the SMT solver may take too long as it performs a computationally expensive search. In this case, the impatient user can abort the SMT solver. This construction gives a suitable anytime algorithm, where the result returned is valid even if interrupted by the user prematurely.

As an example, consider a worst-case path that follows the sequence of edges:

\[e_1, e_2, e_3, e_4, e_5, e_6, e_7, e_8\]

with an initial window size of \(s_0 = 4\), and increment of \(d = 2\). We first run CAMUS over \(\{e_1, e_2, e_3, e_4\}\), followed by \(\{e_3, e_4, e_5, e_6\}\), followed by \(\{e_5, e_6, e_7, e_8\}\). If no MUSes are found, we then expand to \(\{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_6\}\) and finally, \(\{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_8\}\).

Note that we may not find all MUSes along a specific path, but it is not necessary. For example, if a path contains one MUS with edges close together (close enough to fit within a small sliding window), as well as a second MUS where the conflicting
edges are far apart, we will only find the first MUS. This eliminates the path in
question (and any such paths containing the MUS) and guarantees forwards progress.
We may later encounter the second MUS on a different worst-case path and can
eliminate it then.

Using the sliding window technique, this approach can also be parallelised easily by
processing different fragments of the sliding window on separate cores or machines.

A further optimisation is to remove redundant clauses before applying the CAMUS
algorithm. Many paths often share the same edge condition amongst several edges.
In such cases, only one instance of the edge condition needs to be passed to the
SMT solver.

7.5 Evaluation

7.5.1 seL4

We demonstrate the applicability of our approach by applying it to a worst-case
interrupt response time analysis of the seL4 microkernel. This approach is used
for the analysis performed in Chapter 5, which searches for the path with longest
execution time within the seL4 kernel, beginning at one of the 125 non-preemptible
regions of the kernel, and ending at the exit point of the kernel. In essence, we are
running 125 separate WCET analyses—one for each entry preemption point, and
one for the entry point of the kernel.

Infeasible paths are detected in 45 of the 125 cases. Where infeasible paths are
found, our algorithm arrives at a feasible path after one iteration in 31 cases, after
two iterations in a further 14 cases, and up to 7 for the remaining 3 cases. In two
cases, it reduces the WCET automatically by 23% (from 17912 cycles to 13800)
using two iterations and 5 MUSes. The improvements in WCET for all 45 cases
where infeasible paths are detected are shown in Figure 7.8.

Our algorithm detects 252 MUSes when applied to seL4. Note that these are only the
MUSes required to identify specific worst-case execution paths as infeasible. Many
more may exist in the program, but they do not affect our WCET computation. Of
the MUSes found, 20% are a single-element MUS (an infeasible basic block), 44% are
pair-wise conflicts, 30% are 3-way conflicts, and 6% are 4-way conflicts.
In previous analyses (those presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), the process of identifying infeasible path constraints was purely manual. The paths eliminated were manually identified as infeasible because of either local constraints, or global kernel invariants. Our automated infeasible path detection only automates the former category, and as such the largest tangible benefit is the reduced human effort. This automation also made it feasible to perform the WCET analysis over all 125 preemption points.\footnote{Running 125 individual analyses manually was always theoretically feasible, but not a particularly exciting proposition for the author, and therefore unlikely to ever have happened.}

To compare the improvements over our manual analysis, we applied our algorithm to the kernel binary used in Chapter 4, with the infeasible path information that was validated in Chapter 6. The results are shown in Figure 7.9.\footnote{As we did not use cache pinning for this analysis, the numbers are slightly larger than those presented in Chapter 6.} Beginning with no infeasible path information, the reduction in WCET from our automated analysis is similar to what was obtained manually and previously validated by sequoll (“validated” from Figure 6.1), but with much less tedium. Our algorithm was unable to improve upon our best manual efforts to eliminate infeasible paths.

**Pairwise-conflict comparison:** We briefly explore the effectiveness of sequoll’s ability to find MUSes of size greater than 2. We found that for the main kernel entry point,
7.5. EVALUATION

Figure 7.9: Reduction in WCET (in thousands of cycles) through applying automated infeasible path detection. The baseline figure uses no infeasible-path information, while optimal is the best result achieved with manual annotations.

using only pair-wise edge conflicts gave a 4.7% improvement in computed WCET (compared with no infeasible path detection), whereas using \( n \)-way conflicts gave a 10.7% improvement. This difference indicates that eliminating infeasible paths with \( n \)-way conflicts can give notable improvements to WCET estimates.

7.5.2 Comparing CAMUS vs built-in unsat core

We can demonstrate the effectiveness of the CAMUS algorithm by comparing it with the single unsatisfiable core generated by our SMT solver (Yices 1.0.37). With either the CAMUS-generated MUSes, or the single “unsat” core provided by Yices, we are guaranteed to arrive at the same result, assuming that there are no bugs in the SMT solver.\(^3\) What we can evaluate is how much faster we arrive at a feasible path.

Applying the CAMUS algorithm to seL4 required 67 refinements of the control flow graph. In comparison, using the unsat core generated by Yices required 152 refinement iterations. However, the number of refinement iterations alone does not necessarily imply a faster result, as it does not account for the extra runtime of the CAMUS algorithm. Unfortunately, our implementation (for either approach) is far

\(^3\) We encountered one bug in Yices which caused it to crash on certain inputs. The Yices developers swiftly fixed this bug in the 1.0.37 release.
CHAPTER 7. AUTOMATED INFEASIBLE PATH DETECTION

<table>
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<th>Benchmark</th>
<th># conflicts</th>
<th># iterations</th>
<th>original WCET</th>
<th>new WCET</th>
<th>improvement %</th>
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<td>447116</td>
<td>447097</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Infeasible paths detected in Mälardalen WCET benchmark suite

from optimal in this regard, and as such it is difficult to quantify the difference between CAMUS and a single unsat core. As a data point, the seL4 analysis with the CAMUS algorithm ran for 3 hours and 45 minutes, whereas using the single unsat core took 5 hours and 15 minutes. However, due to our current overheads of running an SMT instance, these timing results are skewed in favour of CAMUS’ fewer iterations.

In the future, we plan to improve the implementation so that these can be more accurately quantified.

7.5.3 WCET benchmarks

We applied our algorithm to detect infeasible paths in programs from the Mälardalen WCET benchmark suite (Gustafsson et al., 2010). Like in our previous results in Section 6.5.2, we had to omit benchmarks using floating-point arithmetic, irreducible loops and recursion, due to lack of tool support. Due to shortcomings in our implementation we were also unable to analyse several other benchmarks.

We detected infeasible paths in four benchmarks, shown in Table 7.1. Depending on the benchmark, the number of infeasible paths detected and the improvement in WCET vary dramatically, and most have little impact. We note that although many of the benchmarks are single-path programs, they can still exhibit infeasible paths due to the abstractions used. Infeasible paths are much more likely in larger programs, where they can cause significant overestimation.

We see much larger improvements in seL4’s WCET than in these benchmarks because of the increased complexity of the code being analysed in seL4. The size and

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4 Due to implementation details, a C program encoding the SMT problem is compiled for each SMT instance. A sizable proportion of the execution time is spent in the C compiler. An optimised implementation would not incur these overheads.
structure of the seL4 code means that there are many infeasible paths which can be eliminated. For example, the repeated use of switch statements as described in Section 4.6 creates many infeasible paths which are detected and eliminated by our algorithm.

7.6 Related work

The issue of infeasible path detection in static analysis arises not only in the worst-case execution time domain, but also when generating test vectors (Ngo and Tan, 2008), detecting programming errors (Huuck et al., 2012), and in other general data flow analyses (Bodik et al., 1997). As such, there has been much research into finding infeasible paths. However, the domain of worst-case execution time analysis, and specifically using IPET-based analyses, places many limitations on what infeasible path information can be utilised. As such, not all techniques for finding infeasible paths are applicable to IPET.

Engblom and Ermedahl (2000) demonstrate how various types of flow information can be converted to equations suitable for IPET-based analyses. They divide a program into “scopes”, which are loop-free subsets of code, and express a number of different constraint types as ILP equations. These include the same construction we use for expressing conflicting edges. Their method also supports the ability to restrict constraints to specific loop iterations. They do not detect any constraints, but allow a user to provide these annotations more easily.

Suhendra et al. (2006) developed an algorithm to find infeasible paths for WCET analyses, based on detecting pairwise conflicts between assignments and conditional branches. Like our approach, they are also limited to finding such conflicts within loop-free CFGs, and thus treat each loop individually. As they only search for pairwise conflicts, their algorithm would not detect the case given in our motivating example.

Gustafsson et al. (2006a) have shown that abstract interpretation can be combined with symbolic execution to find infeasible paths. Their approach is able to detect paths with more than two conflicting edges, and is similarly limited to loop-free segments of code. Their evaluation was only on a single deterministic set of input values, whereas we are able to support unspecified inputs. Otherwise, their method shares many similarities with ours—they are limited by the reasoning ability of their
symbolic execution engine, whereas we are limited by the reasoning ability of our SMT solver.

The model-checking-based approach taken by Cassez (2011) to compute WCET inherently eliminates infeasible paths, as it is guaranteed to find a concrete worst-case (if the analysis terminates). However, the technique does not scale to programs the size of seL4.

Huuck et al. (2012) present a method to eliminate infeasible paths for reducing false positives in static analysis of source code. They use a model checker to identify a path to an error condition, compute a weakest precondition from the path, and use an SMT solver to test the validity of the precondition. If the SMT solver shows that the precondition is unsatisfiable, they augment the model with an “observer” which encodes the unsatisfiability information and eliminates the path from subsequent model checking runs. Their approach works on loops, as the loop is detected by the model checker, and unrolled inside the weakest precondition expression given to the SMT solver. However, the infeasible path information they detect cannot be incorporated into an IPET-based WCET analysis.

Banerjee et al. (2013) demonstrate a method to incorporate information from infeasible path analysis into the micro-architectural model of the system. They use a SAT solver to identify infeasible paths in parallel with the micro-architectural modelling phase in order to eliminate spurious machine states which arise due to the merging of paths in abstract interpretation, thereby reducing overestimation. This technique complements an existing infeasible path detection algorithm.

Our approach shares conceptual similarities with counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) algorithms for model checking (Clarke et al., 2003), which were later extended to software verification (Beyer et al., 2007). CEGAR-style algorithms use counterexamples to refine the abstraction of a system in order to arrive at a model with the required precision to solve the problem. Černý et al. (2013) have applied CEGAR-like algorithms to general quantitative properties such as WCET. They demonstrate automated abstraction-refinement schemes of cache behaviour, using standard CEGAR techniques for eliminating infeasible paths. Their approach does not however easily integrate into IPET-based analyses.
7.7 Summary

Eliminating infeasible paths is necessary to obtain good worst-case execution time estimates on large programs. We have demonstrated a method to automatically detect infeasible paths within a control flow graph using an SMT solver. We use the CAMUS algorithm for finding all subsets of mutually unsatisfiable constraints to speed up the detection of feasible paths, and have shown how to integrate CAMUS effectively in the context of infeasible path detection.

Our method can detect arbitrary sets of conflicting edges on a control flow graph. The information about infeasible paths can be easily integrated with an IPET-based WCET analysis. Being based on an SMT solver, it can detect more complex conflicts relations than other approaches.

We have evaluated our detection method by applying it to a worst-case execution time analysis of seL4, where we demonstrate that it can reduce the WCET estimate by 23%. By using the CAMUS algorithm, we can achieve these results with fewer iterations than using a single unsatisfiable core obtained from an SMT solver. We also significantly reduce the amount of labour, and potential for error, that arises from performing infeasible path elimination manually.
Chapter 8

A look at verification and performance

This chapter is based on work presented at APSys 2012 in which I was the primary author (Blackham and Heiser, 2012).

8.1 Overview

The majority of this thesis has focused on worst-case execution and response times, in order to provide temporal guarantees. However, overall system performance is still an important factor in system design. This chapter addresses the interaction between formal verification and the limits of code optimisation in higher level languages.

Code optimisation plays a large role in overall system performance. Systems designers must pay particular attention to the performance of typical workloads (i.e. average-case performance), as this directly impacts on power usage (and therefore battery life), latency, throughput, as well as the hardware cost required to meet design goals. Code that is shorter or faster can significantly improve performance across all these factors.

Targeted code optimisation has the greatest impact when applied to the common case. In many systems, this is often inner loops used for computation, or mundane but frequent tasks such as copying memory. In microkernel-based systems, the common case is message-passing inter-process communication (IPC). As a result, there has been a strong focus on improving the performance of IPC in microkernel-based systems (Liedtke et al., 1997; Gray et al., 2005).
CHAPTER 8. A LOOK AT VERIFICATION AND PERFORMANCE

Many microkernels achieve good performance by providing fastpaths for IPC, which can improve the performance of IPC operations by an order of magnitude. Fastpaths are created in order to perform a specific operation for the most common set of conditions. If any of these conditions do not hold, a fastpath reverts back to the standard code path through the kernel (referred to as the slowpath). A key property of a fastpath is that the kernel’s behaviour should be functionally identical with or without it.

The first L4 microkernels were coded entirely in assembly, in order achieve the best possible performance from the hardware (L4IMPL). Later versions such as Hazelnut, Pistachio and Fiasco were written in C or C++, however performance-critical sections such as the IPC fastpaths were still coded in assembly.

As assembly does not need to comply with any ABIs (other than at the system-call interface), more opportunities for optimisation are available. For example, all registers may be utilised, including normally sacred registers such as the stack pointer. By hand-crafting fastpaths for specific CPUs, authors can minimise pipeline stalls by careful instruction scheduling, avoid cache misses using strategic prefetching, and craft the control flow to minimise costly branches. Using these techniques, impressive IPC times have been achieved—e.g. 151 cycles on the ARMv5-based Intel XScale PXA255 (L4HQ) and 36 cycles on Itanium (Gray et al., 2005).

However, these results challenge maintainability and formal verification. Assembly code is generally more difficult to read, write and maintain; combined with the non-conformance to any standard ABIs, fastpaths are extremely fragile, requiring full knowledge of the system to confidently make any modifications. Even modifications of seemingly unrelated C code elsewhere in the kernel may impact upon the fastpath.

seL4 similarly has a fastpath which improves the performance of IPC by an order of magnitude.\(^1\) However the fastpath is written in C, as the verification infrastructure could only formally verify C code, not assembly.\(^2\) As a result, we expected a performance penalty, but estimated it to be less than 10%.

We have observed that modern C compilers for RISC architectures are becoming competitive with assembly crafted by a talented and skillful programmer. Using the

\(^1\) Efforts have also been devoted to improve seL4’s slowpath performance. This has reduced the gap between slowpath and fastpath performance, but it is still large enough to provide significant benefit.

\(^2\) Recently, researchers at NICTA have achieved formal verification of the assembly code from binaries compiled with –O1 and most of the binary compiled with –O2 (Sewell et al., 2013).
gcc compiler on ARM, we have been able to optimise the compiled machine code by modifying only the C source code.

We have improved the speed of the fastpath by 35% through tuning of the C code to aid compiler optimisations. Our fastpath is competitive with hand-crafted assembly, and with other microkernels on the same architecture. In this chapter, we explore various techniques for optimising the assembly output of the compiler by refining the C code used for IPC. We show that modern compilers can obtain almost all of the gains attainable with hand-optimised assembly, even for low-level kernel code. The key insight from this result is that formal verification, and the need to use higher level languages such as C, does not necessarily require compromising on performance.

### 8.2 Related work

The debate over the merits of optimisation in assembly code vs C (or other higher-level languages) dates back to the 1970s and continues on today (Hyde).

Clearly, a knowledgeable and talented assembly developer, given enough time and resources, can outperform a compiler. However there is the secondary issue of maintainability. One can argue that highly-optimised C code requires just as careful maintenance as an equivalent assembly implementation in order to preserve correctness and performance. We contend that a greater level of skill, knowledge and care is required to maintain an assembly version.

Whether compilers would ever catch up to the level of a talented assembly developer is an old question. Massalin (1987) investigated the idea of finding not just an optimised sequence of instructions, but an optimal sequence for a given loop-free construct. He wrote a brute-force compiler called a superoptimiser to exhaustively search for the optimal sequence. Given the exponential nature of the superoptimiser, it is limited to short sequences of code (a dozen instructions in Massalin’s work). However the technique has been applied to peephole-optimisations in standard optimising compilers (Bansal and Aiken, 2006).

Liedtke (1993a) states that a microkernel should place emphasis on IPC performance above all other considerations. Optimising for the most common case will clearly result in the largest gains and for microkernel-based systems that is the IPC path.

For the Pentium, MIPS and Alpha architectures, the inherent architectural costs of
IPC have been shown to range between 45 and 121 cycles (Liedtke et al., 1997). On the ARM architecture, IPC times as low as 151 cycles have been demonstrated on the ARMv5 Intel XScale PXA255 (L4HQ). Our experiments focus on the ARM1136 (ARMv6) CPU core, which has a deeper 8-stage pipeline. On this core, previous L4 kernels have achieved 206 cycles for a one-way IPC (Klein et al., 2009b).

Gray et al. (2005) describe their experience optimising the IPC fastpath for the Itanium processor, with a complex VLIW pipeline. They could reduce their IPC time from 508 cycles to 36 cycles by hand-optimising their assembly. Due to the complex VLIW-based pipeline, their compilers struggled to generate efficient code. Their initial attempt at a hand-crafted assembly path gained a 3x improvement over the compiled C version. Further refinements, through better instruction scheduling and eliminating pipeline stalls, resulted in an additional 4.7x improvement and their final 36 cycle one-way IPC. We believe that on simpler pipelines common to RISC architectures, modern compilers can achieve closer to optimal output.

### 8.3 Microkernel IPC

IPC is often provided in both synchronous and asynchronous forms, and seL4 is no exception. Synchronous IPC transfers a message only when both the sender and receiver are at a “rendezvous” point – specifically, the sender must be ready to send and the receiver must be ready to receive. This allows for a direct transfer of data from sender to receiver. On the other hand, asynchronous IPC does not require the coordination of threads, as messages are buffered in the kernel until the receiver is ready receive.

In L4-derived microkernels, synchronous IPC is typically provided by five basic primitives:

- **Send** is a one-way message transfer to another thread. The send will block until the recipient thread is ready to receive.

- **Wait** receives a message from any thread that is ready to send data to it, or blocks if no threads are ready to send.

- **Call** is a combined send and receive operation to another thread, and will run to completion or fail with an error. It is often used by a client to request an
8.3. MICROKERNEL IPC

- Are we only transferring data?
- Are we (not) responding to an exception?
- Decode address of destination
- Is the destination a valid endpoint?
- Is the endpoint ready to receive?
- Does the receiver thread have a valid address space?
- Can we schedule the receiver thread immediately?
- Can this endpoint be used for Call operations?

- Dequeue receiver thread from endpoint
- Block sender thread
- Copy message from sender to receiver
- Context switch to receiver thread
- Return to user

Figure 8.1: Anatomy of a fastpath Call IPC in seL4. Conditional checks are denoted by a ◆ symbol whereas actions and computations are marked with a □ symbol.

operation be performed by a server. These semantics guarantee to the server that it can respond without waiting or needing to buffer the response.

- Reply is a non-blocking send, used to a respond to a message received with Wait. If the sender had used Call, then it is guaranteed to be blocked and ready to receive the response.

- ReplyWait combines the effects of Reply and Wait together. This sequence is frequently used by servers, and in most cases allows for a direct context switch.

This synchronous IPC model is best suited to a priority hierarchy such that servers always have a higher priority than their clients. This allows both Call and Reply-Wait operations to directly transfer data and control flow from clients to servers and vice-versa, significantly improving IPC efficiency. As a result, optimising these two operations offers the largest benefit to real systems. The remainder of this chapter focuses on optimising these two synchronous IPC operations within the seL4 microkernel.

8.3.1 seL4’s IPC path

Anatomy of an IPC fastpath In many performance-critical applications, the focus of optimisation is commonly on tight loops found in computation kernels or memory
copying. However, in a microkernel-based system, the IPC path, unlike typical hotspots, has very few tight loops and is largely composed of conditional branches. This precludes many of the usual optimisation techniques.

Although there are a large number of branches, the majority of these handle exceptional circumstances. The most common scenario for a synchronous IPC, and the one that reaps the most benefit in optimising for, is where a thread A sends a message to a thread B, and:

- thread B is ready and waiting for a message;
- thread B can begin executing immediately under the current scheduling discipline; and
- no error conditions occur.

In such a case, we can pass control flow directly from thread A to thread B, copying the message directly between the two threads with no buffering.

There are numerous steps and checks involved in handling a common IPC operation in seL4, such as testing that all objects involved in the operation are valid and in the correct state for the fastpath. These are shown in Figure 8.1, denoted by a diamond. If any of the checks fail seL4 reverts to the slowpath. Assuming all the checks succeed, the fastpath can proceed to transfer the data and control to the new thread.

Figure 8.2 shows the performance difference between the slowpath and the fastpath in seL4—the fastpath is 5.6 times faster. Figure 8.3a shows the control flow graph of the slowpath and offers some insight into why it takes so much time to perform
8.3. MICROKERNEL IPC

Figure 8.3: Control flow graphs of the slowpath (left) and fastpath (right) of seL4. Each node in the graph is a basic-block or a call to a function. The shaded node in the fastpath leads into the slowpath.

precisely the same operation as the fastpath: it must handle all exceptional circumstances, which results in a larger cache footprint as well as incurring many branches and potential branch mispredictions.

Focusing on the common case, we obtain a fastpath with the control flow graph shown in Figure 8.3b. The shaded node represents a call out to the IPC slowpath. There are two loops to decode the address of the destination and to transfer the message data, identified by $L1$ and $L2$ on the loops’ entry nodes. A typical IPC in this fastpath would have almost no branching, except in the message copy. Even decoding the address requires only a single loop iteration in most systems. We use this fastpath as our starting point for further optimisation.
8.4 Optimisation techniques

There is a plethora of “collective wisdom” for optimising C code, often given as simple tips or rules which may allow a compiler to generate better performing code. These techniques should obviously not be applied blindly, as what performs better on some architectures may be detrimental on others. Additionally, many of these techniques, such as loop reversal and unrolling, are performed automatically by modern compilers.

Our improvements focused on using the gcc compiler (4.6.1), from Mentor Graphics’s CodeBench Lite 2011.09-69. We also evaluated our improvements with ARM’s own compiler (armcc 5.01).

The essence of our fastpath optimisation work is to analyse the compiled machine code from the C compiler and search for missed optimisation opportunities. Opportunities may arise in the form of pipeline stalls, redundant calculations, or suboptimal data packing. We found that almost all of these can be resolved by modifications to the C code which gave the compiler more scope for optimisation.

In doing this step-by-step comparison, we performed several simple optimisations which are commonly a part of the collective wisdom of optimisation, including:

- avoiding unnecessary use of char, short, and signed types to avoid superfluous sign-extension and zero-extension;
- avoiding unnecessary bit-masking, e.g. when it is known that unused bits will be zero;
- giving branch hints to achieve straight-line code for the common case;
- avoiding complex expressions which may result in many live registers, leading to stack spilling.

We also employed some lesser known techniques, described in the following sections, in order to assist the compiler. We note that even a “smarter” compiler could not have performed most of these optimisations automatically, as they depend on code invariants which cannot be detected by static code analysis.

One necessary optimisation for the fastpath was to ensure that all leaf functions were inlined, in order to avoid unnecessary branching. As both the Call and ReplyWait
fastpaths total around 120–130 instructions each, this does not result in a significant code bloat.

It is also interesting to note that sometimes individual optimisations would not result in any improvement in performance, as it could be masked by some other inefficiency. In several cases, gains were only seen after two or more complementary optimisations being applied together.

### 8.4.1 Avoiding pipeline stalls

The IPC fastpath is heavily control-oriented—there are many conditional branches to ensure the conditions for the fastpath are satisfied. Many of these branches depend on values loaded from memory, and form load-test sequences that create pipeline stalls.

For example, Figure 8.4 lists a portion of the seL4 fastpath that contains consecutive branches. Each test depends on loading a value from memory. The generated assembly code is shown in Figure 8.6. On the ARM1136, each load instruction (LDR) has a 3-cycle latency for its result. As the results here in r0 and r3 are required immediately, the CPU is stalled for two cycles after both loads.

With knowledge of the pipeline and the intent of the C code, a human can observe that the second load can be issued earlier. This speculative loading cannot be performed by the compiler, as there is no hint to suggest that it is safe to do so—the validity of the second pointer could depend on the result of the branch.

By “lifting” the load for the second memory access above the first branch, we tell the compiler that it is safe to issue the memory access earlier. This is shown in Figure 8.5. The compiler may still choose to defer the load until it is required. However in this case, the compiler can see the optimisation opportunity to avoid the pipeline stall, and has sufficient spare registers which can be utilised. The resulting assembly code in Figure 8.7 has only one stall cycle, saving three cycles off the execution of the fastpath.

In some cases this type of reordering may slow down a specific path through the code (e.g. if the value of a lifted load is never used because a branch is taken first). However, such effects are insignificant compared to the typical execution time of the slowpath, and it has a net gain on all other paths through a fastpath. We do not
see this effect in Figure 8.7 because the lifted load is inserted where the pipeline was already stalled.

We discovered many places where this simple optimisation could be used in the fastpath, giving the compiler more flexibility to schedule instructions.

It should be noted that lifting accesses may not always offer better optimisation opportunities to the compiler. Due to the possibility of pointer aliasing, a compiler is not always able to safely reorder a read and a write to memory, even if the developer knows it to be safe.\(^3\) Therefore, lifting a memory load may actually result in increased register pressure, so this optimisation should be used with care.

### 8.4.2 Optimised choice of constants

In the ARMv6 architecture, only certain constants can be loaded in a single instruction, without the use of literal loads (reading the constant out of memory). In particular, constants must be expressible as an 8-bit value, shifted left by an arbitrary offset, and optionally bitwise-negated.

One heavily used constant in seL4 represents an index into the virtual address space at which some per-address space data is stored. Changing this constant from \texttt{0xffe} to \texttt{0xff0} allowed this constant to be loaded immediately, avoiding a literal load, saving both cycles and cache-line usage off the fastpath.

### 8.4.3 Expressing memory layout

In seL4, the thread object is composite, formed of two smaller objects which are positioned adjacently in memory—a CNode and a thread control block (TCB), each 256 bytes. Thread objects are always aligned to their size (512 bytes). Often, seL4 is required to access the CNode given a pointer to the TCB. The address for the CNode was computed by clearing the 8th bit of the TCB address.

This can be optimised by instead of clearing the 8th bit, simply subtracting \(2^8\). By doing so, the compiler is made aware of the actual memory layout of these objects, which it could not infer when we only cleared the bit (it is possible that the bit may

\(^3\)Many compilers support \textit{strict aliasing}, which guarantees that pointers of different types will never overlap, however the possibility for aliases of pointers of the same type still exists. The \texttt{restrict} keyword can assist in excluding aliases in this case.
8.4. OPTIMISATION TECHNIQUES

/* Check endpoint is not in send state. */
endpoint = *endpointPtr;
if ((endpoint & 0x3) == 0x1) goto slowpath;

/* Check that the caller cap is valid. */
callerCap = *callerCapPtr;
if (callerCap == 0) goto slowpath;

Figure 8.4: An example of C code without lifting optimisation

endpoint = *endpointPtr;
callerCap = *callerCapPtr;
/* Check endpoint is not in send state. */
if ((endpoint & 0x3) == 0x1) goto slowpath;
/* Check that the caller cap is valid. */
if (callerCap == 0) goto slowpath;

Figure 8.5: Code with callerCap load lifted

ldr r0, [r4]
and r3, r0, #3
cmp r3, #1
beq slowpath
ldr r3, [ip, #-208]
cmp r3, #0
beq slowpath

Figure 8.6: Generated assembly without lifting optimisation

ldr r0, [r4]
ldr r3, [ip, #-208]
and r5, r0, #3
cmp r5, #1
beq slowpath
cmp r3, #0
beq slowpath

Figure 8.7: Generated assembly with callerCap load lifted
not have been set in the first place). In particular, it can optimise memory loads from the CNode given the TCB address by negatively-indexing the TCB address when performing the memory load. In ARM assembly, this can be expressed as `ldr r0, [r1, #-256]`, where `r1` is the TCB address. Although this only saves one cycle, it also reduces register pressure, allowing the compiler to use the register for other optimisations.

### 8.4.4 Usage of inline assembly

We use assembly code only for hardware-specific operations which cannot be expressed in C. As the IPC fastpath entails a context switch, it requires accessing CPU-specific registers which have no C equivalent.

On the ARM11, the kernel must change the page directory and address space identifier, flush any virtually-addressed caches\(^4\), clear the “exclusive monitor” (for synchronisation purposes) and return control back to userspace.

By utilising inline assembly instead of function calls to external assembly routines, the compiler is not constrained to use the C ABI at these boundaries. This allows for better register allocation, stack usage and alias analysis. As we inline all assembly routines, including the return to userspace, the resulting code has no branches in the case of a 0-length IPC.

### 8.4.5 Limitations of compiled C

Almost all of the optimisations that we were able to identify could be expressed equivalently at the C level. Some further optimisations required using assembly, yet did not give a measurable gain to the IPC fastpath. In particular, we were able to remove the need for a valid stack. This potentially saves several cycles, by avoiding unnecessary register loads and memory accesses, and reduces register pressure. However, despite removing all these superfluous instructions, the overall cycle count of the IPC fastpath was not reduced, as removing these instructions left bubbles in the pipeline where it was already stalled.

The register gained (sp) was not useful in the fastpath either, as there were already

\(^4\)On the ARM1136, although the L1 caches use physical addresses, the branch prediction unit uses virtual addresses and thus requires cache flushing on each context switch.
8.5 Evaluation

We evaluated the results of our optimisations by measuring the execution time on an ARM11 core on the Freescale i.MX31 processor. We used the performance monitoring unit to measure precise cycle counts for 160,000 iterations of a ping-pong benchmark between two address spaces. We computed the one-way IPC as half the average round-trip time. The results are shown in Figure 8.8.

The “theoretical limit” is what we would achieve if we could eliminate all unnecessary pipeline stalls in the existing assembly, assuming it is otherwise optimal. There are practical limitations to achieving this, but this number is a lower bound, given the design of seL4. The difference between “C-optimised” and “Asm-optimised” reflects
optimisations which could not be performed at the C level (e.g. discarding the stack and repurposing the stack pointer).

The best results were obtained using the gcc compiler. Although armcc often generates better optimised code than gcc, it was unable to optimise our fastpath as effectively. We found that this occurred for the following reasons:

- armcc did not order code optimally, despite hints using \texttt{\_\_builtin\_expect()}. As a result, there were 7 more branch mispredictions in the armcc version compared to the result from gcc. These mispredictions account for over 90\% of the difference between gcc and armcc fastpaths.
- armcc saves most registers onto the stack, as it does not use the noreturn attribute as a hint that it can be avoided. This contributes two extra cycles to the armcc-compiled fastpath.
- armcc’s inline assembler does not support the instructions to directly return to userspace. Instead, a call to an external function must be used. This contributes four extra cycles to the armcc-compiled fastpath.

We also measured the effect of compiling seL4 for ARM’s size-optimised Thumb instruction set. Thumb reduced the size of the compiled fastpath (in bytes) by 20\%, but increased the cycle count by over 80\%, as significantly more instructions were needed.

8.6 Discussion

Using optimisations at the C level has allowed us to reduce the one-way IPC times by 35\%. Using modifications to the assembly code, we were able to remove superfluous instructions, but we were unable to reduce the execution time further. Given our experiences, we claim that for heavily control-oriented code such as the fastpath, and for our register-rich RISC platform, human-guided compilers can achieve almost as good a result as hand-optimised assembly.

Our experiments were performed on a single-issue pipeline, common to many embedded systems. Multiple-issue (e.g. superscalar or VLIW) pipelines pose interesting optimisation challenges both for compilers and humans.
There may be situations where the compilers are not aware of (or are unable to generate) instructions that would lead to more optimised output. Inline assembly may be able to assist in some of these cases, whilst keeping the majority of the code in C.

**Optimisation effort**  We dedicated around two person-weeks of work to optimising the C fastpath. Like many optimisation efforts, we achieved the majority of our gains within the first 30% of the work, rapidly reaching the point of diminishing returns. We estimate that optimising an assembly implementation would require at least twice as much effort, and significantly increase the subsequent maintenance burden.

**Maintenance** There are two distinct aspects to maintaining code such as the fast-path: performance and correctness. One disadvantage of a C-optimised fastpath is that the performance is highly sensitive to changes in the compiler. Vigilant performance regression testing is required to ensure that the optimisation efforts do not bit rot.

However, we claim that C code is significantly easier to understand, and to maintain correctness of, than the equivalent assembly implementation. Changes to data structures are much easier to incorporate into C than in assembly.

**Portability** The majority of our optimisations do not target a specific architecture or compiler—they simply present further optimisation opportunities for the compiler. For example, if there existed a superoptimiser capable of scaling to produce optimal machine code for the fastpath, it too would be assisted by our optimisations.

**Verification** The IPC fastpath is a verified part of the seL4 microkernel—i.e. there is a machine-checked formal proof that it adheres to the functional specification and preserves all invariants within the kernel. By limiting our optimisations to the C code, we retain the ability to verify the fastpath.

**Cache layout** The majority of IPC benchmarks are focused on hot-cache performance. Ideally, all memory accesses are in the L1 cache, which on our platform can
be accessed in a single cycle. However, even for hot-cache performance, pathological memory layouts may lead to conflict misses and significantly degrade performance.

There are approximately 120 unique instructions executed by a one-way IPC, giving an instruction-cache footprint of 18 cache lines. Due to the compactness of the IPC fastpath, and the ease with which code placement in the microkernel can be manipulated, it is simple to avoid instruction-cache conflicts.

The data-cache footprint of the IPC fastpath is 22 cache lines. However, due to the nature of object alignment in seL4, there is very little entropy in the lower address bits of some objects. For example, a thread object in seL4 is \(2^9\) bytes, and a single way of the 4-way set-associative L1 cache on our processor is \(2^{12}\) bytes. This means that given two different threads in seL4, there are only three bits available that determine the possible cache lines for the thread object, greatly increasing the chances of cache collisions, even in hot-cache scenarios.

8.7 Summary

We have demonstrated that for heavily control-oriented code, it is possible to perform significant optimisations at the C level. Modern compilers are sufficiently advanced that they can recognise many optimisation opportunities. Where optimisations are missed by the compiler, it is often due to a lack of insight available to the compiler, and can be resolved through modifications to the C sources.

Using carefully guided optimisations on the IPC fastpath, we were able to attain all of the possible optimisations we could conceive without resorting to hand-crafting assembly code. On RISC platforms such as ours, the need to write fastpaths in assembly to get maximum performance is questionable when modern compilers can achieve similar results in C.

Although these are preliminary results on two specific code paths, we believe that the techniques here can generalise to hot code paths in both kernels and general userspace code. We also note that this approach is heavily used in the high-performance commercial OKL4 microvisor (Heiser and Leslie, 2010) and its derivatives to ease portability and maintainability.

Maximising the benefits of compiler optimisations often requires an intricate understanding of the details of the microarchitecture and closely inspect the generated
assembly code. This is no different to the depth of knowledge required to optimise
an assembly implementation. However, by performing optimisations at the C level,
we retain expressiveness, reduce maintenance overhead, and can make use of current
formal verification techniques.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 Summary

In this thesis, we have explored several aspects of building trustworthy mixed-criticality real-time systems. Mixed-criticality systems are a promising approach for reducing design and production costs by integrating mission-critical functionality with convenience features on the same CPU. In order to make such systems trustworthy, we need strong guarantees on both their functional and temporal behaviour.

We propose that a verified microkernel such as seL4 is well suited to fulfill these guarantees. The formal verification of seL4 ensures that the C source code, and also the compiled binary, behave as specified. Additional proofs also show that seL4 preserves integrity and confidentiality, guaranteeing that separated components cannot affect each other.

We have focused on complementing these functional guarantees with timing guarantees. Safe bounds on seL4’s interrupt response time allow hard real-time systems to be constructed on top of the seL4 microkernel, with unprecedented levels of assurance. To achieve this, we have investigated the worst-case interrupt response time of seL4, and explored what is required to make it suitable for a wider class of real-time systems.
9.2 Contributions

The contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows.

In Chapter 3, we adapted state-of-the-art tools to compute safe upper bounds on the WCET of the complete seL4 microkernel. This is the first such published WCET analysis of any protected general-purpose operating system kernel, and we believe it to be the largest code base on which a fully context-aware WCET analysis has been performed. The computed interrupt latencies were well over a millisecond—well beyond the acceptable limits for some real-time systems—thus raising the issue of how they could be improved.

We found that modifications to reduce the interrupt latency needed to be done with care in order to ensure the resulting kernel could still be formally verified. In Chapter 4 we explored how this could be achieved, and described the design principle of incremental consistency which simultaneously enables small bounded execution times and aids formal verification. Applying this principle to seL4, and guided by our WCET analysis, we managed to reduce the interrupt latency of seL4 by an order of magnitude, down to several hundred microseconds.

As many application domains require even shorter latencies, in Chapter 5 we explored the limits of how short the latency of a non-preemptible kernel such as seL4 could be made. To achieve this, we had to forgo the requirement of formal verification on seL4, but we maintained a design which was still amenable to reasonably comprehensive testing and analysis by avoiding concurrency. With some targeted improvements, we were able to reduce seL4’s interrupt latency by a further order of magnitude, to tens of microseconds. This satisfies the majority of hard real-time application domains, though there is still scope to reduce this further.

In the pursuit of computing safe bounds on seL4’s interrupt latency, we created a framework which could analyse compiled binaries in order to validate manual annotations used for the earlier WCET analyses. In Chapter 6, we presented the sequoll framework which used model checking in order to automatically compute the loop bounds of loops in the seL4 binary, as well as test the validity of some infeasible path constraints.

We further improved the utility of sequoll in Chapter 7, where we presented a technique to automatically detect infeasible path constraints. The resulting analysis method efficiently and effectively eliminated a substantial amount of human effort.
9.3 Future work

The ideas and results of this thesis integrate many different areas of research—that of formal verification, program analysis, real-time systems, kernel design, and program optimisation. The directions in which these lead are equally, if not more, diverse.

One area of improvement is the accuracy of our WCET analyses. As we have noted, some WCET analysis methods promise much more precise estimates, but scale poorly in the face of several thousand lines of code (such as the seL4 micro-kernel). Thus we used techniques with coarser approximations which provide better scalability in order to compute seL4’s WCET. There is scope to improve this by, for example, using precise model-checking-based approaches for computing basic blocks or even larger sections of code, and using scalable IPET-based solutions for computing the global WCET, as suggested by Huber and Schoeberl (2009). This is the most promising approach for tighter analyses of non-preemptible OS kernels, where the analysed code paths can be relatively long.

Another direction to improve the WCET analysis of a verified microkernel such as seL4, is to make use of formally-verified invariants in computing the WCET. In particular, many infeasible paths can only be detected with knowledge of global program invariants. Many of these invariants exist within the proof, but are not presently available to the WCET analysis. The sequoll framework lays down the foundations to support reasoning about these infeasible paths, using either model checkers or SMT solvers. A significant challenge is expressing the high-level invariants on abstract objects in terms of bytes, registers and memory words. Sewell et al. (2013) have recently shown how to compute a correspondence between C and
optimised machine code, thereby guaranteeing that the machine code maintains the high-level invariants. Their work may assist significantly in reusing the invariants at the machine-code level.

Following the formal verification thread, we could gain even stronger confidence in the timing guarantees of seL4 by also integrating time itself into a formal proof framework. At present, our timing guarantees are based on implementations of various algorithms. Although the algorithms and theories are considered sound, bugs in the implementation can easily undermine any such guarantees. Integrating WCET execution time into the formal proof is a logical progression for a high-assurance kernel. This idea has been explored by Fidge et al. (1997), who present a software development methodology where execution time is a first-class concept. There remain many hurdles and much effort required to realise this for a complex code base such as seL4.

From Chapter 5, it remains to be seen as to how small the worst-case interrupt latency (to userspace) of a non-preemptible kernel can be. Similarly, it also remains open as to what the worst-case interrupt latency of an equivalent fully-preemptible kernel would be. We propose that they could be within an order of magnitude, but a deeper analysis is required.

Finally, an aspect largely untapped by this thesis has been the extension to multi-core mixed-criticality real-time systems. As multi-core processors are becoming the norm, even on embedded hardware, multi-core mixed-criticality systems have become an active research area spanning a wide variety of issues including WCET estimation (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012), scheduling (Mollison et al., 2010), kernel design (Baumann et al., 2009) and formal verification (von Tessin, 2012). There are still many open problems in delivering high-performance and high-assurance systems on top of multi-core architectures.
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